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Editor’s Introduction:
Context and Comparison in the Age of ISIS
Michael Pregill
Public scholarship and addressing ISIS as media phenomenon
The Mizan initiative aims to address the pressing need to make
the expertise of scholars of Islam available to a wider public, particularly
by distributing original scholarship of contemporary relevance through
digital channels on an open access model (that is, free of all restrictions
on access and almost all on reuse).1 Undoubtedly, more conventional
scholarly publishing outlets, whether university presses or private
academic publishing houses, have achieved great success in utilizing
digital media, networks, and distribution systems to disseminate the
results of scholarly research more widely than was possible in the past.
However, the Internet, particularly social media, has also to a great
extent enabled the acute spike in Islamophobia and other forms of xeno-
phobic expression in America and Europe over the last decade.2 Mizan
aims at restoring the balance—to contribute to an improvement of online
discourse about various facets of Muslim culture, both historical and
contemporary, by making a range of material freely available on this
website, including the peer-reviewed, open access journal ofwhich this
essay is a part. We firmly believe that promoting sophisticated but acces-
sible scholarship aimed at a variety of audiences, addressing a variety
of subjects, provides an important service to diverse communities among
both scholars and the general public with an interest in the history, cul-
ture, and current developments in the Islamic world.
doi: 10.17613/qdyh-pc18 Mizan 1 (2016): 3–39
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Given Mizan’s mandate to deploy scholarly expertise to illuminate
events and phenomena pertaining to Islamic cultures, communities, and
traditions—especially through analysis that provides historical context
and fosters comparative inquiry—it has seemed particularly appropriate
to devote our first issue to the subject ofThe Islamic State in Historical and
Comparative Perspective. This is first and foremost due to the massive
media profile of the ISIS movement, which combines features of an insur-
gency, terror network, and nation-state (at least aspirationally), with its
ideology adroitly disseminated by an effective public relations machine
skilled at exploiting both traditional and social media— particularly with
gruesome acts of violence manipulated as political theater. ISIS’ succes-
ses, both on the ground and as a media phenomenon, have catapulted
it into the global spotlight, and its continuing cultural prominence calls
for responsible scholarly commentary.
We have also felt that it is urgent to devote our first issue to analysis
of the ISIS movement because of the specific nature of its ideology and
claims, which reflect a complex, contentious, and highly problematic
relationship to Islamic history and tradition—as demonstrated, for exam-
ple, by its flag, which appropriates the image of the seal of the Prophet
Muḥammad. ISIS appeals directly to the worldwide Muslim public by
claiming to have revived the Sunni caliphate of old, positioning itself as
the sole legitimate political and religious authority for the global Muslim
community. Despite this claim to universality, the movement paradox-
ically rejects the communitarian ideal traditionally espoused by Sunnis
in favor of a puritanical perfectionism; further, it unhesitatingly sanc-
tions acts of extreme violence against fellow Muslims whom it deems to
be apostates, heretics, or infidels—a posture typically associated only
with the most radical sectarian formations within the Islamic fold. Claim-
ing to represent true historical Islam, ISIS thus presents a lethal threat
to any and all voices ofdissent, while simultaneously reviving a wholly
anachronistic vision of a jihad state based on conquest and domination,
its military successes supposedly validating claims of divine favor and
moral rectitude as they once did for caliphs who lived over a thousand
years ago.
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Some efforts to analyze the rise of ISIS and particular aspects of its
ideology, especially its claim to revive long-forgotten but essential aspects
of Islam, have been controversial specifically because of the problem of
authenticity. What qualifies ISIS, or any other movement that seeks to
mobilize elements of Islamic tradition for political ends, to justifiably
claim to be a genuine revival of the caliphate or any other traditional
Islamic institution? What position should a responsible scholar take vis-
à-vis such claims? Are these assertions, however anachronistic or ano-
malous, as valid as those of any other group, given that scholars have
long been accustomed to emphasizing that Islam is not a monolithic
thing, but rather must be understood as a plurality ofdiverse and some-
times contradictory ideas and practices?3 Or is the scholar obligated,
particularly on moral grounds, to refute ISIS’ claims as not only illegit-
imate but actually un-Islamic?
A major factor in such considerations is ISIS’ almost unprecedented
perpetration of startling acts of violence, overshadowing those ofmost
terror organizations that previously enjoyed widespread media attention
in ferocity and scope (except, perhaps, for the attacks committed by Al-
Qa’idah against the United States on September 11, 2001). The persistence
and brutality of ISIS’ field campaigns and oppression of conquered popu-
lations in Iraq, the regularity of terror attacks in the West committed in
its name over the last two years, and its gloating revival of slavery and
calculated attacks on cultural heritage sites in the territory under its
control have earned it a degree of infamy dwarfing even that ofOsama
bin Laden or the Taliban, whose strategy and tactics now seem, depres-
singly enough, far milder in comparison, and their ideology far less per-
nicious. While the Taliban and Al-Qa’idah compelled both scholars and
spokespeople for the moderate Muslim majority to relativize their ata-
vistic fundamentalism and global jihadism as marginal and aberrant,
ISIS’ commission of sadistic atrocities inspires even more energetic dis-
avowals, provoking the question ofwhether some conceptions of Islam
are so extreme as to be beyond the pale ofwhat can justifiably be called
Islam at all.
At least for a time, ISIS had significant success in recruiting fighters
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to join its ranks in Iraq and Syria, primarily through its deft manipulation
of social media to disseminate its slickly produced propaganda.4 However,
one might argue that this propaganda, projecting horrific imagery that
seems to play on the world’s collective nightmares about Islamist vio-
lence, has had an even greater impact in triggering extreme reactions
from both government and populace in various Western countries. The
recent rise to prominence of far-right groups and spokesmen throughout
Europe and even America—where the formerly mainstream Republican
Party has recently begun to openly indulge white supremacist, Christian
Identity, and ethnonationalist constituencies to an unprecedented degree
—has been encouraged by ISIS’ visibility in the media landscape. ISIS’
propaganda is clearly tailored to play upon Western fears of an imminent
Islamic threat, seemingly confirmed by sporadic terror attacks in Euro-
pean and American cities—even though the bitter truth of the matter is
that the victims of ISIS’ terror campaigns are disproportionately Muslim
by a very wide margin, their attacks on various communities in the Mid-
dle East having been vastly more devastating. Provocation of extreme
responses in Europe and America—encouraging the perception of a state
of ineluctable hostility between not only the West and the Islamic State
but also majority populations and their Muslim minorities— may actually
at this point be the primary function of the material generated and cir-
culated by the ISIS propaganda office.
In the context of ever-escalating nativist and ethnonationalist rhe-
toric in Europe and America, it is disheartening to find voices in both
traditional and new media claiming that ISIS is not marginal or anomalous
at all, but rather epitomizes Islam—a claim that has provided significant
traction and advantage in political campaigns for some organizations,
even some in the mainstream, while also placing Muslim minorities at
real risk of violence, not to mention providing justification for state-
sponsored policies of discrimination and surveillance. ISIS’ persistent
claims that its operation has revived the traditional model of the caliphal
jihad state, including a number of long-abandoned practices, while repu-
diating virtually all of the common adjustments to modernity found in
most contemporary Muslim communities worldwide, encourages pole-
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micists’ grotesque portrayal of the movement as ‘real’ Islam, and ‘real’
Islam as something essentially un-modern, uncivilized, and medieval.
Thus, for many scholars and spokespeople, it is not rejecting the
actual practices and ideas associated with ISIS that is the problem, for
even the most conservative Islamic state actors and community spokes-
men throughout the world have not hesitated to disavow it completely.
Rather, the problem is how to responsibly describe ISIS, for when craven
fearmongers claim that it represents not an outlier but the very essence
of Islam, it can be all too tempting to simply reject ISIS as a total aber-
ration that has nothing whatsoever to do with ‘real’ Islam, and sweep
the problematic implications of such categorical disavowal under the
rug. It was exactly this tendency towards disavowal that Graeme Wood
sought to address in his much-discussed piece for The Atlantic, which
sought to locate ISIS in an overarching trajectory of contemporary Jihadi-
Salafi thought with recognizable, albeit problematic, roots in certain
aspects of the classical and medieval Islamic mainstream.5
The controversy raised by Wood’s piece and other discussions of
the ISIS phenomenon inspired a panel discussion on April 23, 2015 at
the Pardee School for Global Studies of Boston University, “Interdiscipli-
nary Approaches to the Islamic State.” The papers from that panel
provided the kernel of this, the first issue ofMizan: Journal for the Study
ofMuslim Societies and Civilizations. The need for nuanced, balanced, and
sensitive discussion of critical issues pertaining to the background, ideo-
logy, and propaganda of the Islamic State has only intensified over the
last sixteen months, particularly in the lead-up to the American presi-
dential election. This issue seeks to address that need, at least in some
small way.
Approaching ISIS in broad comparative perspective
The visibility of ISIS, as well as the varied political and media res-
ponses to it in both the Western and the Islamic world, demands that
scholars interrogate the complex intersections of historical memory
(and amnesia), identity, religion, and politics that constellate in its claims
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and actions. The articles in this issue ofMizan deal, for the most part,
with analysis of primary texts associated with ISIS, especially its propa-
ganda magazine Dabiq. In addition, some of them deal with aspects of the
varied responses to ISIS and its claims. None of them deal with the scat-
tered instances of small-scale coordinated terror attacks in Europe in
2015 or 2016, or with the so-called ‘lone wolf’ or ‘wannabe’ attacks perpe-
trated in the United States by individuals with no tangible connection
to ISIS through conventional networks, yet who have justified acts of
violence by claiming ‘inspiration’ by the movement or pledging allegiance
to it. However, it is important to take note of these attacks, at least in
passing, for they have given right-wing parties in both Europe and Ame-
rica the most fodder for ethnonationalist rhetoric, often taking on con-
spicuously racist, chauvinist, and imperialist forms that at times evoke
not only traditional nationalist tropes, but also triumphalist Christianity.
This has been particularly true in America, where Republican candidates
for office have made implicit or explicit appeals to evangelical support
on the one hand, and exploited the now-shopworn tropes of the post-
9/11 security state on the other, sometimes combining them in curious
and provocative ways.
It is clear that scholars have a responsibility to subject these pheno-
mena to analysis of a comparative or contextualizing sort, particularly
in the classroom or in public outreach settings, where opportunities to
correct fallacious or pernicious misconceptions abound. For example, a
logical fallacy we commonly encounter in media discussions of Islam is
the tendency to absolutize it as essentially violent or essentially peaceful.
Not only are religions as abstract concepts incapable of being aggressive
or peaceable, of course, but even when we speak ofMuslims as individuals
and communities possessing full human agency, to attempt to charac-
terize all Muslims as having one or another personal quality, political
orientation, or moral disposition is, of course, ludicrous. Rather, as is the
case with all religions, the textual and traditional sources of Islam offer
rich resources for believers to articulate diverse positions.
Some of those positions have been more typical and deemed norma-
tive by consensus than others, to be sure. However, we must surely ack-
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nowledge that tradition does provide a symbolic language to Muslims
who seek to tighten the definition ofwho the real members of the com-
munity are, and thus supplies pretexts for fostering violence against
those within the community who disagree with them. But insofar as such
an insight implicitly challenges the position that ISIS has nothing to do
with Islam—admittedly a farfetched claim—it is also useful to apply this
insight more broadly, in seeking comparanda beyond the boundaries of
Islam. Something that contemporary American polemicists fail to under-
stand—or refuse to recognize—as they typify Islam as violent and Chris-
tianity as peaceful is that neither characterization holds up to close
scrutiny. No religious tradition—or its all-too-human practitioners—can
successfully avoid the extremes; no community on earth fails to encom-
pass every human behavior possible. This is hardly an abstract obser-
vation; rather, direct historical evidence shows this to be true.
In my article in this issue ofMizan, I draw a direct parallel between
the millenarian doctrine promoted in ISIS propaganda and that of a much
older Islamic movement, that of the Fatimids, a Shi’i group that estab-
lished a powerful caliphate that dominated North Africa and the Eastern
Mediterranean for two hundred years. The similarities between the
Fatimids and ISIS are striking, and this comparison is especially useful
because of the distinct differences between them—separated by a thou-
sand years, each arose under completely different political circumstances,
the former as one ofmany radical Shi’i groups fostering rebellion against
standing Sunni authorities, the latter as an offshoot of the Iraqi insur-
gency that draws on specific trends in late twentieth century ideologies
of political Islam (especially the militant posture of contemporary Jihadi-
Salafi groups).
But there have been numerous Islamic movements that espoused
millenarian ideas in support of statebuilding projects like those of the
Fatimids and ISIS—including the Abbasids, the classical form of the
imperial caliphate par excellence; the Almohads, who dominated North
Africa and Spain in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and, it seems,
the early Muslim community under Muḥammad himself. The apparent
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recurrence not only of apocalyptic but of apocalyptic specifically har-
nessed as a political ideology in Islamic tradition is a phenomenon that
merits considerably more analysis. However, it must be emphasized that
the exploitation of expectations ofmillenarian deliverance specifically
as a means of legitimating an extreme sectarian position and violence
against outsiders in the hopes of achieving a radical reconfiguration of
society (or the world) has not been the exclusive purview of Muslim
groups throughout history.6
For one thing, in their era, Islamic groups such as the Fatimids were
hardly alone in embracing apocalypticism or claiming a millenarian role
for their dominion. As Holland deftly demonstrates in his sweeping his-
tory of Europe and the Mediterranean in the tenth and eleventh centuries,
Christian powers were repeatedly gripped with apocalyptic fervor at this
time, and numerous statebuilding and imperial projects presented their
military and political activities as hastening the coming of the Kingdom
ofGod and the End Times. Holland’s account shows that as the Millennium
approached (whether interpreted as the thousand-year anniversary of
Christ’s birth or that of his resurrection instead), various regimes and
potentates found the temptation to endow their claims to authority and
pretexts for expansion with the halo of the numinous (and the inevitable)
simply irresistible, and did so by smearing their opponents as Antichrist
and presenting their own rule as hastening the Second Coming.7 It is also
noteworthy that at least some contemporary scholars have begun to
emphasize the role of religiously sanctioned violence in the spread of
Christianity in Europe, particularly during the Carolingian age, during
which time Christianity was forcibly imposed upon Germanic and Nordic
populations.8 One recent attempt to demonstrate that this policy of
aggressive subordination of pagans was a direct borrowing from Islam
by Charlemagne himself has now been decisively refuted; there were
ample factors present in Christian Frankish culture to account for the
Carolingian ‘jihad’ as an internal development without, in effect, blaming
it on Muslim ‘influence.’9
The irony in all this is palpable. The creation of Europe as we know
it—geographically, culturally, politically—was arguably the result of a
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sequence of struggles at least partially inflected by millenarian beliefs,
and indisputably the result of spreading Christianity by the sword. By
contrast, a thousand years later, ISIS seek to unravel and ultimately erase
the idolatrous legacies of European modernity—with its false gods of
liberalism, tolerance, and church-state separation—by once again heral-
ding the imminent advent of the apocalypse. But in doing so with the
twin instruments of coercive violence and apocalyptic ideology, ISIS is
not tapping into Islam’s medieval legacy; if anything, it is mirroring the
troubled origins ofChristian Europe.
Some might argue that the millenarianism and compulsion that
marked medieval imperial projects in Europe were aberrant, not typical
of or essential to ‘real’ Christianity. It is certainly extremely common to
find ideologues drawing a negative comparison between Christianity
and Islam on the basis of the contrast between the pacifism of Jesus on
the one hand and Muhammad’s supposed resort to the sword on the
other—the image of the founder thus supplying the ideal that defines
the faith, however disparate the realities might be.10 It may otherwise
be argued that the appeal to apocalyptic and messianic rhetoric, or the
resort to compulsion in the spread of Christendom, was superseded by
the more enlightened and secular ideologies that motivate the political
and military agendas ofWestern nation-states today. This is the crux of
the common polemical claim that Islam remains backward and medieval
while the West has progressed into modernity, despite the actual decline
in secularism (at least in the United States)—the outlook that supposedly
marks the absolute criterion of difference between a regressive Islam
and Western modernity in discussions of Islam’s need for ‘reformation.’
However, it is not difficult to find contemporary Western analogues to
this ‘medieval’ aspect of Islam as well.
For one thing, in the eyes ofmany Muslims, Western colonialism
and imperialism have a distinctly religious aspect to them, even ifmany
Europeans and Americans would disagree. The common denial of the
association ofChristianity with projects ofdomination, political expan-
sion, slavery, even genocide, cannot withstand critical scrutiny; decades
ofdeconstruction of the Bible and its use to promote such agendas pro-
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vides ample evidence that the facile distinction between an Islam that is
at its root diminished and invalidated by its association with the sword
and a conveniently depoliticized Christianity simply does not hold up.11
This perspective is worth considering because some scholars and
critics have suggested that the foreign policy of the powerful Western
democracies in the twenty-first century, in particular the so-called War
on Terror prosecuted by the United States and allies like the United King-
dom, displays aspects of the very apocalyptic millenarianism that is
supposedly eschewed by the modern secular state—and that America
supposedly seeks to combat in ISIS.
Northcott’s study An Angel Directs the Storm offers a potent critique
of the messianic underpinnings of the War on Terror during the Bush
administration: the apocalyptic imperialism that shaped policy; the anti-
democratic drive to consolidate power in the hands of the executive
branch to support an absolute struggle against America’s enemies; and
the relentless expansion of a frontier marked by violent confrontation
that continues to justify keeping America on a perpetual war footing
today. Northcott argues that the administration played on a new inter-
pretation of the Christian “Kingdom ofGod” as a divinely-ordained mis-
sion in pursuit of global hegemony, one that was secular in orientation,
at least on the surface, but that drew on ancient and perennially effective
appeals to Christian triumphalism.12
Northcott’s work complements Lincoln’s compelling study of the
use of religion in American political rhetoric at the outset of the War on
Terror. Lincoln’s analysis of the speeches ofOsama Bin Laden and George
W. Bush on October 7, 2001 reveals the deep religious subtexts of both;
in particular, Lincoln’s deft deconstruction exposes Bush’s subtle appeal
to evangelical Christian supporters through carefully coded evocations
of eschatological, providential, and messianic concepts.13 Given the tragic
history ofAmerican military interventions into Muslim societies in the
last fifteen years, the rhetoric of a millenarian caliphate like ISIS, with
its clear goal of legitimating state violence, is in the final analysis not so
different from the neoliberal messianism used to authorize contemporary
Western imperialism and state terror—enabling the paradoxical claim
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to safeguard the world for freedom and democracy through bombing
campaigns, drone strikes, and military occupation.
The millenarianism of official organs of the American state is at
most only implicit: Lincoln is at pains to point out that the evangelical
messaging embedded in Bush’s speeches was carefully telegraphed to
supporters sensitive and sympathetic to it, but remained covert in order
to avoid openly promoting such ideas, since this would have corroded
the administration’s legitimacy in the eyes of secular-minded Americans.
However, other elements in the American political system, particularly
Republicans less concerned with alienating the secular mainstream and
more concerned with securing the support of the evangelical base, have
in recent years come to a more or less open embrace of apocalypticism.
Thus, in spring 2015, former Representative and Tea Party activist Michele
Bachmann (R-MN) gave multiple interviews to right-wing Christian media
outlets opining that the Rapture was imminent, a direct result of the
Obama administration’s impending nuclear deal with Iran, as well as the
advances made toward the universal legalization of gay marriage in
America.14 This can hardly be considered a fringe tendency when such
ideas are openly espoused by members ofCongress or the surrogates of
contenders for a major party nomination for candidacy for the American
presidency, seeking to stoke evangelical support by promising a quasi-
messianic return to a theocratic utopia should their candidacy prove suc-
cessful.15
In this, the Tea Party appears to be as conspicuously sectarian as
ISIS—if perhaps ultimately less successful in establishing itself as a major
player in national or international politics. It may be easy for many Amer-
icans to dismiss these ideas as fringe and unworthy of serious attention
in comparison to those parallel views which seem to have had much
greater impact in inspiring ISIS. But one cannot ignore the fact that such
political millenarianism has traction for certain constituencies under
certain political circumstances, and that the success of one group and
the marginality of another may be determined, in the final analysis, by
differing material, political, and social conditions—and not much else.
Millenarian views may not be as widespread in America as they are in
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Iraq, but they certainly are widespread; that a fringe apocalyptic group
has not seized control of the United States government as ISIS has sought
to wrest control of Iraq from the current regime surely reflects America’s
economic prosperity, institutional stability, and the continuing durability
of its civil society, and not an intrinsic immunity to extremist belief
systems grounded in a selective reading ofaspects of its majority religion.
One might argue that when American politicians make explicit
religious appeals to their supporters, they are simply playing to the
heavily millenarian belief system openly embraced by Christian evan-
gelicals, including the religious or quasi-religious Zionism that is a main-
stay of contemporary Republican ideology. Promoting this worldview
also has the felicitous benefit of exploiting a kind ofManichaean belief
in a world dominated by the struggle between good and evil; this has
clear utility as a form ofpolitical theater that plays well in the American
media and appeals to a certain demographic. But reducing this to mere
theater or propaganda in no way reduces the validity of comparison with
ISIS: we know nothing of its leaders’ convictions, only what forms of rhe-
toric seem to have appeal for their supporters and the types ofdiscourse
that prove effective for recruitment.
Moreover, the embrace of a radical dualism that reduces problems
to a fundamental, even cosmic, struggle between good and evil is espe-
cially beneficial for an opposition group that is primarily concerned with
harnessing anti-establishment hostility to promote their agenda, and is
for the most part largely unconcerned with the pragmatic considerations
of actual governance.16 The simplistic ideology of ISIS that flattens the
world, rendering the complexities of global politics into a struggle
between a pure Muslim elite and a host of threats from both insiders and
outsiders, is much more effective as a recruiting tool for a disillusioned
and alienated fringe of Muslim society—especially individuals already
prone to violence—and much less effective as an ethos that can sustain
a stable statebuilding enterprise. This is equally true for the Christian
dualism evoked by some American politicians, similarly grounded in end
of the world fantasies; it is far easier to blame a complex, chaotic world
on outsiders or diabolical forces than it is to confront the public with
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uncomfortable truths about problems that require resourcefulness and
complex, difficult solutions.
This is precisely why the right wing in American politics that em-
braces millenarianism stridently denies the reality of climate change,
insofar as this is an explanatory mechanism for global problems that is
not only grounded in science (and not the supernatural) but that calls
for accountability on the part of citizens and institutions alike. Insofar
as the problems at hand have been caused by our own overconsumption,
overpopulation, and overtaxing of the world’s limited natural resources,
with corporations and public institutions entirely complicit in making
the problems worse, a Manichaean-style dualism is hardly adequate for
coming to grips with the problem in a realistic fashion.17 Here we come
full circle, for the Syrian political crisis that led to the country’s decline
into civil war in 2011—and thus enabled the rise of ISIS—was allegedly
preceded and triggered by a climate-related crisis, stemming directly
from the unrest and instability that were repercussions of a drought that
wracked the country from 2006 to 2009, displacing hundreds of thousands
of people and causing millions of livestock animals to perish of starvation
and thirst, abandoned by farmers who had no choice but to flee to already
overcrowded and overtaxed urban areas.18
Further, one can hardly maintain that ‘radical Islam’ has a monopoly
on the use of divisive language of radical ‘othering’ such as we observe
ISIS using in its propaganda, designed to legitimate the oppression and
victimization of its fellow Muslims. British Prime Minister David Cam-
eron’s reference to ISIS as a “death cult” was admirably motivated by a
desire to distance the extreme acts of the movement from ordinary Mus-
lim citizens—essentially operationalizing the critique of ISIS as beyond
the pale of true Islam as an aspect of public relations and government
policy. But the invocation of the language of ‘cult’ specifically is ironic
given the background of this term in historical Euro-American responses
to alternative religious formations, particularly movements that tend
towards more extreme expressions of eschatological fervor. Scholars of
religion no longer use ‘cult’ as a reliable descriptive term; rather, it is
now widely recognized as a political construct intended to mark a group
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not only as deviant but subject to extreme sanction by government
agencies (the Branch Davidians ofWaco being the most obvious example).
The language of ‘terror’ serves much the same purpose.
While American and British administrations may mean well in seek-
ing to delineate ‘real’ Islam from deviants who commit violence in its
name, the disquieting consequence is that the state takes on the respon-
sibility of arbitrating in such matters, arrogating to itself the role of
deciding which forms of religiosity are or are not legitimate—with life
and death often literally hanging in the balance. Just as ISIS uses coded
language to mark Shi’ah and noncompliant Sunnis as infidels whose blood
can legitimately be shed, the use of the language of ‘cult’—especially
‘death cult’—seems tailored to prepare the public for absolute war against
the implacable evil of ISIS, without regard for the potential cost in civilian
casualties. (Ironically, the relentlessly apocalyptic vision presented by
speakers at the Republican National Convention in July 2016 prompted
one commentator to characterize the Republican Party itself as a kind
ofdeath cult.19)
Exposing the historical connections between Christianity, ideologies
of imperialism and triumphalism, and the fostering of discursive and
bodily violence against various ‘others’ is hardly necessary to establish
a moral basis for objecting to such positions. But it is perhaps important
to explicitly articulate that the historical and contemporary association
of Christianity with empire-building and the legitimation of violence
does not constitute a refutation of Christian principles as expressed by
the majority of Christians, let alone justify marginalizing people who
embrace its tenets. It is self-evident, even banal, to note that the same
consideration should apply to Muslims. But even-handed approaches to
and representations of Islam continue to be frustratingly elusive in the
current American political environment, in which calls for the closing
of the borders to Muslims and even oaths of loyalty and “shari’ah bans”
have come from some of the most high-profile politicians associated with
the Republican Party.20
Another irony emerges here, for the political discourse and strategic
communications that have emerged around the Republican candidate
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for president in the 2016 campaign mimics that of ISIS in disturbing ways.
Donald Trump’s campaign—and Republican cadres in general—seek to
mobilize support among right-leaning constituencies through indulging
in extreme nativist and xenophobic rhetoric. They present a worldview
in which such supposedly distinctly American values such as freedom
and democracy are wholly incommensurable with Islam, and thus imply
an ongoing state of potential, and at times actual, hostility between Ame-
rica and the Muslim world, supposedly typified by radical movements
such as ISIS (and supposedly confirmed by the actions of lone wolf radicals
such as the Orlando and San Bernadino shooters). In defiance of the
increasing aversion in official channels to indulging in damaging ‘Clash
ofCivilization’-type rhetoric or typifying the actions ofmarginal groups
and individuals as characteristic of all Muslims, the Trump campaign and
its proxies insist on depicting ‘radical Islam’ as an existential threat, a
tactic that is the functional equivalent of ISIS’ attempts to exacerbate
tensions between Western societies and their Muslim minority popu-
lations. Both seek to alienate Muslims from their home societies in Europe
and America and exploit anxieties about irreconcilable conflict for poli-
tical advantage.21
Similarly, the media proxies of the Trump campaign have elaborated
a complex coded language that is in its own way just as strongly sectarian
as that found in ISIS propaganda, designed to promote an image of insiders
as virile, prosperous victors and opponents as servile, submissive, emas-
culated, and ripe for defeat. This is an extension of the type of rhetoric
the candidate himself uses even in day-to-day speech, like his frequent
reference to critics, especially women, as ‘disgusting’; the political impli-
cations of the imagery of bodily revulsion as a form of total rejection has
been widely remarked in a variety of contexts.22 The official and unofficial
organs of the Trump campaign valorize aggressive, even predatory beha-
vior: on social media, supporters are termed ‘centipedes,’ playing upon
the insect’s capacity for stealthy, venomous attacks against its prey.23 As
was widely documented during early 2016, the candidate himself repeated
encouraged violence against protestors at his rallies during the primary
campaign. Online, his joke about turning protestors out into the cold
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without their coats has been turned by his proxies and supporters into
a trope, with ‘give the man a coat’ becoming a compliment, based on the
idea of stealing said coat from anyone who opposes or criticizes him.
Further, the gloating, gendered triumphalism of ISIS and its spokes-
men—who mock their opponents as “quasi-men,” even when they are
(purportedly) women24—is echoed in the hypermasculine discourse of
Trump supporters on social media, where the default term for Trump’s
opponents is “cuck” (short for cuckold), with the intentionally degrading
and racist associations sometimes left implicit, and sometimes not. The
use of this term seems to have originated a number of years ago with the
coinage “cuckservative,” an insult applied to Republicans deemed insuffi-
ciently conservative (similar to the code word RINO, “Republican In Name
Only”), but “cuck” has quickly been expanded from being a term of inter-
nal critique within the Republican fold to being more widely applied,
especially to liberals and socialists, who supposedly epitomize the self-
abnegating, humiliating posture the term is meant to capture.25 The open
chauvinism of the candidate himself, as well as the puerile and hyper-
sexualized behavior ofmany ofhis supporters, led many to question the
sincerity of his attempt to represent himself as the champion of gay
Americans after the June 2016 Orlando shooting; given the policies
Republicans openly endorse, as well as the cultural climate they foster,
it is implausible that a Trump presidency would do much to benefit LGBTQ
citizens.26
Perhaps the most bizarre turn in the 2016 campaign has been the
overt turn to explicitly religious language, especially attempts to literally
demonize the opposition. Trump has repeatedly made allegations about
Hillary Clinton’s corruption and criminality (leading to the recurring
rallying cry of “Lock her up!” at his events, as well as insinuations by his
proxies that she will be tried and executed upon Trump’s inauguration
as president), but this has recently escalated to a straightforward claim
that Clinton is literally the Devil.27 This sort of name-calling is unpre-
cedented in modern American presidential campaigns; the Trump cam-
paign’s capacity to vilify the opposition seems limitless, as, for example,
when the candidate himself repeatedly asserted that Obama and Clinton
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were the literal founders of ISIS, only significantly later downplayed as
a sarcastic rhetorical move.28 Such rhetoric obviously plays to the enthu-
siasms of the Republican base, at the very least granting the candidate
political traction among a vocal minority who indulge in fantasies of
incarcerating or even executing Clinton.
This rhetoric has a subtler effect as well, in that it serves to locate
the candidate in the camp of those fervent Christians who see in Barack
Obama in particular and the Democratic Party in general a concerted
campaign against their religion; the open indulgence in religious rhetoric
of a theatrically excessive but symbolically resonant sort implies a simi-
larity in worldview to those who already read partisan political struggles
in theological terms. This alignment of the Trump campaign with right-
leaning Christians—despite the candidate’s historically profane character
and questionable personal rectitude—has also been encouraged by his
hinting at a willingness to repeal firewall laws protect-ing the separation
of church and state such as the Johnson Amendment. The alliance with
evangelical elements eager to gain political advantage by allying them-
selves with Trump has proceeded to such a degree that, in breaking with
the well-established tradition of pastoral neutrality in public political
settings, the benediction delivered by the Reverend Mark Burns on the
opening night of the Republican National Convention explicitly called
on God’s assistance to defeat the “enemy”—openly specified as Clinton
and the Democratic Party—while referring to the gathered assembly as
“the conservative party under God” and praying for “power and author-
ity” to be bestowed on Trump.29 The energetic vilification of political
rivals in openly religious terms is of course a staple of ISIS propaganda;
a particularly striking parallel appears in ISIS’ attacks on Jabhat al-
Nuṣrah, upon whom ISIS spokesmen literally called down the curse of
God in a dispute with their former allies.30
Extending our comparative analysis still further, ifwe seek to con-
sider with equanimity all worldviews that emphasize the categorical
boundaries between insiders and outsiders, investment in a messianic
figure and anticipation of imminent and final judgment that will usher
in a new golden age, a radical embrace of violence, and a reliance on
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scriptural themes, especially symbols and code-words, then these traits
appear to describe not only ISIS but also certain virulent fringe elements
in contemporary Judaism as well. The fact that most historical Jewish
communities have not had access to state power has tended to impede
recognition of the importance ofholy war traditions in Judaism, although
the work of Firestone in particular has done much to correct the miscon-
ception that Jews have not articulated religious justifications for vio-
lence.31 Likewise, for complex political reasons, the significance of Jewish
terrorist movements in modern history is seldom recognized, and ter-
rorism does not occupy the same place in discussions of contemporary
Judaism that it does in discussions of contemporary Islam—despite its
significance in certain contexts, in particular the foundation of the state
of Israel.32 Thus, locutions such as ‘violent Zionism’ or ‘radical Judaism’
have nowhere near the same currency among Western commentators
on Middle Eastern politics (let alone the general public) as ‘radical Islam’
and other expressions of that sort.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the modern era certain actors have
invoked Judaism, a tradition typically presented as exempt from such
tendencies, to support radically exclusionary ideologies of a messianic
nature, to not only foster violence against dehumanized outsiders, but
to support expansionist political projects. A particular disposition to such
radical ideology can be seen in certain wings of the Israeli settler move-
ment, which justifies expansionism through such religiously-inflected
conceptions as the “redemption of the land.”33 Further, both Firestone
and Claussen have written about the significance of the thought ofYitz-
ḥaq Ginsburgh in supporting the ideology ofwhat we might call the Jewi-
sh jihadist fringe of the settler movement operating in the Occupied
Territories, often committing violence in the name of Judaism, and often
with impunity.
Ginsburgh’s teachings are of particular interest because of the way
in which he amalgamates biblical narratives and symbols with a virulent
political message, reminiscent of ISIS’ use ofqurʾānic themes and images
drawn from early Islamic history. Thus, following the reading of the noto-
rious right-wing rabbi Meir Kahane, Ginsburgh holds up Pinḥas, the
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grandson ofAaron who zealously killed a fellow Israelite and the Midian-
ite woman with whom he illicitly consorted (Numbers 25), as an ideal
for faithful Jews to emulate. Interpreting the kabbalistic principle of
tiqqūn ʿōlam (‘repairing the world’) as a mandate to undertake unconven-
tional, even extreme, behavior to defend the Jewish people and sanctify
their homeland, Ginsburgh and other figures of the Zionist ultra-right
invoke this principle to justify the forced expulsion and killing ofArabs
not only on grounds of self-defense or for the sake ofnational self-deter-
mination, but even as a holy act.34
These ideas do not appear in a vacuum, of course; rather, they pre-
sent only the most explicitly religious justifications for violence on the
part of state and quasi-state actors in Israel, particularly in contested
areas such as the Occupied Territories—the main arena for Israeli expan-
sion through settler groups acting as state proxies. Thus, Kahane’s ideas
inspired Baruch Goldstein (whom Ginsburgh has openly defended), the
perpetrator of the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in 1994 in Hebron. Of
course, the majority of Israelis would reject Ginsburgh’s ideology as a
perversion of Judaism—just as the vast majority ofMuslims abhor ISIS’
distortion of Islam. The difference in media representation could not be
more stark, however: ISIS is presented as a virtually existential threat
to Western democracy and freedom (and implicitly, to American hege-
mony in the Middle East); by contrast, the settler movement is only infre-
quently mentioned in the media, and the virulent aspects of the ideology
of settlers is seldom acknowledged, despite the considerable impact the
movement has had—and continues to have—on Israeli politics, demo-
graphic and political realities in the Occupied Territories, and thus, at
least indirectly, on American policy and interests in the region.35
Perhaps the most significant counterargument to claims by Western
analysts that the ISIS phenomenon represents something pernicious
within Islam’s essence, a pathological tendency towards violence that
marks an absolute distinction between Christianity and Islam, or ‘Western
civilization’ and Islam, is presented by the phenomenon of American
Christian jihad. Over the last two years, a number of journalists have
reported on the Dwekh Nawshā, a Christian militia fighting ISIS in the
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northern Iraqi theater ofwar. What is significant about this militia group
is that although it is primarily made up ofAssyrian Christians native to
the area acting in support of the larger and better organized Kurdish
peshmurga, like ISIS, they have attracted a small group of foreign fighters
as well, and these have predominantly been Americans, most of them
with genuine military experience.
Many of the Americans who affiliate themselves with Dwekh Naw-
shā as volunteers express a combination of religious and political
motivations for their immigrating to the theater ofwar. They often seem
to construe their actions as defensive, though this is how Muslim jihadists
have always presented their emigration (hijrah) to fight in various hot-
spots around the world where Islam is perceived as being under attack,
whether it is Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, or now Iraq and Syria.36 It
is unclear whether these American jihadists mean to martyr themselves
as many of ISIS’ fighters do, though the name of the group is telling in
this regard; dwekh nawshā means ‘self-sacrifice’ in Aramaic, and some
of the American fighters mix militant nationalism and Christian religious
symbolism in their self-presentation, though the Dwekh Nawshā organ-
ization itself (which also labels itself the Assyrian Army) seems to eschew
explicitly Christian imagery. Notably, even though the media coverage
of foreign fighters from the United States often implies that their efforts
are futile or even foolhardy, their motivations are typically portrayed in
a positive light, especially through an emphasis on their desire to contri-
bute to defending Christians against Islamic aggression. They are never
recognized as another aspect of the original imperialist project that
established an American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan—the theaters
in which most of these foreign fighters first acquired military experience
and expertise.37
The relationship between the various elements I have drawn to-
gether here is sometimes unclear. For example, not all apocalyptic move-
ments necessarily embrace violence, though they often seem prone to
this—or are at least prone to be exploited to foment and justify violence.
Not all are expansionist or even inclined towards collective political or
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military action, though many of them certainly are. Perhaps it is that
apocalypticism is such a useful instrument for constraining and redirec-
ting social elements prone to violence that it has simply been expedient
for expansionist states to attempt to harness it. Whatever the case, one
thing is clear: Islam is not the only one of the monotheistic traditions in
which combinations of violence, millenarianism, and a radically exclu-
sionary ideology has been used to drive military action in support of
political projects. ISIS is perhaps unusual in the extremity of its views
and in combining a number ofdifferent elements in its ideology, but as
I have shown, there is considerable overlap between its rhetoric and
propaganda and that of other groups and movements throughout history.
Upon deeper analysis, we find that no community is completely exempt
from apocalyptic or hypermilitant tendencies, or lacking members who
seek religious justifications for their extreme acts. We should thus seek
explanations for the emergence and popularization of radical ideology
not in the ‘essence’ or roots of a religion, but rather in the material causes
and particular circumstances that engender it, and drive some believers
to marshal whatever resources their religion might offer to support and
legitimize violence.
Contributions to this issue
The articles included in this issue primarily stem from the afore-
mentioned panel held at the Pardee School for Global Studies at Boston
University in April 2015, “Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Islamic
State.” Kecia Ali, Thomas Barfield, and myself presented early versions
of our articles as papers on that panel, and Jessica Stern, Franck Salameh,
and Kenneth Garden not only responded to our respective papers, but
have also been kind enough to rework their comments into brief response
papers that have also been included here. The additional articles, one by
Jeffrey Bristol and another by Tazeen Ali and Evan Anhorn, were submit-
ted for inclusion in the issue later. Overall, these articles represent diverse
approaches to the ISIS movement, its rhetoric, and its relationship both
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to historical aspects of Islam and contemporary social and political
expressions ofMuslim belief, including responses to the claims and
actions of ISIS itself.
Although there have been a number of publications on ISIS over
the last two years, most of the peer-reviewed scholarship on the phe-
nomenon has come from policy-oriented disciplines such as Political
Science, International Relations, and so forth. We believe that this
issue fills a conspicuous gap in the existing literature in offering scho-
larly perspectives from the Humanities and Social Sciences, particularly
Religious Studies, History, and Anthropology. The offerings here are
deliberately eclectic, united mainly by their common interest in inter-
rogating not just the claims and ideology of the Islamic State, but the
critical issues pertinent to the study of Islamic tradition and Muslim
history and culture that are raised by such inquiry.
Kecia Ali’s contribution, “Redeeming Slavery: The ‘Islamic State’
and the Quest for Islamic Morality,” examines the contrasting claims
of ISIS propaganda on the one hand and the “Open Letter to Al-Bagh-
dadi” on the other on the question of the permissibility of slavery—one
defining the practice as essentially un-Islamic, the other as paradig-
matically Islamic. Ali demonstrates that a number of critical questions
converge on this issue, including the cultural and political contexts
in which sexual violence is categorized and represented and how tra-
dition may be defined and contested through attempts to delineate
what is or is not “Islamic.” Notably, although ISIS propaganda approa-
ches slavery as an indelible and essential part of Islam, its approach
to the juristic issues raised by the practice, ofwhich ISIS’ audience is
inevitably ignorant, actually underscores slavery’s anomalous nature.
Jessica Stern’s brief response to this article explicitly challenges the
claim that ISIS’ violation of standards of international law, morality,
and common decency must be defined as ‘Islamic’ simply on the basis
of the group’s use of sacred texts and reference to tradition to legiti-
mate them; she points out that this is a strategy that many different
sorts of radicals, including Jewish and Christian radicals, adopt to
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justify extreme acts and cloak them in the veneer of tradition. Deeper
investigation of ISIS’ practices of organized rape and plunder shows that
they do not necessarily stem from an ideological core, but rather help
the group to fulfill specific pragmatic and programmatic goals.
In my article “ISIS, Eschatology, and Exegesis,” I attempt to place
aspects of the use of tradition in ISIS propaganda in deeper historical
context, comparing the interpretation of specific qurʾānic topoi, parti-
cularly Noah’s Ark, in Dabiq, the ISIS propaganda magazine, with that
found in the propaganda of the Fatimid Empire. Although the Fatimid
dominion flourished a thousand years ago, the comparison of ISIS with
this Isma’ili Shi’ite state is productive insofar as it shows that groups
adopting a radical sectarian position, especially by seeking to foment
violence against their fellow Muslims in the pursuit of statebuilding
projects, must employ a specific kind of reading strategy—a sectarian
hermeneutic—in deploying the Qurʾān and symbols and themes from
Islamic history to support their positions. The comparison of the early
Fatimids and ISIS yields especially compelling results given that both
groups support an extreme sectarian ideology with the claim of fulfilling
prophecy by bringing events in an apocalyptic timetable to pass. The
point is not to paint ISIS as somehow crypto-Shi’ite, but rather to delin-
eate a specific kind of sectarian logic that shapes particular ideological
claims and tends to rely on particular methods. As Kenneth Garden
emphasizes in his commentary on my piece, pace those who seek to depict
ISIS as representing true or essential Islam, the group actually employs
reading practices that not only legitimate the use of violence against
other Muslims but openly confirm its minority status, even celebrating
it; ISIS spokesmen at one and the same moment accept that most of their
coreligionists reject their message and exploit this fact as confirmation
of their role as harbingers of the End Times.
The next contribution in this issue, “ISIS: The Taint of Murji’ism
and the Curse ofHypocrisy” by Jeffrey Bristol, focuses on the background
and development of a single aspect of ISIS’ messaging in its propaganda,
namely its reliance on the codeword “Murji’ite” in its polemic against
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the Muslim mainstream. In fulminating against Murji’ism as a supposedly
perennial heresy in Islamic history, ISIS propagandists skillfully draw on
a traditional set of ideas and claims about this oft-maligned school of
thought—including recent developments in jihadist ideology antedating
the emergence of ISIS—and take them in new directions. The specter of
Murji’ism becomes an evocative, multifaceted instrument in ISIS’ sec-
tarian toolbox, serving the especially critical function of casting main-
stream, accommodationist Muslims who refuse to align themselves with
ISIS and its extreme positions as themselves members of a heretical
group, the authenticity ofwhose Islam is supposedly questionable.
Thomas Barfield’s “The Islamic State as an Empire of Nostalgia”
places ISIS in the broadest possible context, analyzing its caliphate as an
exemplary case of a type of secondary empire that seeks to propagate
its authority not on the basis of controlling significant territory or
resources, but rather by capitalizing on the claim to have restored institu-
tions associated with an alluring golden age. The symbolic self-presen-
tation of the ISIS caliphate evokes precursors from Islamic history, parti-
cularly the Abbasid dynasty, during whose rule the imperial hegemony
of Islam was at its most robust. Barfield specifically contrasts ISIS’ stra-
tegic appeal to this older caliphal golden age, at once political and reli-
gious in nature, with the secular state ideology of the Ba’ath and other
groups that dominated the Arab-Islamic world during the flourishing of
the nation-state system throughout the Middle East in the twentieth cen-
tury. The appeal to a transnational Islamic identity has been crucial for
ISIS’ attraction of foreign fighters to its cause, transcending the narrower
interests more directly in play in the Syrian conflict and the domestic
struggles that have wracked Iraq since the withdrawal ofAmerican forces
in 2007. In his response, however, Franck Salameh cautions us to recog-
nize that the appeal to an Islamic golden age has always undergirded the
supposedly secular ideology of modern Arab nationalism, which long
capitalized upon a form of nostalgia for Islam as the essence of Arab
identity and its empire as the apogee ofArab accomplishment.
Finally, “ISIL and the (Im)permissibility of Jihad and Hijrah,” co-
authored by Tazeen Ali and Evan Anhorn, adopts yet another perspective
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on the Islamic State phenomenon, again by bringing ISIS propaganda
into conversation with the “Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi.” Taking a dif-
ferent approach than that adopted in Kecia Ali’s discussion, the authors
examine these documents as evidence of the larger problems attendant
on the question ofMuslim belonging in Western states. They argue that
both ISIS and Western groups (including Western state authorities) play
upon Western Muslims’ anxieties about their place in American or Euro-
pean society and construct different but analogous ideals of Muslim
identity: ISIS presents allegiance to its cause and disavowal of citizenship
in Western democratic states as a necessary criterion ofMuslim identity,
while Western states and media impose a requirement of absolute dis-
avowal of ISIS and public or semi-public expressions of loyalty and patri-
otism upon its Muslim citizens. In the latter case, this has the effect of
delimiting the permissible parameters of political discourse, making
social trust contingent upon an admission that religion is the ultimate
wellspring of conflict—that is, that conflict stems from Islam, or bad
interpretations of Islam, rather than from material, political, or societal
causes. Notably, the authors draw upon the classic theories of the sociol-
ogist Max Weber concerning the role of charisma and institutionalization
in society, contrasting the charismatic claims of ISIS with the reconfig-
uration of charisma in the cultural and institutional resources that Mus-
lim communities may draw upon in articulating a unique and stable place
in Western civil society.
In these articles, no attempt has been made to unify terminology.
We have permitted the contributors to select whatever nomenclature
for the entity that calls itself al-dawlah al-islamiyyah fī’l-ʿirāq wa’l-shām
(the Islamic State of/in Iraq and Greater Syria) they believe is best (e.g.
ISIS, ISIL, the Islamic State, Daesh, etc.) While steps have been taken to
ensure that ISIS publications are cited responsibly, especially for the
purpose of exposing the movement’s claims to critical analysis, on
account of their nature as political propaganda of an aggressive state
that has violated international law repeatedly in supporting or directly
perpetrating terrorism, human trafficking, and destruction of cultural
heritage, we do not provide direct links to the online sources of these
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publications. The Clarion Project (www.clarionproject.org) archives ISIS
publications in English; further, original translations of materials per-
taining to ISIS, including transcripts of videos and other media materials,
can be found at www.jihadology.net.
Context and Comparison in the Age ofISIS 29
Notes
All digital content cited in this article was last accessed via the
URLs provided in the notes below on October 21, 2020.
1. Earlier drafts of this material were reviewed by Ken Garden,
Will McCants, and Stephen Shoemaker, and later versions by Megan
Goodwin, Kecia Ali, Olga Davidson, and Elizabeth Pregill. Their advice
has been invaluable in helping me to shape what this essay has become.
Naturally, I am responsible for the faults and flaws that remain.
2. This has not occurred spontaneously, of course; as Bail and
others have observed, significant moneyed interests exert a titanic
influence on American perceptions of Islam, particularly by mani-
pulating media representation of current events to fit well-established
and highly prejudicial narratives about Muslims: see Christopher Bail,
Terrified: How Anti-Muslim Fringe Organizations Became Mainstream
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). The work of Bail is
especially useful insofar as much of the literature on Islamophobia
addresses cultural attitudes, social dynamics, and media represen-
tation, but overlooks the specific institutional contexts in which ideas
and images about Muslims are actually generated and disseminated.
3. The conception of “Islam” as essentially undefinable and
comprehensible only as a body of concepts, practices, and discursive
positions vis-à-vis a highly malleable and selectively accessed tradition
is most closely associated with Talal Asad; see his recent methodo-
logical statement “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Qui Parle 17
(2009): 1–30.
4. ISIS’ media output seems to have been most robust during the
year from spring 2014 to spring 2015 when both its recruitment of
fighters on the ground in Iraq and Syria and its military advances were
most successful. For various reasons, its media output has actually
declined since then, although its profile in the Western media has
seemingly increased in response to the sporadic terror attacks that
have been perpetrated in its name (or at least for which its spokesmen
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have sought to take credit). See Aaron Zelin, “ICSR Insight: The Decline
in Islamic State Media Output,” ICSR.info, April 12, 2015 (https://icsr.info/
2015/12/04/decline-islamic-state-media-output/).
5. Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March
2015. Most of the contributions to this issue, including my own, address
the problem of nomenclature and characterization from a variety of
angles; many of them cite the controversy over Wood’s article as a touch-
stone for navigating these issues. For two radically different opinions on
the problems provoked by ISIS’ very name, compare William McCants
and Shadi Hamid, “John Kerry Won’t Call the Islamic State by its Name
Anymore. Why That’s Not a Good Idea,” Brookings.edu, December 29, 2014
(https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/john-kerry-wont-call-the-islamic-
state-by-its-name-anymore-why-thats-not-a-good-idea/) and Carl Ernst,
“Why ISIS Should Be Called Daesh: Reflections on Religion & Terrorism,”
ISLAMICommentary, November 11, 2014 (https://soundcloud.com/
dukeislamicstudiescenter/carl-ernst-why-isis-should-be-called-daesh-
reflections-on-religion-and-terrorism). For a compelling argument as to
why the use of the label “Islamic” matters, see Shahab Ahmed, What Is
Islam? The Importance ofBeing Islamic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2016), 106-107.
6. There is copious scholarly literature on the conjunction of apo-
calypticism and violence in the contemporary world; cf., e.g., the classic
account of John R. Hall with Philip D. Schuyler and Sylvaine Trinh, Apo-
calypse Observed: Religious Movements and Violence in North America, Europe,
and Japan (London: Routledge, 2000). For a recent account that takes a
broadly historical comparative approach similar to that I have sought to
adopt here, see Catherine Wessinger, “Apocalypse and Violence,” in John
J. Collins (ed.), The Oxford Handbook ofApocalyptic Literature (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 422–440. Wessinger’s treatment attempts to delin-
eate the common discursive and sociological elements that tie together
phenomena as diverse as qurʾānic apocalypticism, contemporary jihadism,
the Crusades, Anabaptist Münster, Christian Zionism, and the Branch
Davidians.
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7. More than one review ofHolland’s work accuses him of reducing
the religious motivations of European monarchs and churchmen who
employed millenarian rhetoric simply to Realpolitik, criticizing his ap-
proach to the religious justifications for various political projects around
the year 1000 as reductionist. For a particularly transparent example
written for a website affiliated with the Christian Dominionist movement,
see Lee Duigon, “A Review of The Forge ofChristendom,” Chalcedon, n.d.
(https://chalcedon.edu/resources/articles/a-review-of-the-forge-of-
christendom/). The accusation of reductionism seems to be a common
trope levied against studies that expose Christianity’s tendency to be
exploited as a political ideology as opposed to approaching the subject
with concern for the sincere religious convictions of the individuals
involved, but naturally those advocating such an approach to the histori-
ography of European Christendom do not extend such courteous con-
sideration to Muslim jihadists.
Notably, after Holland’s work was published, the thesis that the
First Crusade was specifically motivated by belief in an immanent apo-
calypse was again advanced by Jay Rubenstein in his Armies ofHeaven:
The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse (New York: Basic Books, 2011);
Rubenstein’s approach was widely criticized by historians on the grounds
that religious motivations and eschatological or millenarian motivations
do not at all amount to the same thing (see, e.g., the review of Jonathan
Riley-Smith in Catholic Historical Review 98 [2012]: 786–787).
8. Robert Ferguson has emphasized the emergence ofViking war-
fare against specifically religious targets such as monasteries—the aspect
ofViking raiding that has often been seen as most distinctive of the era,
beginning with the attack on Lindisfarne in 793—as a deliberate response
to the perceived threat of Frankish campaigns of violence initiated in
the 770s that resulted in forced conversions (followed on some occasions
by mass executions), imposition of the death penalty for defying Christian
ordinances, and destruction of Saxon holy sites; see The Vikings: A History
(New York: Viking, 2009), 41–57. Anders Winroth’s recent The Conversion
ofScandinavia: Vikings, Merchants, and Missionaries in the Remaking ofNorthern
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Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) underscores the impor-
tance of both individual and communal agency in the spread of Chris-
tianity in Northern Europe, asserting that the conquest and forced con-
version model does not account for the variety of motivations pagans
had for accepting the new imperial faith. But the same is, of course, true
for the spread of Islam.
9. See Yitzhak Hen, “Charlemagne’s Jihad,” Viator 37 (2006): 33–51
and the systematic critique of Daniel G. König, “Charlemagne’s ‘Jihād’
Revisited: Debating the Islamic Contribution to an Epochal Change in the
History of Christianization,” Medieval Worlds 3 (2016): 3–40; see also the
trenchant notes of Jonathan Jarrett posted on his blog, A Corner ofTenth-
Century Europe, January 14, 2007 (https://tenthmedieval.wordpress.com/
2007/01/14/charlemagnes-jihad/).
10. This is a polemical claim that has been made against Islam by
Christian spokesmen at least since the ninth century, when it was ini-
tiated by Arabic-speaking apologists who were well versed in both the
religious and historical traditions of Islam: see, e.g., Thomas Sizgorich,
“‘Do Prophets Come with a Sword?’ Conquest, Empire, and Historical
Narrative in the Early Islamic World,” American Historical Review 112
(2007): 993–1015.
11. For a convenient recent introduction to this topic, see the essays
in C. L. Crouch and Jonathan Stökl (eds.), In the Name ofGod: The Bible in
the Colonial Discourse of Empire (Leiden: Brill, 2014). See also now Erin
Runion’s challenging study, The Babylon Complex: Theopolitical Fantasies of
War, Sex, and Sovereignty (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014),
which directly indicts the biblical foundations of the contemporary Amer-
ican drive to global political and economic domination.
12. Michael S. Northcott, An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Reli-
gion & American Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 103–133.
13. Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September
11 (2nd ed.; Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 2010), 19–31.
14. Brian Tashman, “Bachmann: Rapture Imminent Thanks to Gay
Marriage & Obama,” Right Wing Watch, April 20, 2015 (https://
www.rightwingwatch.org/post/bachmann-rapture-imminent-thanks-
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to-gay-marriage-obama/). The coincidence of an outbreak of right-wing
intimations of imminent apocalypse in spring 2015 with growing aware-
ness of the millenarian nature of ISIS ideology at that time is striking.
Compare Edward L. Rubin, “Our End-of-the-World Obsession is Killing
Us: Climate Denial and the Apocalypse, GOP-Style,” Salon, March 26, 2015
(https://www.salon.com/2015/03/26/our_end_of_the_world_obsession_is
_killing_us_climate_denial_and_the_apocalypse_gop_style/), and the Vox
interview with Will McCants published a week later, Zack Beauchamp,
“ISIS is Really Obsessed with the Apocalypse,” Vox, April 6, 2015 (https://
www.vox.com/2015/4/6/8341691/isis-apocalypse). Commentators some-
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The ‘Islamic State’ and the Quest for Islamic Morality
Kecia Ali
Abstract
Engaging texts produced by the so-called Islamic State and some
of its Muslim opponents, particularly as they treat the enslavement and
sexual use/abuse of female captives, this essay argues for a nuanced
account of how actors invoke and claim tradition. The Islamic State’s
capture, sale, and rape ofYazidi women and girls have garnered media
attention. It has also generated attempts by IS to justify their deeds as
religiously legitimate—not just permissible but actively good—a trium-
phalist reflection of the Islamic State’s authority, its enactment of a
continuous Muslim legal tradition, and a proving ground for the moral
improvement of its adherents. I assess the disparate ways IS presents
enslavement in its English-language propaganda and its Arabic legal
manuals and compare its appeals to authority and precedent with those
of its Muslim opponents. Muslims confronted with IS’s actions and
proclamations engage in disaffirmation, distancing, and denial, ranging
from the rejection of IS’s claim to be Islamic to more sophisticated
attempts to rebut its interpretation of sacred sources and historical
precedent. Both IS and its Muslim opponents propose historically-
grounded notions of legitimacy that affirm their actions as properly
Islamic to a variety of audiences, Muslim and non-Muslim.
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Introduction
In February 2015, journalist Graeme Wood caused a stir with “What
ISIS Really Wants,” published in The Atlantic.1 Wood’s article focuses on
the Islamic State’s apocalyptic religious vision, since analyzed more fully
by Will McCants.2 Among other things, Wood asserts that the group is,
as Bernard Haykel puts it, “smack in the middle of the medieval tradi-
tion,” which includes things that shock and repulse observers, Muslim
and non-Muslim alike—including, it seems, savage violence and slavery.3
Its deployment of brutality, especially its capture, enslavement, sale, and
rape ofwomen from Iraq’s Yazidi minority, are among the issues men-
tioned when the question is asked: Is the Islamic State in fact Islamic?
Though Wood grants that most Muslims do not support IS, and
acknowledges the role of interpretation in formulating its doctrines, the
overall impression conveyed by the article is that Muslims who deny
that IS fairly represents Islam are either apologists or simply do not really
know anything about Islam. The article quickly attracted rebuttals.4 More
than one commentator has pointed out that treating IS as a legitimate
representative of the Islamic tradition, as seriously religious and dedi-
cated to the texts “shared by all Sunni Muslims,” bolsters the group’s
agenda.5
Wood was right that IS lays claim to the tradition, citing canonical
texts, yet it also seems a stretch to insist, as Haykel contends, that “these
guys have just as much legitimacy as anyone else.”6 Religious studies
scholars are not tasked with judging which groups are “Islamic” or “un-
Islamic.”7 Rather, the job is to analyze how various actors make claims
to represent, understand, or further their tradition.8 One can do so while
still making distinctions between various religious actors and situating
religious claims in an historical and social framework.
In her classic 1986 essay “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic
Examples,” Marilyn Waldman argues that in Muslim societies, appeals
to tradition do not serve to maintain the status quo but rather to promote
change by appealing to the perceived authoritativeness of some past
practice or precedent.9 More recently, Zareena Grewal defines tradition
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as “a process of debate over what links past, present, and future in a con-
tinuity that is meaningful and authoritative.” Rather than “understanding
… tradition as a discrete body of ideas and practices [preserved] from
the past [that] survive into the present and persist into the future,” she
advocates closer scrutiny of “how tradition moves over time … as a
mediation process that is reflexive and selective.” In this process, “Custo-
dians,” sometimes self-appointed, “decide which elements should be
emphasized, highlighted, even added in order to ensure the tradition’s
survival in the future.”10 Both IS and its detractors claim custodianship
of the tradition. Without asserting that all are equally close to the norms
generally espoused by the bulk of Muslim thinkers and believers over
the centuries, scholars of religion must attend to the elements empha-
sized, highlighted, added, and—I would argue—subtracted in contem-
porary contestations of Islam. Slavery serves as a useful test case to assess
arguments over tradition.
Violence, victimization, and media attention
This essay addresses religio-legal interpretation, but any discussion
ofviolence and its justifications must address the real violence inflicted
on real people in real places. Whose victimization merits attention has,
deservedly, been a major theme discussed in the United States and else-
where in the last year, as the media treats deaths at the hands of ter-
rorists, so-called lone-wolf shooters, police officers, and military forces
very differently. What forms do narratives of violence take? When is
violence terror, an inevitable outgrowth of a violent tradition, and when
is it mundane and individual? When is it nearly invisible? Whose suffering
merits notice? Whose lives matter?
United States drones terrorize swathes ofArab and Asian lands but
seek to fly under the radar ofAmerican public opinion. IS has deliberately
courted media attention with its spectacular brutalities. Barely known
before 2014, IS now dominates headlines disproportionate to the territory
it controls and the body count it racks up.11 As Jessica Stern and J. M.
Berger write, “To simply highlight ISIS’s barbarity is inadequate to under-
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cut its messaging goals; in many cases, it accomplishes them.” They high-
light the way beheading creates fear: “In the Western world, in the
twenty-first century, the idea of a beheading was something unreal,
archaic, a vaguely understood and little-contemplated relic of a distant
past.”12 Slavery is not nearly so distant temporally from beheadings, but
it also has the feel of something archaic, primitive, and horrible, espe-
cially when it merges violence and sex.
Mass media transforms some information into signal while other
information remains simply noise.13 Women’s suffering in wartime is
typically noise, not perceived as a form of terrorism—not even necessarily
as news—but as a ‘women’s issue.’14 The deplorable capture, rape, and
sale ofYazidi women, which came to the fore of the news cycle in summer
2014, like the previous spring’s kidnapping ofhundreds of girls by Niger-
ian separatists Boko Haram, amplified the signal ofMuslim fanaticism.
No Orientalist trope is as powerful as that of the oppression ofMuslim
women or the oppression ofwomen by Muslims.15 Sex and violence make
an irresistible combination. Accounts of enslaved Yazidi women and girls
presented in journalist Rukmini Callimachi’s New York Times article
exploring IS’s “theology of rape” fit into a familiar narrative ofMuslim
barbarism.16 So too Callimachi’s exposé of the systematic, coercive use
of contraception and abortion by Islamic State soldiers to make possible
the ready transfer and continual sexual availability of their captives,
which refers to the “medieval codes” on which IS draws to justify its
practices.17
Such accounts, both true and terrible, do political work. As Irvin
Schick pointed out nearly two decades ago, “political capital continues
to be made of the sufferings, whether systematic or isolated, of non-
European women.” Though he advocates “neither indifference, nor abject
relativism,” he insists that one must “bear in mind the geopolitical matrix
within which these images of victimized oriental women circulate.”18
Lila Abu-Lughod’s Do Muslim Women Need Saving? illuminates the white
savior complex that frames much reporting on and humanitarian inter-
vention in lands where Muslims live; she illustrates the ways in which
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women’s suffering has been coopted and repurposed to justify imperialist
warfare.19
In some respects, the capture and rape ofYazidi women are ordi-
nary actions. Sexual violence against women in wartime is epidemic.
Muslim troops are by no means unique in violating women and girls.
Rape has been used systematically as a weapon ofwar in Bosnia, Rwanda,
and Colombia and, reaching back further into the twentieth century, in
China by Japanese soldiers and in Bangladesh by Pakistani soldiers. Mus-
lim women were systematically raped in Bosnia and Bangladesh, by non-
Muslims in one case and Muslims in the other.20 U.N. peacekeeping forces
have been implicated in patterns of sexual assault.21 American soldiers
have been guilty of the same around the globe, and within military ranks.
Beyond occasional rogue soldiers who rape, U.S. military and intelligence
services have routinely used sexualized torture and humiliation.22
If sexual violence is all too common in conflict zones, leaving aside
the deplorable forms it takes in what we might call ordinary life, why
emphasize the criminal behavior ofMuslim insurgencies? Why not treat
the systematic capture and sale ofYazidi women and girls as a form of
sex trafficking or wartime rape? By using the term slavery, does one
confer legitimacy on IS claims to be following Islamic law? Is taking
seriously IS propaganda—even attempts to refute it from within Islam—
a concession that Muslim behavior can be explained through religious
doctrine? My aim is not to grant IS propaganda status as a legitimate or
full explanation of its actions or motives. Rather, it is to understand a
series of attempts at tradition-making, taking slavery as a case study.
The Islamic State has attempted to justify the capture, enslavement,
and sale ofwomen and girls as religiously meritorious: not just acceptable
but a positive good. Rather than grudgingly grant its permissibility, or
merely matter-of-factly assume its legality as most premodern texts do,
IS proclaims enslavement a triumphalist reflection of its own legitimacy.
Muslims confronted with IS’s actions and proclamations engage in a
ritualized dance ofdisaffirmation, of distancing, of rejection and denial.
The ways they do so range from the commonsensical, if naïve and reli-
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giously problematic, rejection of IS’ claim to be Islamic—in other words,
takfīr (the act of one Muslim asserting that another Muslim, on the basis
of beliefs or actions, is actually not a Muslim but rather an infidel or
kāfir)—to more sophisticated attempts to rebut its interpretation of sacred
sources and historical precedent.23 The quest for both IS and its Muslim
opponents alike is to frame a notion of authority that legitimates their
actions to a variety of audiences, Muslim and non-Muslim.
Interlude: Chattel slavery, sex slavery, and the Orientalist imagination
For most Americans, the term slavery evokes racialized chattel
slavery as practiced on Southern plantations, in the field and the master’s
house. This is a limited and partial view of the range and scope ofAmer-
ican slavery, which extended beyond the South, beyond the cotton field,
into workshops and trade, and involved considerable sexual and other
types ofviolence. Muslim practices of capture, enslavement, and slave-
holding were even more diverse across the geographical and chrono-
logical breadth ofMuslim civilization. Slavery in court-linked households
in Mughal-ruled India and the Mamluk and Ottoman Empires differed
from domestic and trade-based slavery in Sub-Saharan Africa.24 Captivity
with the usual aim of ransom by Barbary corsairs was different still.25
For quite some time, the idea prevailed (including in writings by
sympathetic non-Muslims) that Islamic slavery was mild while American
slavery was harsh.26 In fact, some forms and practices of slavery among
Muslims or by Muslims could be equally harsh. Laws might be closely
followed or not.27 Practices could be harsher than rules or not. Legal
discussions having to do with slavery might be grounded in concrete
circumstances of enslavement or not. One may generalize, however, to
note that the purchase of female slaves for sex as well as domestic service
was an enduring aspect of slave markets.28 The form of slavery IS is inte-
rested in reviving, the enslavement and sexual use of females captured
from enemies, has the most purchase on the Western imagination, en-
visioning women imprisoned and used for sex: a somewhat more brutal
instantiation of the harem. If one accepts that IS’ tactics are chosen in
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part for the reaction they aim to provoke, media reaction to enslavement
would seem to justify it. Additionally, the availability of sex, whether
with captive women or through marriages arranged by a marriage
bureau, serves as an incentive for recruiting fighters.29
Tradition and moderation: The “Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi”
A handful of documents by IS and its detractors published in late
2014 and early 2015 present competing conceptions of authority, prece-
dent, and history: two manuals and two articles from the Islamic State
and a coauthored “Open Letter” to the leader, fighters, and followers of
IS by a diverse group of self-identified scholars and religious figures,
condemning IS’ actions, including enslavement, as incompatible with
Islam.30 These writings present contradictory perspectives on the permis-
sibility and desirability of slavery in the contemporary world, and reveal
a great deal about how diverse actors deploy history and understand the
concepts of the permissible and the forbidden.
The contours of the Islamic State’s two main approaches to justi-
fying slavery can be better understood through a brief exploration of
one outside attempt to rebut its legitimacy and views. The “Open Letter
to Al-Baghdadi” was presented at a press conference and published online
in September 2014, after the media’s attention in summer 2014 to the
enslavement ofYazidi women and girls. The Council on American-Islamic
Relations took the lead on its release, in conjunction with the Fiqh Council
ofNorth America.31 The letter foregrounds the issue of legitimate auth-
ority. Its 126 (male) signatories are global, including scholars and religious
figures from Uzbekistan, the Sudan, Iceland, and the United States. Its
modes of presentation and argumentation are slick and geared toward
media accessibility, though the mainstream media did not pay much
attention to it.32 Its English-only executive summary begins: “It is for-
bidden in Islam to issue fatwas without all the necessary learning
requirements”; moreover, “It is forbidden in Islam to ignore the reality
of contemporary times when deriving legal rulings.”33 Although “It is
permissible in Islam [for scholars] to differ on any matter, except those
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fundamentals of religion that all Muslims must know,” the list focuses
on the forbidden. Of the twenty-four points of the “executive summary,”
more than three quarters (nineteen) declare something to be forbidden
in Islam.34
Among the acts and beliefs it declares forbidden is contemporary
enslavement. The summary declares: “The re-introduction of slavery is
forbidden in Islam. It was abolished by universal consensus.” The body
of the letter, which runs to twenty-three pages, goes on to make a more
detailed two-paragraph argument as to why slavery is forbidden today.35
It posits a trajectory of social progress that encompasses all ofhumanity,
while insisting that Muslims may legitimately claim its basic principles
as part of their essential belief structure: “No scholar of Islam disputes
that one of Islam’s aims is to abolish slavery.” This claim is both absurd
and ahistorical, or perhaps absurd because it is so blatantly ahistorical.36
Certainly, one may posit within Muslim tradition “an emancipatory
ethic”—a consistent preference for freeing slaves and a reluctance to
enslave (so a foundling, for instance, could not be taken as a slave).37
Muslim theologians have been uncomfortable with slavery, just as some
were uncomfortable with killing animals. But emancipation is an ameli-
orative practice, and does not presume abolition; indeed, it accepts that
enslavement and slaveholding will continue and thus require regulation.
Still, the letter’s claim merits further exploration. It views slavery’s abo-
lition as not only a Muslim victory but one ofhumanity writ large: “For
over a century, Muslims, and indeed the entire world, have been united
in the prohibition and criminalization of slavery, which was a milestone
in human history when it was finally achieved.”38
Despite this reference to all ofhumanity, the letter’s main focus is
Islam. It argues that there was “a century of Muslim consensus on the
prohibition of slavery” which IS has now violated by taking “women as
concubines.”39 They have also broken covenants since “all the Muslim
countries in the world are signatories of anti-slavery conventions.” They
cite Q Isrāʾ 17:34 to insist that Muslims must uphold their covenants;
therefore, Muslims must not reintroduce slavery. The section concludes
by insisting that “You [al-Baghdādī] bear the responsibility of this great
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crime and all the reactions which this may lead to against all Muslims.”
The “Open Letter” appeals not to truth or falsehood but to a desire to
preserve Muslim life, well-being, and reputation from the depredations
ofunspecified actors.
Islamic State propaganda: Dabiq
One may read the fourth issue ofDabiq, IS’ online English-language
propaganda magazine, which was published the following month, as a
response to this “Open Letter.” An article entitled “The Revival of Slavery
Before the Hour” treats the “abandonment of slavery” as part of the
“abandonment of Sharī’ah law” and “the rise of tāghūt law” which also
involved “the desertion of jihād.”40 Imagining Muslim history through
a reductive, distorted lens, IS deems the “revival” of this authentic early
practice as a sign of its own efficacy and legitimacy. It frames enslavement
as part of a campaign against Western enemies as well as against neutered
Muslims who have abandoned the practice of slaveholding. Muslims’ fall
from glory coincided with the abandonment of slavery; the revival of
slavery has practical, symbolic, and apocalyptic significance. It will,
according to Dabiq, save Muslims from sexual sin: “the desertion of
slavery” has resulted in an increase in sexual misconduct “because the
shar’ī alternative to marriage is not available.” Additionally, “prohibited
khalwah [or] (seclusion)” leads to illicit sex “between the man and the
maid, whereas if she were his concubine, the marriage would be legal.
This again is from the consequences of abandoning jihād and chasing
after the dunyā.”41
Beyond the practical rationale for reviving slavery, it signifies IS’
resumption of jihad, and its success in that realm. It touts “this large-
scale enslavement ofmushrik families [as] probably the first since the
abandonment of this Sharī’ah law”—though it acknowledges the “much
smaller” example of “the enslavement ofChristian women and children
in the Philippines and Nigeria by the mujāhidīn there.”42 It prevents
sexual sin (the major concern of an article in a later issue, “Slave-Girls
or Prostitutes?”, published under a female pseudonym43), affirms IS’
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power and prowess, and carries apocalyptic weight. A convoluted inter-
pretation of a prophecy about the End Times attributed to Muḥammad
mentions slavery and seems thus to require the existence of slavery as
both foreshadowing and helping bring about the Last Judgment (“the
Hour”). The Dabiq article declares it “interesting to note that slavery has
been mentioned as one of the signs of the Hour as well as one of the
causes behind al-Malhamah al-Kubrā,”44 the great battle between belie-
vers and “Rome”—now understood as Westerners, including Americans
—that presages the End Times.45
IS embraces the familiar revivalist model of a pristine early period
followed by decline. It presents its version of Islamic morality as indis-
putable, describing Muslims who disagree as “weak-minded and weak
hearted.” While the “Open Letter” describes slavery as “something the
Shariah worked tirelessly to undo,” Dabiq describes “enslaving the families
of the kuffār and taking their women as concubines” as “a firmly estab-
lished aspect of the Sharī’ah that if one were to deny or mock, he would
be denying or mocking the verses of the Qurʾān and the narrations of
the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam), and thereby apostatizing from
Islam.” ‘Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah,’ author of the aforementioned
Dabiq article “Slave-Girls or Prostitutes?”, scorns Muslim “quasi men”
who live among non-Muslims, accept human rights norms, and consider
“taking a slave-girl as a concubine” to be rape.46
In her study ofAmerican Muslim knowledge seekers, Grewal notes
that “the reformist narrative of rupture depicts tradition in the recent
past as a moral departure or degeneration from its own beginnings; they
define their authority in the present as a recurrence, but not a contin-
uation, of the raw potential of Islam’s foundation.”47 Both Dabiq and the
“Open Letter” acknowledge discontinuity in the practice of slavery. In
the case ofDabiq, their revival of slavery attempts to actualize that “raw
potential.” The “Open Letter,” by contrast, posits a moral trajectory in
which the essential seed of abolition planted has now borne fruit: the
present stands as culmination of a continuous tradition, in which it is
the “raw potential” for abolition that has finally been actualized.
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Islamic State jurisprudence: The Research and Fatwa Department
In contrast to Dabiq’s articles, which acknowledge disagreement
between contemporary Muslims over the permissibility of slavery and
which emphasize the contemporary resurrection of an abandoned prac-
tice, Arabic legal publications by the Islamic State acknowledge no discon-
tinuity in the practice of enslavement and slave concubinage, nor dis-
agreement about their basic permissibility. Whereas Dabiq’s propaganda
emphasizes revival and chastises weak Muslim opponents, IS’ Research
and Fatwa Department echoes the “Open Letter” in its publications by
pretending a seamless continuity with the religious-scholarly tradition
of the past, even as its texts make clear just how distant and unfamiliar
that past is.
One of these Arabic documents was released online in late 2014. A
five-page pamphlet entitled “Questions and Answers on Captives and
Slaves” lists as its publisher “the Islamic State Research and Fatwa Depart-
ment.”48 A longer manual entitled “The Captive (sabī): Rulings and Ques-
tions” was published earlier in 2014.49 It situates practical rules within a
more fleshed-out legal and theological frame. Both texts, in different
ways, provide straightforward guidance for ugly practices; presume their
audience’s unfamiliarity with basic elements of jurisprudence governing
enslavement; and juxtapose advocacy of the enslavement ofunbelievers
and acceptance of the rape of children with theological reflection on the
potential injustice of slavery, the merit to be gained by recognizing the
humanity of enslaved people, and the deep moral weight of ownership.
Here, Stern and Berger’s remark on IS’ “strange but potent new blend of
utopianism and appalling carnage” is apt.50
“Questions and Answers” contains thirty-two catechistic questions.
It affirms the permissibility of men “having sex with slaves who have
not reached puberty,” specifying, as classical texts do when they discuss
sex with minors, that the slaves must be “fit for sex”; otherwise they may
be enjoyed without intercourse.51 They may be beaten to correct a fault.
They can be bought, sold, and given. They are property.
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The very basic nature of some of the questions answered suggests
the deep unfamiliarity of the institution of slavery to its target audience.
It asks, “What is a ‘sabī?’” It asks, “If a female slave is married, does her
husband or her master have the right to have sex with her?” Although
the pretense of the Q&A is that this is an institution for which texts and
scholarship provide all the answers, the inclusion of such basic material
makes clear that its audience has no idea about things that were taken
for granted in the premodern legal tradition. This presumably reflects
both the unfamiliarity of slavery to several generations ofMiddle Eas-
terners and the fact that the audience for the pamphlet is comprised of
laypeople with no legal training. Premodern legal texts generally proceed
casuistically, stating a complicated case and then addressing the various
issues that arise from such permutations. Basic rules are typically pre-
sumed rather than stated directly. Here, however, the practical and not
jurisprudential import of the queries and responses is clear.
“The Captive,” too, begins by dissecting the terms sabī and sabāyā.
It then segues into a lengthy set of anecdotes about the Prophet Muḥam-
mad and some of his Companions. These serve not merely to illustrate
particular precedents but to paint a portrait of a society in which enslave-
ment of captives and the sexual use of female slaves was part of the status
quo. The examples it includes, taken from ḥadīth compilations and other
early texts, record specific instances of behavior in order to weigh in on
whether, for instance, one might practice withdrawal with a female cap-
tive in order to attempt to prevent pregnancy. In this new context, the
anecdotes portray enslavement as a central practice of the pious forbears
(salaf) who constitute the movement’s central exemplars.
Although the manual takes pains to show that Muḥammad and
other Companions owned slaves, including those taken in battle, slave-
holding nonetheless poses potent problems. If all are slaves ofGod, how
can some people own others? This theological conundrum is answered
with an appeal to God’s actions: it is God who has “placed your brothers
under your hands.” Potential unease is further assuaged by owners’ obli-
gations of good treatment: they are to feed and clothe these enslaved
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“brothers” from what they themselves feed and clothe themselves, and
not to impose work on them that they cannot bear.52
Despite the assumption that its audience will be unaware of the
legal treatment ofmatters involving slaves, the short pamphlet and longer
manual present themselves as part of a continuous scholarly tradition,
evoked through the use of terms such as “consensus” (ijmāʿ) and “dis-
agreement” (ikhtilāf). Their doctrines are generally consonant with the
classical tradition. Yet their mode of presenting these rules inadvertently
attests to their strangeness in this vastly changed context. When the
pamphlet insists, “There is no disagreement among the ‘ulama about the
permissibility of [taking] disbelieving concubines,” it affirms a classical
doctrine. At the same time, its pointed focus on something that would
once have been too obvious to bother mentioning points to the need to
relegitimize basic elements of a defunct worldview. The pamphlet also
invokes scholarly consensus in a later entry, about whether a slave manu-
mitted as expiation of a sin other than inadvertent killing must be a Mus-
lim. The pamphlet alludes to specific substantive disagreements between
scholars as part of its discussion, sometimes identifying its views as the
“majority” or “stronger” position. The longer manual does more with
these differences, signaling dispute on a number of questions between
adherents ofdifferent schools before siding with one or the other group,
often through an opinion of the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziyyah. By contrast, the “Open Letter” insists on the permissibility
of scholarly disagreement but gives few examples; it prefers the general-
ized grand declaration ofabsolutes.
Assumptions operative in some of the pamphlet’s questions and
answers are telling. Unbelief is the criterion for legitimately taking cap-
tives, but some queries presume that slaves will convert and practice
Muslim rituals. For instance, it explains what female slaves must cover
in prayer. More broadly, some material imagines the integration of female
slaves into households, families, and community. One query asks whether
a female slave has a right to a portion ofher master’s time, as each wife
in a polygynous marriage would. The answer—though she does not have
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a right to a share, her owner must enable her to keep chaste, so he must
have sex with her himself, marry her off, or sell her to another owner
who can provide for her—is of a piece with the longer manual’s concern
for the appropriate feeding and clothing of slaves. These documents
disconcertingly juxtapose the stark and sometimes brutal claims of
owners over slaves’ bodies with pious concern for the enslaved people’s
human needs for food, clothing, and sex.
These recognitions of the common humanity of slave owners and
enslaved people are largely absent from the partial translation of the
pamphlet published by the Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI).53 Though MEMRI has been criticized for presenting a biased
picture of contemporary Muslim and Middle Eastern perspectives by, for
instance, cherry-picking unrepresentative texts, its translations are
generally accurate. MEMRI’s version of “Questions and Answers” includes
twenty-five of the original thirty-two entries. A closely attentive reader
may notice that the numbers jump from 22 to 24 and 25 to 27, but entries
28–32, the final entries, are omitted without any indication that they
have been removed other than the brief prefatory note that the trans-
lation is of “excerpts from the pamphlet.”
MEMRI’s introductory blurb combines dispassionate recitation of
facts with a selective highlighting of salient details:
The Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State (ISIS)
has released a pamphlet on the topic of female captives and
slaves. The pamphlet, which is dated Muharram 1436 (Oct-
ober/November 2014) and was printed by ISIS’s publishing
house, Al-Himma Library, is titled Su’al wa-Jawab fi al-Sabi wa-
Riqab (“Questions and Answers on Taking Captives and
Slaves”). It was presumably released in response to the uproar
caused by the many reports this summer that ISIS had taken
Yazidi girls and women as sex slaves. Written in the form of
questions and answers, it clarifies the position of Islamic law
(as ISIS interprets it) on various relevant issues, and states,
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among other things, that it is permissible to have sexual
intercourse with non-Muslim slaves, including young girls, and
that it is also permitted to beat them and trade in them.54
Like the New York Times articles on the rape ofYazidi captives, the
MEMRI translation focuses the readers’ attention on two points: “it is
permissible to have sexual intercourse with non-Muslim slaves, including
young girls, and … it is permitted to beat them and trade in them.” The
slavery discussed here is sexualized, embodied, and female. These notes
of sex, violence, and money were echoed in mainstream media accounts
with titles like “Sex Slavery Manual.” Unsurprisingly, given its focus on
violence toward slaves, MEMRI omits the query about the slave’s sexual
satisfaction and ends on a partial translation of the query about the
reward for freeing a female slave. This attention to manumission, which
is explained as protecting believers from the torments ofHell, seems at
odds with the other content included but aids in portraying Muslims as
violent by emphasizing their preoccupation with “hellfire.” The trans-
lation leaves out the immediately preceding query, a terse question about
whether a female slave can buy herself from her owner. (Answer: “Yes,
it is permissible and this transaction is called ‘al-mukataba.’”) More sali-
ently, MEMRI’s version leaves off the final five entries, which discuss
freeing slaves in order to expiate misdeeds or fulfill oaths. Through this
omission, MEMRI retains the focus on having sex with, beating, or selling
women and girls, and bypasses the pious preoccupation with gaining
reward through the act of freeing a believing slave. This concern with
religious merit in treating slaves well and freeing them where appropriate
in no way mitigates, and may even highlight, the horror of IS’ basic posi-
tions on capture and enslavement. The MEMRI translation’s omission of
the discussion of manumission, however, leaves readers further from
understanding how IS makes its appeals to tradition.
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Conclusion: Tradition-making
It is irresponsible to ignore political, economic, and military factors
that have contributed to creating and nurturing both the ideology and
the actions of IS and other violent extremist groups. Yet to suggest that
religion is merely a veneer is also unsatisfactory. Attempting to situate
IS and its practices on a spectrum from most to least Islamic is likewise
futile. What is necessary is nuanced attention to processes of tradition-
making. The Islamic/un-Islamic dichotomy assumes a static definition
of Islam. Often, this definition assumes a tradition that simply emerges
from a body of texts. Practices consonant with the texts—or that are
interpreted as being so—are therefore Islamic. (The actual practices and
politics of interpretation remain obscure.) Muslims who say otherwise,
as the overwhelming majority do when confronted with IS or the idea
of contemporary slavery, are insufficiently educated or fooling them-
selves.
If one acknowledges the obvious—Muslim tradition is contested—
questions remain about how best to conceptualize divergences. I have
argued that one must attend to notions of history as well as authority.
IS and the scholar-signatories of the letter to Baghdādī agree that early
Muslims held slaves. They deem different aspects of their practice exem-
plary—in Dabiq, taking, owning, and reproducing through slaves; in the
“Open Letter,” freeing them. The letter quotes qurʾānic passages on the
freeing of slaves (Q Balad 90:12–14 and Mujādilah 58:3) and declares “The
Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah is that he freed all male and female slaves
who were in his possession or whom [sic] had been given to him.”55 Yet
it is not as simple as IS = retrograde = focus on enslavement; non-extrem-
ist scholars = respect for the present context = focus on manumission.
Both the taking of slaves and the freeing of them come to the fore in
“Questions and Answers,” which quotes the Qurʾān and gives examples
regarding the freeing of slaves in cases of specific transgressions.
Different ideas ofhistory inform these documents. Both Dabiq and
the “Open Letter” acknowledge that the practice of slavery has histor-
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ically been discontinuous. They disagree about the meaning of its resur-
gence. IS congratulates itself on “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour”
—a sign that Muslims are taking up an abandoned, righteous practice.
The “Open Letter,” by contrast, deems forbidden the “reintroduction of
slavery” after it was abolished by consensus. Interestingly, these texts
combine different notions ofhistory with similarly timeless notions of
shari’ah. Followers of idolatrous laws abandoned shari’ah and hence
abandoned slavery, according to IS. For the letter’s signatories, the
shari’ah sought the abolition of slavery from the start; it merely took a
while for it to fully materialize, but when it did, it was final. It goes
without saying that for both, shari’ah determines legitimacy. Rules may
change, and the letter insists that one must take contemporary circum-
stances into account, but its signatories take it as axiomatic that if a
practice is to be forbidden today, the seeds of that prohibition must have
been sown already in its earliest moments. In contrast to both of these
documents, the Q&A pamphlet and “The Captive” presume a timeless,
seamless notion of history in which the taking, selling, and owning of
slaves is simply part of the status quo.56 In this way, it more effectively
erases the contested nature of this practice, even as it inadvertently
attests to how unfamiliar slaveholding is for its audience.
Asking new questions of these documents can help present a fuller
picture ofwhat is at stake. One might ask, for instance, about gendered
authority. Beyond the presumptions about gender, sexuality, and owner-
ship in the rules about enslavement and slaveholding adapted from
classical Muslim jurisprudence, there are questions about gendered
authority in contemporary situations. In the IS legal documents, in the
“Open Letter” as originally released, and indeed in Wood’s article in The
Atlantic, women are absent as authorities: the scholars, whether religious
authorities or Western secular academics, are all male. Girls and women
appear instead as objects of enslavement or of rescue. Women’s agency
only appears in two minor forms. One is the Dabiq article ascribed to a
woman emigrant (‘Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah’), which, among other
claims, criticizes Muslim men who reject enslavement. The other ack-
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nowledgment of women’s agency comes from the brief references in
Dabiq articles and IS legal texts to the possibilities that enslaved women
might convert, as well as the legal texts’ acknowledgment that they might
run away, commit punishable offenses, or buy themselves from their
masters.
Both IS and its opponents draw on Muslim history, scripture, and
interpretive texts and communities as they claim legitimacy for their
version ofMuslim tradition. Slavery as contested presents a useful lens
through which to view this tradition-in-the-making. Debates over slavery
are global, happening online even as real bodies suffer tragically in real
places. Redeeming slaves is one issue, but it pales beside the larger con-
cern of IS and its opponents with redeeming Islam. It remains to be seen
what form that redemption will take.
Redeeming Slavery 59
Notes
All digital content cited in this article was last accessed via the
URLs provided in the notes below on October 29, 2020.
1. Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015.
2. William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and
Doomsday Vision ofthe Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015).
3. Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”
4. One example: Jack Jenkins, “What The Atlantic Gets Dangerously
Wrong About ISIS and Islam,” ThinkProgress.org, February 18, 2015
(https://archive.thinkprogress.org/what-the-atlantic-gets-dangerously-
wrong-about-isis-and-islam-820a18946e97/).
5. The quoted phrase is from Bernard Haykel in Wood, “What ISIS
Really Wants.” Jack Jenkins provides a fuller and substantially more
nuanced version ofHaykel’s comments in “What The Atlantic Left Out
about ISIS According to Their Own Expert,” ThinkProgress.org, February
20, 2015 (https://archive.thinkprogress.org/what-the-atlantic-left-out-
about-isis-according-to-their-own-expert-afd98cf1c134/).
6. Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.”
7. As for assessing their religiosity, when a released captive repor-
tedly affirmed that his IS captors did not even have a copy of the Qurʾān
(as though this were dispositive of the question of religiosity), the media
pounced (e.g., “ISIS Captors ‘Didn’t Have a Quran,’ Says Ex-Hostage,” Al
Arabiya English, February 4, 2015 [https://english.alarabiya.net/en/
News/middle-east/2015/02/04/ISIS-captors-didn-t-have-a-Quran-says-
former-hostage.html]). It turns out, however, that the captive was mis-
quoted in the original CNN article, which later corrected his remarks: it
was the captives who were not provided with a copy of the Qurʾān; Mick
Krever, “ISIS Captors Cared Little About Religion, Says Former Hostage,”
CNN.com, February 4, 2015 (https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/ intl_
world/amanpour-didier-francois/index.html).
8. Zareena Grewal pithily diagnoses “the problem with the revivalist
movement: everyone is an expert, and the most asinine arguments share
Kecia Ali60
the shelfwith real scholarship, and not everyone knows the difference.”
Zareena Grewal, Islam is a Foreign Country (New York: New York University
Press, 2013), 186.
9. Marilyn Waldman, “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic
Examples,” History ofReligions 25 (1986): 318–340.
10. Grewal, Islam is a Foreign Country, 200.
11. Rafia Zakaria, “ISIS Wants You to Share This: How the Well-
Meaning Public Became a Handmaiden for Terror,” The Nation, January
12–19, 2015.
12. Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State ofTerror (New York:
Harper Collins, 2015), 251, 2.
13. For one exploration: Arundhati Roy, War Talk (Boston: South
End Press, 2003).
14. Aki Peritz and Tara Maller, “The Islamic State of Sexual Vio-
lence,” Foreign Policy, September 16, 2014 (https://foreignpolicy.com/
2014/09/16/the-islamic-state-of-sexual-violence/).
15. The “Sydney siege” hostage-taker had a documented history of
sexualized harassment and violence. He was taken seriously as a threat
only when he was treated as a Muslim terrorist. Michelle Innis, “Sydney
Hostage Siege Ends with Gunman and 2 Captives Dead as Police Storm
Café,” New York Times, December 15, 2014.
16. Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape,” New
York Times, August 13, 2015. The New York Times later presented infor-
mation on similar sexual offenses committed by U.S. allies—Afghan men
using boys for sex—which American military personnel were told to
tolerate. That exposé never suggested religious doctrine as an expla-
nation or justification for the men’s actions. Joseph Goldstein, “U.S.
Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse ofBoys by Afghan Allies,” New York
Times, September 20, 2015.
17. Rukmini Callimachi, “To Maintain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS
Pushes Birth Control,” New York Times, March 12, 2016.
18. Irvin C. Schick, The Erotic Margin: Sexuality and Spatiality in Alterist
Discourse (London: Verso Books, 1999), 157.
Redeeming Slavery 61
19. Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2013). Rochelle Terman offers a thoughtful
critique of Abu-Lughod, with particular emphasis on honor crimes, in
“Islamophobia, Feminism, and the Politics ofCritique,” Theory, Culture &
Society 33 (2016): 77–102.
20. One could also cite the rape and murder ofMuslim women dur-
ing the Gujurat “pogrom” of 2002; see Roy, War Talk, 105.
21. For one example: Owen Bowcott, “UN Accused of ‘Gross Failure’
over Alleged Sexual Abuse by French Troops,” The Guardian, December
17, 2015 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/un-gross-
failure-sexual-abuse-french-troops-central-african-republic).
22. The report is available as the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Deten-
tion and Interrogation Program together with Foreword by Chairman
Feinstein and Additional and Minority Views,” S. Rpt. 113-228, December
9, 2014 (http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications). As I was com-
pleting revisions to this article, a further discussion of sexualized humil-
iation appeared: Spencer Ackerman, “CIA Photographed Detainees Naked
before Sending them to be Tortured,” The Guardian, March 28, 2016
(https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/28/cia-
photographed-naked-detainees?CMP=twt_gu).
23. On various approaches to takfīr: Erik Pell, a convert to Islam,
considers IS members to be apostates; see Nicholas Schmidle, “Lost in
Syria,” New Yorker, February 16, 2015. In a blog post, amina wadud rejects
the temptation to practice takfīr but signals her perception that IS does
not meet even basic criteria for Islam, and so refuses to use the term
“Islamic” in discussing them; “Muslim Separatists and The Idea of an
‘Islamic’ State,” Feminism and Religion, September 5, 2014 (https://
feminismandreligion.com/2014/09/05/muslim-separatists-and-the-idea-
of-an-islamic-state-by-amina-wadud/). On Sunni reticence about the
practice of takfīr, consult Sherman A. Jackson, On the Boundaries ofTheo-
logical Tolerance in Islam: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s Fayṣal al-Tafriqa (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), especially Jackson’s introduction to al-
Kecia Ali62
Ghazālī’s text.
24. Indrani Chatterjee, Gender, Slavery and Law in Colonial India
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery
in the History ofMuslim Black Africa (New York: New York University
Press, 2001).
25. Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville, FL:
University Press of Florida, 2005). Distinguishing between captivity
and slavery in North African sources (114–115), Matar argues that
though “greed and economic need” were motivations, so too was
“retaliation for the violence committed against them by Europeans—
government sponsored acts of empire as well as disparate attacks of
pirates and privateers” (113). The racialization of captivity and slavery,
with whites/Europeans subject to the former and black Africans to
the latter, deserves further attention.
26. Ehud Toledano, Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East
(Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1997), 122–129, 138–139; Ber-
nard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992), vi. Recently, in reaction to the slaving activities of the
Islamic State, Abdullah bin Hamid Ali expressed a variation of this
view, “Islam & the Abolition of Slavery,” Lamppost Education Initiative,
August 19, 2012 (https://lamppostedu.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/06/Emancipation-of-Slaves.pdf).
27. Fisher, Slavery, 27. He discusses Muslims’ enslavement of
other Muslims.
28. To give just one example of the importance of female slaves,
consider the relative demand for and prices of various slaves discussed
in Fisher, Slavery, 325–331. Note that all female slaves except married
ones were legally subject to their masters’ sexual use, even those not
specifically bought for concubinage. Cf. Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery
in Early Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2010), espe-
cially Chapters 1 and 5.
29. One might also investigate more fully the connections be-
tween enslavement as an organized, well-regulated horror and the
presence of a functioning marriage bureau operative in IS territory.
Redeeming Slavery 63
30. The full text of the letter, which was published in English and
Arabic, is available as a joint release from the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR) and Fiqh Council ofNorth America as the “Open
Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri, alias ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’, and
to the Fighters and Followers of the Self-Declared ‘Islamic State’,” Sep-
tember 19, 2014 (www.lettertobaghdadi.com).
31. CAIR, “Groups, Individuals Asked to Endorse Open Letter
Refuting ISIS’s Ideology,” September 30, 2014 (https://www.cair.com/
action_ alerts/groups-individuals-asked-to-endorse-open-letter-refuting-
isiss-ideology/). The Fiqh Council ofNorth America participated in the
DC press conference. See Zulfiqar Ali Shah, “Muslim Leaders Refute ISIS
Ideology,” September 24, 2014 (http:// fiqhcouncil.org/muslim-leaders-
refute-isis-ideology/; updated June 3, 2016). Anti-Muslim polemicist
Robert Spencer notes that though these organizations “really do oppose
the Islamic State,” the letter is “a deceptive piece designed to fool gullible
non-Muslim Westerners into thinking that the case for ‘moderate Islam’
has been made, but which will not change a single jihadi’s mind.” Robert
Spencer, “Muslim Scholars ‘Refute’ Islamic State’s Islamic Case—While
Endorsing Jihad, Sharia, Caliphate,” Frontpage, September 24, 2014
(https://archives.frontpagemag.com/fpm/muslim-scholars-refute-
islamic-states-islamic-case-robert-spencer/). Spencer here conflates the
issue of opposition to IS and its doctrines with the issue ofhow effective
such opposition will be in changing the minds of jihadists.
32. A keyword search for “Open Letter to Baghdadi” at nytimes.com,
washingtonpost.com, bostonglobe.com, wsj.com, guardian.co.uk,
nbcnews.com, abcnews.go.com, and cbsnews.com on February 15, 2015,
when Wood’s Atlantic article appeared, returned no results. A search of
bbc.co.uk returned results, none ofwhich mentioned the letter.
33. This executive summary (“Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi,” 1–2 of
the PDF version in English available at www.lettertobaghdadi.com),
absent from the Arabic version of the letter, attests to the presumption
of an English-reading audience. The list of signatories on the version
released on September 19, 2014 has been supplemented by online signers.
As of February 15, 2015, when Wood’s Atlantic article was published, forty-
Kecia Ali64
nine additional people had signed, including a handful ofwomen.
34. A few others declare acts permissible, and one declares it “obli-
gatory to consider Yazidis as People of the Scripture.” It vacillates on
jihad, declaring it neither obligatory or permissible nor forbidden but
“not permissible” except under three conditions, explained as in a sum-
mary as “the right cause, the right purpose and … the right rules of
conduct.”
35. As Wood notes, it is different to say that slavery is forbidden,
full stop, than to object to its reintroduction into the contemporary
world. The previous existence of slavery and God’s apparent tolerance
for it raises significant and subtle theological problems encompassing
questions of divine will, human suffering, and theodicy. In addition to
an extensive literature on justice and suffering in the classical tradition,
recent theological reflections include Sherman A. Jackson, Islam and the
Problem ofBlack Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Laury
Silvers, “In the Book We Have Left Out Nothing”: The Ethical Problem of
the Existence of Verse 4:34 in the Qur’an,” Comparative Islamic Studies 2
(2006): 171–180; Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics and Islam: Feminist Reflections on
Qur’an, Hadith, and Jurisprudence (London: Oneworld, 2016), especially
Chapter 3.
36. “Premodern Muslims were typical rather than unique in having
both patriarchal marriage and slaveholding. The two coexisted through-
out the ancient Near East and Mediterranean as well as in pre-Islamic
Arabia” (Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam, 11). On the interrelated
concepts ofmarriage and dominion, consult also 164–186.
37. I owe the phrase “emancipatory ethic” to an anonymous
reviewer.
38. That this claim is factually incorrect—Saudi Arabia abolished
slavery fifty years ago; Mauritania repeatedly declares abolition, as it has
not fully taken—does not make it any less interesting. On abolition,
consult William Gervase Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Abolition ofSlavery
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Ehud Toledano’s
detailed, critical review of this work illustrates the diverse and divergent
modes of enslavement and slaveholding throughout Muslim-majority
Redeeming Slavery 65
and/or Muslim-ruled societies. Ehud Toledano, “Enslavement and Abo-
lition in Muslim Societies,” Journal ofAfrican History 48 (2007): 481–485.
39. The Arabic text of the letter uses the term sabāyā for “concu-
bines” here.
40. “The Revival of Slavery before the Hour,” Dabiq 4 (Dhū’l-Ḥij jah
1435 [September-October 2014]): 14–17.
41. The full quotation: “a number of contemporary scholars have
mentioned that the desertion of slavery had led to an increase in fāhishah
(adultery, fornication, etc.), because the shar’ī alternative to marriage
is not available, so a man who cannot afford marriage to a free woman
finds himself surrounded by temptation towards sin. In addition, many
Muslim families who have hired maids to work at their homes, face the
fitnah of prohibited khalwah (seclusion) and resultant zinā occurring
between the man and the maid, whereas if she were his concubine, this
relationship would be legal. This again is from the consequences of
abandoning jihād and chasing after the dunyā” (“Revival of Slavery,” 17).
The use of transliterated Arabic and Anglicized Arabic terms in Dabiq
deserves further investigation.
42. “Revival of Slavery,” 15.
43. Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, “Slave-Girls or Prostitutes?”
Dabiq 9 (Shaʿbān 1436 [May-June 2015]): 44–49.
44. “Revival of Slavery,” 15.
45. For more on the prophecies surrounding the End Times, consult
McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, especially appendices 1–3, 161–178.
46. Umm Sumayyah, “Slave-Girls or Prostitutes?” appears in the
“From Our Sisters” section.
47. Grewal, Islam is a Foreign Country, 213.
48. Anon., Suʾāl wa-jawāb fī’l-sabī wa’l-riqāb (Al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah:
Dīwān al-Buḥūth wa’l-Iftā’, 1436 [2014]).
49. Anon., Al-Sabī: Aḥkām wa-masāʾil (Al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyyah: Dīwān
al-Buḥūth wa’l-Iftāʾ, 1435 [2013-2014]).
50. Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State ofTerror, 3. This utopian dimen-
sion has become far more prominent in IS propaganda than it once was,
while brutality has diminished. Quilliam researcher Charlie Winter finds
Kecia Ali66
it the dominant theme in IS propaganda produced during a thirty-day
period from mid-July to mid-August 2015, with more than half of the
counted propaganda items adhering to its themes. War comes second
with about 60% as many mentions of utopia. These are followed by
victimhood and then small amounts of attention paid to themes ofmercy,
brutality, and belonging. These proportions represent significant shifts
from earlier dynamics. Charlie Winter, “Documenting the Virtual
‘Caliphate’,” foreword by Haras Rafiq, Quilliam Foundation, October 2015
(http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
publications/free/documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf), 17; analysis
of the utopia theme in propaganda appears at pp. 30–37.
51. On sex with minors, consult Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early
Islam, 75–77 and Sexual Ethics and Islam, 182, and sources cited therein.
52. Al-Sabī, 9.
53. For a discussion ofMEMRI and its ideological, organizational,
and financial links to anti-Muslim organizations, see Christopher Bail,
Terrified: How Fringe Anti-Muslim Organizations Became Mainstream
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 81–83. In his book, Bail
attends to how certain ideas about who Muslims are and what they do
have become prevalent. He finds that between 2001 and 2008, in a vicious
and difficult-to-reverse cycle, anti-Muslim ideas and organizations moved
sharply from the margin to the center of American discourses. In the
year since his book was published, anti-Muslim rhetoric has become a
staple of Republican presidential candidates’ campaigns. Juan Cole has
also discussed the organization: “Repressive MEMRI,” Antiwar, November
24, 2004 (https://original.antiwar.com/juan-cole/2004/11/24/repressive-
memri-2/).
54. MEMRI, “Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet On Female
Slaves,” December 4, 2014 (https://www.memri.org/jttm/islamic-state-
isis-releases-pamphlet-female-slaves).
55. “Open Letter,” 18 (section 12).
56. For a similar process in Saudi fatwas, consult Ali, Sexual Ethics
and Islam, Chapter 3.
Response to Kecia Ali,
“Redeeming Slavery”
Jessica Stern
In numerous publications, including its online magazine Dabiq
(published in several languages), ISIS has spoken of its revival of the
institution of slavery as a means of improving the moral life of its fighters
and as a way to fulfill one of the “signs of the hour,” indicating the immi-
nence of the end of time.1 By sexually enslaving captive Yazidi girls, ISIS
claims to believe that it is revivifying Islam, offering its followers a ver-
sion of Islam that was practiced by the salaf(early generations ofMus-
lims), unencumbered by hermeneutics or the accretions of historical
practice. How are we to interpret these claims?
Slavery has been employed through most ofhuman history, includ-
ing during the early period of Islam. It was abolished in most countries
by the end of the nineteenth century, but remained legal in a number
of states in the Middle East and Africa until well into the twentieth,
among them Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab
Emirates.2 Slavery is now de jure illegal in all nations of the world, but
modern slavery—including sex trafficking, involuntary domestic servi-
tude, and child soldiering—is a highly profitable global business, gener-
ating billions of dollars per year.3 Indeed, United Nations Secretary
General Ban Ki Moon refers to human trafficking as “one of the world’s
most shameful ills.”4
There are numerous references to slavery and to concubinage in
the ḥadīth, as ISIS claims and as Kecia Ali’s work confirms. But does that
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make ISIS’ practice of enslaving its captives “Islamic”? Some analysts
and scholars have said that it does, arguing that those who reject ISIS’
claim to religious legitimacy are falling into the same takfīrī trap that
ISIS has— taking it upon themselves to determine who is, and who is not,
a real Muslim.5
But there is nothing uniquely Islamic about slavery. Just as Islamic
texts reflect the historical period in which they were written, so too do
Jewish and Christian texts. There are many references to slavery in both
the Jewish and Christian bibles. For example, the book ofLeviticus pro-
vides detailed instructions regarding which peoples may be taken as
slaves, and rules for purchase and inheritance:
As for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy
male and female slaves from among the nations that are around you.
You may also buy from among the strangers who sojourn with you and
their clans that are with you, who have been born in your land, and
they may be your property. You may bequeath them to your sons after
you to inherit as a possession forever. You may make slaves ofthem,
but over your brothers the people ofIsrael you shall not rule, one over
another ruthlessly.6
Are we to refer to the practices ofmodern-day slave traders as Jewish
or Christian because these practices are delineated in Jewish and Chris-
tian texts?
Kecia Ali proposes that ISIS’ use of tradition must be seen not as a
way to purify Islam by restoring it to some historical or original essence
but as a means of inventing and controlling the future—both that of its
caliphate and of its victims. She urges that Muslim scholars neither prac-
tice takfīr by declaring ISIS un-Islamic nor accept the view, promulgated
by Bernard Haykel and others, that ISIS has as much of a claim to religious
legitimacy as anyone else.
To her arguments I would add two observations. First, ISIS is by no
means unique among religious terrorists in referring to sacred texts to
justify violations of both national and international laws, as well as of
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contemporary religious practices and norms.7 I have found in my inter-
views of religious terrorist groups, across religions, that it is common to
justify illegal actions by referring to religious texts. Second, it seems
likely that there is an additional, more pragmatic reason for ISIS’ “Revival
of Slavery Before the Hour”: to enable them to compete successfully with
rival groups fighting on behalf of Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. As ISIS implies
in its own writings, it is offering an alternative to sex outside marriage
for those fighters who cannot afford to marry.
In the article entitled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” to
which Kecia Ali has referred, the author explains:
Finally, a number of contemporary scholars have mentioned
that the desertion of slavery had led to an increase in fāhishah
(adultery or fornication, etc. [technically any sex act unreg-
ulated by shari’ah]), because the shar’ī alternative to marriage
is not available, so a man who cannot afford marriage to a free
woman finds himself surrounded by temptation toward sin. In
addition, many Muslim families, who have hired maids to work
at their homes, face the fitnah [trial or temptation] of prohib-
iting khalwah (seclusion) and resultant zinā [unlawful sexual
relations between unmarried persons] between the man and
the maid, where if she were his concubine, this relationship
would be legal.8
Thus, it would seem, enslaving women is not only a means of avoiding
sin, as Kecia Ali concludes, but is also expedient for the movement, in
that fighters who can’t afford to get married can be enticed to join the
Islamic State with the promise of sex.
The fantasy of reviving an uncontaminated form of religious prac-
tice is not unique to ISIS. The essence of fundamentalism is longing for
an imagined, purer past, an antidote to the moral and spiritual confusion
ofmodernity. But sacred texts are filled with contradictions. Christian
slaveholders and abolitionists both pointed to religious texts to justify
their positions on slavery. The same can be said regarding terrorists who
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kill “baby butchers” and those who, often using the same religious texts,
strongly oppose violence against abortion providers. Terrorists across
religions find justification in sacred texts to do what they want to do—in
the case of ISIS, to rape, pillage, and plunder.
Millenarian terrorist groups are not just aiming to change or purify
the world. They are also organizations qua organizations. Like any other
non-profit or for-profit firm, terrorist organizations do not survive for
long if they don’t attend to the emotional and physical needs of their
workers. Just like McDonald’s or the March ofDimes, they need to attract
capital and labor, and they need to articulate a brand. ISIS is using sexual
slavery not only to compete for labor with rival groups, but also to raise
revenue. Over time, many terrorist groups become more focused on the
wellbeing ofparticipants than achieving the mission, becoming “incen-
tive-driven” organizations rather than “mission-driven” ones.9
Still, it is not clear that the practice of enslaving girls will help ISIS
attract foreign fighters. Some ISIS “fanboys” in the West have refused
to believe that the stories are true. One commentator, “AAibrah52,” wrote
in response to an article in the New York Times that described ISIS’ practice
of rape from the perspective of the victims, “What an ugly lie. You kuffar
are sex obsessed.”10 Another wrote, “Media getting desperate.” When
her parents revealed to the media that US government officials had dis-
covered that ISIS’ leader, Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī, had kept the American
hostage Kayla Mueller as a sex slave, some ISIS fanboys expressed doubts
about the veracity of the report, claiming that it was impossible to believe
that Baghdādī would have sex with a white girl.11
Terrorists who have left their profession often say that “seeds of
doubt” about their leaders’ integrity or true purpose led them to defect.12
In my interviews of terrorists across religions, I have found that new
recruits often believe that the purpose of the group, and the aim of its
leader, is to change the world for the better. But over time, they are often
disappointed to discover that one of the principal goals may be to en-
hance the political power or wealth of its leaders.13 Sometimes, these
“seeds ofdoubt” may be related to the group’s ideology. Maajid Nawaz,
who left Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist Islamist group, explained that the
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“accumulated kindness of strangers,” including non-Muslims, together
with his continuing Islamic education, transformed his thinking about
the group that he had initially found so attractive. He came to view the
ideology he once subscribed to as “totalitarian,” “stifling,” and even “un-
Islamic.”14
Defectors from ISIS have told journalists that they found themselves
in an increasingly brutal regime, not at all like the utopian state that
they had hoped to find. An analysis of fifty-eight of these defectors by
Kings College in London revealed that some complained ofmistreatment
by their commanders; some were repulsed by ISIS’ practice ofmurdering
civilians and hostages; while still others were disappointed that life in
the “caliphate” was neither as lucrative, nor as thrilling, as they had anti-
cipated.15 One defector who spoke to the BBC explained, “In the begin-
ning ISIS used goodness with the population in order to attract the people
and they provided them with what they needed in order to attract them
quickly, because they suffered so much under Bashar and his regime,”
he said. “Once ISIS succeeded in attracting people they changed drama-
tically, from being good to being cruel and harsh.”16 It is important to
ensure that the reports of those who have seen what life in the caliphate
is truly like, and have left, is shared not only with traditional media
outlets, but also via the same social media outlets that ISIS uses to recruit.
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ISIS, Eschatology, and Exegesis:
The Propaganda ofDabiq and
The Sectarian Rhetoric ofMilitant Shi’ism
Michael Pregill
Abstract
The rise and successes of ISIS may at first glance appear unprecedented,
and its extreme ideology as an aberrant distortion of traditional Islam.
However, I will argue that some aspects of the ISIS phenomenon actually
appear familiar when we consider them in deeper historical perspective,
especially in the context of the kinds of arguments and rhetoric that
have been employed by groups seeking to foment violence against their
Muslim coreligionists. Here I will show that in its propaganda, ISIS uses
themes and images drawn from the Qurʾān, as well as certain familiar
tropes and topoi of Islamic history, in a fashion similar to the early
Fatimid Empire, founded by a branch of the Shi’ah that established a
caliphate based in North Africa and Egypt that eclipsed the Sunni cali-
phate of the Abbasids based in Baghdad. The ultra-militant vision of
Islam and Muslim community promoted by ISIS is contrary to the ethos
of Sunnism as it has generally been defined throughout its history; how-
ever, it does resemble the militant and perfectionist conception of Islam
held by early sectarian groups like the Fatimids.
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Introduction
The emergence of ISIS on the world stage seems unprecedented in
modern Islamic history.1 In political and military terms, the rapid evo-
lution of the movement from an insurgency to a territorial state, or at
least a quasi-state entity with pretensions of actual governance, that also
maintains a terror network of significant profile and impact, is an utterly
unexpected development in the sordid recent history of radical jihadism.2
Further, two aspects of ISIS’ policy are especially surprising, making it
seem rather atavistic among modern Islamist movements. First, its brash
declaration of a caliphate—with aspirations ofuniversal recognition by
the worldwide community ofMuslims, however unrealistic this might
be—is not entirely unprecedented, though arguably ISIS has a far more
credible claim to have restored khilāfah, at least in the eyes of jihadist
enthusiasts, than other movements before them who claimed to have
done the same.3 Second, not only has ISIS taken possession of actual
territory over which it claims to rule, but it has rejected the national
boundaries established in the Middle East in the early twentieth century
by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and subsequent treaties.4 Instead, ISIS
aspires to establish a territorial state based in the Jazīrah, a naturally
contiguous zone incorporating northwest Iraq, northeast Syria, and
southeast Turkey and traversing those states’ recognized borders.5 More-
over, in cultural, religious, and intellectual terms, many aspects of the
group’s ideology and praxis—the relentless resort to takfīr (one Muslim
asserting that another Muslim, on the basis of beliefs or actions, is actual-
ly not a Muslim but rather an infidel or kāfir), the revival of slavery, the
public administration of extreme and appalling forms of corporeal pun-
ishment (some unprecedented in modern times)—have been so radical
as to have drawn condemnation not only from virtually all state actors
in the Middle East but even from Al-Qa’idah and other militant organ-
izations.6
However, in this article, I will argue that some aspects of the ISIS
phenomenon appear more familiar when we consider them in deeper
historical perspective—especially if we are attuned to the predictable
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logics that have typically attended Muslim groups’ embrace ofviolence
against their coreligionists. In particular, here I will show that in its pro-
paganda, ISIS uses themes and images drawn from the Qurʾān, as well as
certain familiar tropes and topoi of Islamic history, for the specific pur-
pose of ‘othering’ fellow Muslims and smearing them as unbelievers,
thus marking them as legitimate targets for conquest and slaughter.
Other Muslim movements have made similar exegetical moves based on
the Qurʾān and tradition, under similar circumstances.
The irony here—one that ISIS ideologues and spokesmen would
surely not appreciate—is that they have specifically recapitulated the
discursive and exegetical gestures associated with a sect of the Shi’ah
that engaged in a very successful statebuilding project in the tenth cen-
tury. This is the Fatimid Empire, founded by a branch of the Isma’ilis
(one of the major branches of Shi’ah, each distinguished by the specific
lineage of Imāms from the family ofMuḥammad whom they follow) that
established a caliphate based in North Africa and Egypt, dominated the
eastern Mediterranean for two hundred years, and rivaled (and for a
time eclipsed) the Sunni caliphate of the Abbasids based in Baghdad. ISIS’
tendency to execrate Shi’ah as false Muslims, apostates and infidels, does
not diminish the utility of this comparison. As we shall see, throughout
the history of sectarian conflicts in Islam, Sunni and Shi’i communities
have often resorted to similar, if not the same, modes of discourse and
made analogous rhetorical claims, especially in the process of denouncing
and delegitimizing each other.
Nor is it insignificant that this extreme rhetoric has accompanied
an explicit promotion of baroque fantasies of the end of the world.7 The
ISIS propaganda machine strives to depict the rise of its caliphate as the
fulfilment of prophecy, exploiting various developments in its campaigns
against Iraqi state entities and rival insurgent groups operating in the
Syrian conflict zone as major milestones in the timetable of events leading
up to the End Times. Its military successes are deftly manipulated through
various propaganda outlets, particularly social media, as political theater
to bolster its religious credentials among supporters. The claim to be
fulfilling an apocalyptic timetable has proven particularly successful for
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the recruitment of foreign fighters; many of the jihadists who travel to
Iraq and Syria style themselves as muhājirūn, after the original Muslim
emigrants who joined Muḥammad on his hijrah from Mecca to Medina,
or ghurabāʾ, ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers,’ exploiting the prominent role
assigned to the gharīb in traditional end-time prophecies. Likewise, the
apocalyptic associations of various locales in the Syrian landscape, espe-
cially Dabiq (the Islamic version of Armageddon), allow ISIS to recast
victories of little strategic value as significant triumphs in their propa-
ganda.
Chiliastic anticipation has frequently enabled upstart movements
to overthrow established regimes and seize power in Islamic history, and
apocalyptic rhetoric has particular utility for casting one’s opponents
and critics as servants of the Antichrist and minions of the Devil whose
inevitable defeat has long been foretold. Moreover, we must recognize
that when it is analyzed in a broader sociological frame, the extreme
apocalyptic rhetoric of this so-called Islamic State cannot responsibly
be characterized as an exclusively Islamic phenomenon. Rather, it is
common to many radical groups affiliated with different religious com-
munities found in the contemporary world, especially those seeking to
harness millenarian enthusiasms in the service of aggressive statebuilding
projects.
Fatimid statebuilding and millenarian eschatology
The spectacular achievements of the Fatimid Empire, both in terms
of fostering a rich intellectual tradition and promoting a material culture
of astonishing vigor and sophistication, are well known. At the height of
their power, the Fatimids’ immediate sphere of influence encompassed
not only their heartland in Egypt and North Africa but much ofPalestine
and Syria, southern Italy, and Sicily; their cultural impact and political
reach extended as far as Spain in the west, Yemen in the south, and Iraq
in the east. Most famously, the Fatimids founded the city ofCairo in 969
and established the Azhar—once a thriving center for the propagation
of Isma’ili doctrine and today a Sunni madrasa universally considered
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one of the leading institutions of religious learning in the Islamic world
—in 972.
What is most worthy ofour attention here are the Fatimid dynasty’s
beginnings. Though the movement’s origins in the late ninth and early
tenth centuries are shrouded in a haze ofhagiography and mythology,
the surviving accounts still allow us to draw some solid conclusions about
the nature of the group and its ideology. Like ISIS, the Fatimid regime
originated in an insurgency, as one ofmany Isma’ili groups fomenting
rebellion against the Abbasids and their governors throughout the Islamic
world on behalf of the Alid imāms in the wake of the disappearance or
‘occultation’ (ghaybah) of the Twelfth Imām in 874. The propaganda
campaign and mobilization efforts of one Isma’ili faction operating in
North Africa bore fruit in 909, when a coalition of interests supported
by the military power of the Kutamah Berber tribal coalition conquered
the province of Ifriqiyyah (modern Tunisia) from the Aghlabids, the
Abbasid governors of the region, and openly proclaimed the establish-
ment of a new Shi’i caliphate.8
Within a century the Fatimids had conquered Egypt, constructed
a new capital city—al-Qāhirah or Cairo—and asserted their dominion
over most of the Islamic world from the Levant westward. In this they
presented a vigorous counterpart to the senescent Abbasid dynasty,
which had already experienced a significant deterioration of its political
(if not moral) authority in Iraq, as well as a significant challenge to Sunni
claims about the caliphate. It has also often been observed that it was
under the Fatimids that extensive networks of cultural and economic
exchange throughout the Mediterranean were established or revived,
thus fostering intercontinental trade and travel from Western Europe
and so eventually paving the way for the eastward campaigns and migra-
tions of Latin peoples during the Crusades.
Aside from these specific political and military details, a distinctive
aspect of the Fatimid rise to power is their reliance on millenarian escha-
tology in their ideology and propaganda. The Fatimid caliph-imāms
claimed to be descended directly from ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and Fāṭimah, the
daughter of the Prophet Muḥammad, and clearly presented their rise to
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power as a transformative millenarian event in world history. This was
signaled, above all, by the fact that the first Fatimid caliph-imām, ʿAbd
Allāh, took the regnal title of “the Rightly-Guided One” or Mahdī (‘Guided
One,’ a messianic figure who will marshal the true Muslims and stand as
God’s champion in the final conflict that will precede the advent of the
Last Judgment), thus exploiting the fervent belief among the partisans
of the family of the Prophet that their redemption was imminent.9 As we
shall see, the parallel with ISIS here is exceptionally striking, for the
Islamic State’s propaganda claims that the end of the world is immanent,
the establishment of its caliphate and its campaigns of conquest in Iraq
and Syria serving as proof of its fulfillment ofprophecy in playing a key
role in the dramatic events leading up to the Hour, the Islamic eschaton.10
An anonymous manuscript in the Arabic collections of the British
Library (BL Or. 8419) offers us a unique glimpse of early Fatimid propa-
ganda and its complex interweaving ofqurʾānic prooftexts, biblical and
Islamic history, sectarian claims, and millenarianism.11 This anonymous
work is non-technical in nature, which distinguishes it from most texts
associated with the Isma’ilis in general and the Fatimids specifically. It
addresses itself to an ordinary, though literate, Muslim audience and
does not rely on either veiled language or esoteric arguments compre-
hensible only to initiates to support its main points—a conspicuous mark-
er of Isma’ili tradition already in the formative period of the ninth cen-
tury, and a signal feature ofmost of the surviving literature associated
with the Fatimids.12 Rather, on the basis ofQurʾān and ḥadīth alone, this
work argues that although the Muslim community originally followed
the guidance of the Prophet Muḥammad, they have now gone astray like
other communities that went before them, particularly the Jews. It is
only the Shi’ah who follow the correct path, and so constitute a kind of
saved minority, as opposed to the masses who might call themselves
Muslims but are really no better than Jews or the idolaters and hypocrites
who opposed Muḥammad and his family during their lifetimes.
The text makes this argument by drawing on a group ofḥadīth that
may collectively be called the “Sunnah Tradition.”13 Alluding to or expli-
citly citing qurʾānic references to the communities and nations that pre-
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ceded the coming of Islam, these traditions depict Muḥammad outlining
the essence of Islam for his followers and asserting its superiority to
other paths; but he also issues a stern warning that his community will
go astray just as older communities did. Most often this warning is
phrased as a prophecy that the Muslims “will follow the path of those
who came before you”; the term for path here is usually sabīl (pl. subul),
but in some variations it is sunnah (pl. sunan), and sometimes the path is
explicitly noted as the path of Israel (sunnat banī isrāʾīla)—meaning that
the Muslim ummah, or at least part of it, is doomed to repeat the errors
of the Jews and Christians who preceded them.
The Fatimid text cites a number ofvariations on this ḥadīth:
[The Prophet said:] “…You will surely travel along the paths
of those who came before you, walking in their footsteps;
you will surely follow their example, every inch, every foot,
every mile they traveled—to the degree that if they entered
a dark lizard hole, you’ll do it too.”14
Across the centuries this tradition has been used in a number ofways.
It is commonly cited in connection with Muḥammad’s prophecy that his
community will split into seventy (or seventy-two) sects, as our author
acknowledges:
So did the Prophet warn his community against faction-
alism and differing among themselves (al-furqah wa’l-ikh-
tilāf); and he informed them that they would surely do as the
communities who came before them had done. Thus he said:
“You will surely follow the sunnah of Israel, measure for
measure and like for like.”15
This tradition is also very commonly cited as the basis for the polemical
claim made by Sunni authors that the Shi’ah are “the Jews of our com-
munity” (yahūd ummatinā). As Wasserstrom has demonstrated in his
classic discussion of this tradition, a variety of Sunni authors drew on
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this trope to characterize the Shi’ah as erring in both belief and practice
in recognizably ‘Jewish’ ways.16
However, the Fatimid text provides an intriguing example ofhow
Shi’ah could make use of this tradition in an analogous way, but for the
opposite purpose ofdelegitimizing the path followed by those who rejec-
ted their claims and the cause of the Alids.17 The text is distinctive for
the systematic way in which it draws parallels between events in biblical,
prophetic, and early Islamic history and the situation of the Shi’ah in the
author’s present (most likely the early tenth century). Sometimes this is
done through simile: for example, it compares Pharaoh and the Egyptians
who oppressed the Israelites and the “oppressors of the family ofMuḥam-
mad” who victimized the imāms and their followers.18 At other times the
telescoping of history is accomplished through metaphor: the per-
secutors of the family of the Prophet and their supporters—i.e., Sunnis
—are labeled idolaters and tyrants, “the Pharaohs ofQuraysh.”
In still other instances, the pejorative appellation “the Jews of our
community” appears, a clear reversal of the trope of the Shi’ah as the
Jews of the community as it is commonly deployed in Sunni polemic. As
the Fatimid text develops this image, the persecution of the Alids and
their loyal partisans, the Shi’ah, marks Sunnis as oppressors and infidels.
Their denial of the claims of the Alid imāms as sole legitimate leaders of
the community hearkens back to the Jews’ denial ofMuḥammad’s claims,
one ofmany ways they are like Jews and no better than Jews:
The Jews allege that their faith in God and in Moses and the
other former prophets suffices for them, so that they do
not need faith in Muḥammad… Likewise the Jews of our
community claim that their faith in Muḥammad suffices
for them, making unnecessary faith in the Imām of the
God-fearers [i.e. ʿAlī]…”19
This telescoping of history, the alignment of the travails faced by
the pre-Islamic prophets and their loyal followers, the Prophet Muḥam-
mad and his family, and the Alid imāms and their partisans the Shi’ah,
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particularly in the author’s present, is typical of the ‘hiero-historical’
perspective found in Fatimid texts. Like other Shi’i movements of the
time, the Fatimids distinguished between the ẓāhir or external meaning
of scripture and ritual and the inner, essential meaning, the bāṭin, which
could be disclosed only through exegesis by delegates of the inspired
imāms, to whom God had entrusted true knowledge. This exegesis of the
inner dimension of scripture—the spiritual, but also frequently political,
interpretation accessible only to a few—is termed taʾwīl, disclosure of
the essence or ‘foundational’ meaning.20
What makes this typological exegesis of the Fatimids and other
Shi’i groups so powerful is that it embeds the present in a kind of timeless
scriptural now: contemporary experience is not so different from that
of bygone days, and the present appears as the natural culmination of
the scriptural past. The oppression of evildoers in all ages is the same;
the suffering of the faithful in all ages is the same. The political implica-
tions of scripture are brought to the fore. Pharaoh oppressed the Israel-
ites; the Jews persecuted Jesus and the apostles; the hypocrites and idol-
aters opposed Muḥammad; the Umayyads slaughtered the imāms of the
family of the Prophet. Throughout history, the pattern recurs until the
time of the Mahdī, who like Moses will punish the idolaters and redeem
the Shi’ah, bringing them to their Promised Land.21
Thus, this anonymous propaganda text is unusual in that it both
offers a window onto the ideology of the Fatimids in the foundational
period of their history, when their embrace of violent revolution was
most conspicuous, and presents a set of rhetorical features intended to
be legible and even appealing to a wide public due to their grounding in
qurʾānic texts and early Islamic history. In what follows here, I will ob-
serve a number of striking parallels between claims and ideas promoted
by ISIS and those of the early Shi’ah in general and the Fatimid movement
as exemplified by this work in particular.
It is important that we be clear about the nature and purpose of
our comparison of ISIS with this militant Shi’i dynasty. After all, ISIS is
a militant Sunni organization whose genealogy is more commonly traced
back to precursor insurgent movements of a radical Salafi orientation,
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though its ideology involves a reliance on takfīr and a willful targeting
of Muslim civilians that even Al-Qa’idah and its various offshoots and
affiliates reject. Further, drawing parallels between Muslim groups separ-
ated by a millennium may seem dangerously ahistorical to some. Our
point here, however, is that the ultra-militant vision of Islam and Muslim
community held by the spokesmen of ISIS and expressed in their propa-
ganda is not only contrary to the ethos of Sunnism as it has been conven-
tionally defined throughout its history, but, if anything, hearkens back
to the militant and perfectionist conception of Islam held by early sec-
tarian groups.22 The ideology of the Fatimid Caliphate thus furnishes a
thousand year-old precedent not only for ISIS’ rapid transition from an
insurgency to a successful statebuilding project, but also for important
aspects of their doctrine and propaganda as well. As we shall see, the
results of such comparison are illustrative and provocative.
ISIS’ sectarian apocalypse
Despite its officious claims to be the legitimate heir to and revival
of the long-defunct Sunni caliphate, the ISIS movement is quite demon-
strably deviant in terms of the standard set of values and practices histor-
ically associated with Sunnism. Its spokesmen present themselves as
restoring the golden age of imperial Islam, particularly the period of the
Rashīdūn or “Righteous Caliphs” who ruled for the first thirty years of
Islamic history, that period during which apostolic Islam was supposedly
at its strongest and purest. They are also quite nostalgic for the high
Abbasid period, the apogee of the Sunni caliphate as an institution and
a world power. This is surely not accidental given that the Abbasids repre-
sented the pinnacle of caliphal power in Iraq in particular, ruling from
Baghdad for just over five hundred years—first as a vigorous, expansionist
state, and then, after a long period of decline in the ninth and tenth
centuries, as a severely attenuated, but still nominally and symbolically
authoritative, shadow of its former self.23 However, the ideology of ISIS
—now broadcast through various means as part of a sophisticated propa-
ganda machine heavily reliant on social media networks in particular
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—actually more closely resembles that of the Fatimids in their early
history than that of the classical Sunni caliphate.
ISIS most clearly resembles the Fatimid precursor in the conspic-
uous conjunction of two elements in its rhetoric and propaganda: an
immanent or already realized millenarianism and an unambivalent em-
brace of violence against other Muslims. Regarding the first, it is entirely
clear from the various propaganda statements ISIS has made through a
variety of outlets that its leadership views itself—or at least presents
itself—as having fulfilled a number of traditional prophecies concerning
a sequence of political events that are understood to be harbingers of
the fitan or struggles of the End Times, which will eventually usher in
the arrival of the Mahdī and the conflicts that will culminate in Judgment
Day.24 As already noted, the Fatimids claimed that the caliph who estab-
lished their rule in North Africa in 909 was the Mahdī, and that their
caliphate represented both the culmination ofhistory and the transfor-
mation of the world order. Millenarian anticipation has frequently been
a conspicuous feature ofmodern Shi’i movements as well, especially the
theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which appears to stem
from a longstanding emphasis on a chiliastic or messianic political ideo-
logy among modern Twelvers in particular.25
In contrast, the ideologies of Salafism and Wahhabism that have
generally provided the doctrinal resources for Sunni jihadist groups have
historically been far less prone to apocalypticism and messianism.26 ISIS
has enthusiastically adopted an apocalyptic orientation that has had
some traction in the Sunni world for a number ofdecades now, one that
is given credibility and authority through reference to a corpus of eschat-
ological ḥadīth that have always had an ambiguous status in Sunni learned
circles. Thus, ISIS claims that the caliphate ofAbū Bakr al-Baghdādī is a
crucial step on the path towards the apocalyptic final battle between the
forces of Islam and “Rome” (the West) that will culminate in the end of
the world and the ultimate triumph of Islam.
While the leadership cadres of older Sunni movements fostering
international jihad like Al-Qa’idah have at the very most only hinted that
their struggles have apocalyptic significance, millenarian tendencies
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have been simmering in the rank and file of the jihadist underground
for some time now.27 The centrality of such claims in ISIS’ propaganda
and doctrine may be due to these ideas gaining greater purchase through-
out the Islamic world in general over the last decade, or in the jihadist
underground more specifically. Admittedly, it is also possible that such
ideas have been prominent for some time, or even on the upswing, and
simply escaped the notice of outside commentators until recently. ISIS’
tendency to broadcast its ideology primarily in English through various
propaganda channels has served to remove whatever ambiguity about
their goals and motivations might have formerly prevailed in the Western
media.28
The second major area of similarity between ISIS and the Fatimids
is the former’s unambivalent willingness to not only harm other Muslims,
but to actually make use ofvarious rhetorical instruments to deny their
status as Muslims to justify aggression against them. In early Islamic his-
tory, the reigns of the Rāshidūn and the Umayyads thrived on the massive
successes of their campaigns of conquest against pagan Arab tribes, other
polities in Arabia, and then the Eastern Roman and Sasanian empires.
Under the Abbasids—whose rise was in no small part due both to the
decline of the expansionist military order upon which the Umayyads
had depended and the redirection of potent military forces in the east
back towards the center for the purpose of regime change—outward
expansion of the borders of the Islamic world slowed.29 However, even
the Abbasids conducted regular jihad against the Byzantines and other
neighboring polities and legitimated themselves thereby. This was also
true of the new Muslim states that gained autonomy as the central auth-
ority of the Abbasids gradually broke down, for example the breakaway
Umayyad state in Spain that openly declared its claim to be the legitimate
caliphate in 929 and flourished for a century, largely by preying upon
much weaker Christian principalities in the north.
Other, more recent Muslim statebuilding enterprises—some of them
caliphates—were forced to sustain themselves and expand by waging
war against communities of their fellow Muslims, legitimizing this in a
variety ofways. From the Middle Ages to the early modern period, jihads
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were proclaimed in numerous places throughout the Islamic world, as
often to muster religious support for offensive or defensive campaigns
against Muslim powers as to expand the borders of the dār al-Islām at the
expense ofneighboring Christian principalities, or defend against Chris-
tian expansion at Muslim expense. What a survey of the different circum-
stances in which jihad was proclaimed from the thirteenth century on-
wards reveals is that various Muslim religious authorities were willing
to justify expansion of their states or communities by victimizing their
fellow Muslims, usually by finding ways to describe their Islam as some-
how not genuine or deficient in some significant way. Ibn Taymiyyah,
who legitimated Mamluk warfare against the Ilkhanids of Iran, offers the
classic example of this tendency. Unsurprisingly, many modern jihadist
movements draw on Ibn Taymiyyah’s work to legitimate insurgency
against Muslim regimes.30
What seems to distinguish ISIS as a modern version of this pheno-
menon is its continuation of older, pre-modern tendencies synthesized
with more contemporary jihadist ideology, especially their propounding
of radical takfīr as the justification for fostering a state of war against
infidels and Muslims alike, including lethal aggression against Muslim
state entities, rival jihadist insurgencies, and even civilian populations.
The recent study of Rajan vividly describes the significant transitions
that have occurred in the international jihadist movement with the shift
from Al-Qa’idah and its affiliates, who generally maintained a disciplined
resistance to takfīr in favor of garnering popular support among the
widest possible Muslim constituency, and the full-throated embrace of
takfīr by ISIS and its affiliates, which Rajan characterizes as nothing short
ofgenocidal.31
The extreme behaviors embraced by ISIS, more radical and savage
than practically any Islamist group previously known, has provoked subs-
tantial debate in some circles as to whether or not ISIS is authentically
“Islamic.” The debate centers on whether one sees ISIS as an outgrowth
of certain prevalent trends in Islamic history, particularly older forms
ofmilitant Sunnism, or rather one sees their extremism as simply placing
it beyond the bounds of anything one might legitimately call “Islam,”
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defined by the historical experience and beliefs ofMuslim communities
throughout the world as well as the majority consensus on how Islam
and Sunnism should be defined.
This debate is deeply inflected by the larger social and political con-
text in contemporary North America and Europe, in which Islamophobic
institutions and ideologues compete for the political capital that accrues
to parties that rail loudly against the “Islamic threat.” This has the effect
ofmarginalizing minority Muslim communities in Western societies that
struggle to dissociate themselves from ISIS and other radical groups in
the public eye, yet are continually subject to the kinds of hostility and
discrimination that not only alienates the moderate majority but can
radicalize more vulnerable and less assimilated elements at the edges of
those communities. Thus, the academic debate over whether ISIS’
deviance from so many norms renders it essentially beyond the pale of
what can reasonably be recognized as Islam has occurred against a back-
ground of implicit or even explicit claims that ISIS and other violent
movements actually epitomize Islam—a contention that any objective
observer would find both historically and conceptually untenable, yet
has repeatedly been revived by right-wing politicians in France, America,
and other Western countries.32
There is some irony to this situation, because ISIS spokesmen them-
selves are intensely interested in the question ofwho is and isn’t really
Muslim and what is or isn’t legitimately Islam. In fact, it is their extreme
rhetoric on this issue that is one of the hallmarks of the ISIS movement,
and marks it as completely aberrant in traditional Sunni terms. Predic-
tably, the ISIS movement’s definition of “true Islam” is a rather narrow
one. At various points in its history the movement has alienated various
allies—to say nothing of larger Muslim publics, even those sympathetic
to Islamist insurgency—on account of its willingness to target civilians
and brand rival groups as apostates as a pretext to justify intimidation
and actual aggression against them.33 Yet radical groups seldom if ever
concede that they actually are radical, and ISIS is no exception. Rather,
they use nomenclature in a subtle way to cast their positions as original,
authentic, and essential to Islam, while characterizing those who hold
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different opinions and insist on a different definition of Islam to be out-
siders and deviants.
Thus, in its propaganda, the movement frequently refers to itself
and its followers simply as “the Muslims,” though this term is restricted
to those who support their cause and claims, accept their authority, and
acquiesce to living under their rule. By labeling the subjects of their cali-
phate simply as “Muslims,” ISIS both naturalizes the concept of its sove-
reignty and presents itself as authentically Islamic and perfectly main-
stream: they are the Islamic State, defined by their claim of authority
over “Muslims” in general, commensurate with the traditional conception
of caliphal sovereignty as universal. In contrast, those who resist, object,
or pledge their loyalty elsewhere are marked as deviant and sectarian
using a host of familiar labels such as murtadd (apostate) or munāfiq (hypo-
crite), and seldom if ever dignified by being recognized as Muslims.34
Somewhat more obscurely, ISIS propaganda refers to Shi’ah— whe-
ther Iraqis or Iranians—as “Ṣafawīs,” or “Safavids.” This is a reference to
the dynasty that ruled Iran from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century,
during which time the majority of the country was converted to Twelver
Shi’ism.35 This label serves three rhetorical purposes. First, like the other
labels for noncompliant or “deviant” Muslims employed by ISIS, it brands
Shi’ah as something other than simply Muslim, emphasizing Sunnism as
the norm or mainstream that ISIS represents and from which its oppo-
nents deviate. Second, it asserts a relatively recent origin for Shi’i com-
munities in the area, despite Shi’ism’s long history in Iran and especially
Iraq, in contrast to the original form of Islam that ISIS would claim its
particular interpretation of Sunnism represents.36 Finally, it links Iraqi
Shi’i communities to Iran, marking them as foreign and outsiders, in
contrast to the native Iraqi origins ofmuch of the ISIS leadership (never
mind the fact that Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqawī, ISIS’ spiritual godfather, was
a Jordanian and many of its supporters are foreigners or at least foreign-
born).37
Historically, one of the classic characteristics of Sunnism is its big
tent ideology—a rejection of sectarianism and embrace of diversity of
opinion. However, there is a perennial tendency found among some Sunni
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authorities to emphasize Sunnism as original and essential, “true” Islam,
at the expense of that very avoidance of extremism and acceptance of
diversity that is at the core ofhistorical, majoritarian Sunnism. It is these
elements within the Sunni fold that have gravitated towards takfīr as a
means of imposing their views, enforcing compliance with their definition
of orthodoxy, and policing the boundaries between what they define as
true Islam and error. The paradox is that labeling a fellow Muslim an
infidel based on their supposedly deviant words or deeds is generally
perceived as objectionable in Sunnism, but many Sunni religious author-
ities have leaned in the direction of castigating those who engage in
questionable practices, are insufficiently strenuous in their piety, or
adopt “heretical” dogmas as being virtually or actually beyond the pale
ofwhat can be called Islam.38
Despite this, the willingness to explicitly and unambiguously mark
fellow Muslims as outsiders is rather more conspicuous as a sectarian
tendency; this is one of the most obvious ways in which ISIS moves away
from what is traditionally considered the consensus positions of Sunnism
and towards others more readily associated with groups that were histor-
ically at the fringes of mainstream Muslim society. It is important to
emphasize here that the various communities of Zaydi, Isma’ili, and
Twelver Shi’ah are today generally much more accommodating towards
Sunnis in both their theology and their social practices. The Nizari
Isma’ilis in particular have become well-known for their promotion of
tolerance and a progressive ecumenism through the various philanthropic
initiatives supported by their spiritual leader, HH The Aga Khan. However,
many schools of Shi’ah originally espoused a militant ideology that rejec-
ted Sunnis—really anyone who failed to accept their claims—as heretics
no better than infidels, thus deliberately taking up a counter-establish-
ment position. This is a tendency that the Fatimids inherited from those
earlier militant groups, which articulated doctrinal positions of radical
anti-Sunnism as a politically expedient means of delegitimizing estab-
lished regimes that marginalized and persecuted the Shi’ah. As we have
noted, part of the militant posture of the Fatimid propaganda text is
rejecting the Sunni position as illegitimate by using specific negative
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epithets for Sunnis, referring to them as idolaters, Pharaohs, and the
“Jews of our community.” The use of code terms to mark insiders and
outsiders is a mainstay of sectarian discourse more broadly, but the
parallel with ISIS’ refusal to acknowledge its opponents as “Muslims,”
terming them apostates, hypocrites, Ṣafawīs, and so forth, is particularly
striking.39
Overall, the rationale behind the use of such language, whether in
the tenth or the twenty-first century, is not difficult to discern. Extolling
the virtues of one’s supporters as the true Muslims, those who are most
closely aligned with the spirit of Muḥammad’s teachings and whose
actions are cast as predetermined, the very fulfilment of prophecy, is
an obvious method of legitimizing a clear minority position. Conversely,
‘othering’ one’s fellow Muslims as outsiders, no better than dhimmīs or
infidels, has the effect of justifying their conquest, subordination, and,
if they resist, their enslavement or annihilation, as if they were not
Muslims at all. Calling the integrity of the Islam ofone’s opponents into
question and marking them as legitimate targets of violence gains par-
ticular urgency in an atmosphere saturated with apocalypticism, espe-
cially because the traditional prophecies explicitly assert that a state of
civil war, fitnah, will inevitably precede the coming of the Mahdī. This
is the exact reason why traditions on the terrible events of the End Times
are labeled fitan (the plural of fitnah), after the extreme internecine
struggles that will erupt within the community as harbingers of
apocalypse.
Waiting for the flood: Qurʾānic exegesis, prophetic history, and “intellectual
terrorism”
The ISIS movement’s invocation of the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, and other
classical sources of Islam in its propaganda has attracted significant
attention since they first rose to international prominence with their
capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, in the beginning of the
summer of 2014. However, when we peruse Dabiq, the group’s English-
language propaganda magazine, what we find is that their interpretation
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of the Qurʾān is typically implicit and allusive rather than overt and
direct. An example of this is the extended use of a specific qurʾānic theme
in an early issue ofDabiq, namely that ofNoah’s Ark.
This theme is treated prominently in the second issue ofDabiq; its
cover features a dramatic image of the Ark in a storm-tossed sea, with
captions highlighting the two main features contained therein: “It’s Either
the Islamic State or the Flood” and “The Flood of the Mubāhalah.” Rather
than engage in direct and systematic commentary on the Qurʾān, the
author of the first piece, one ‘Abū ʿAmr al-Kinānī,’ ruminates on the theme
ofNoah and the flood that destroyed his sinning people; his interpretation
communicates a sophisticated message about the Islamic State and its
various claims.40 As an example of sectarian, politically motivated exe-
gesis, ISIS’ approach to the qurʾānic topos of the flood offers us yet ano-
ther point of comparison with the Fatimids and other militant Shi’i
movements, as it has much more in common with the taʾwīl exegesis
practiced by Shi’i commentators on the Qurʾān than it does with classical
Sunni tafsīr.
In the Qurʾān, the story ofNoah is similar to that of the Bible in its
overall contours: God warns Noah of the impending destruction that He
will cause by submerging the earth beneath a great deluge; Noah is com-
manded to save his family by building an ark, to the ridicule ofhis con-
temporaries; subsequently, God’s foretold punishment for the sins of
humanity is realized and all living beings except those ensconced safely
on the Ark perish. The Bible describes all this in detail in Genesis 6–9,
while these details are largely just presupposed in the qurʾānic versions
of the narrative. However, the qurʾānic understanding of the narrative
differs from that of the Bible in various ways as well. For one thing, in
the Qurʾān there is very little description of the making of the Ark, the
coming of the deluge, or the destruction it wreaks on the earth, as in
Genesis. Instead, in keeping with the tendency to ‘flatten’ the biblical
stories of the prophets into their most basic details and emphasize their
most readily generalized elements, the qurʾānic versions of the story
tend to place great emphasis on a theme that is entirely absent from the
account in Genesis but resonates with the stories of other prophets found
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in the Qurʾān: Noah’s engagement with his wayward people to try to
persuade them to repent and their obstinate rejection ofhis message.41
This element of the qurʾānic portrayal of the Noah story is signi-
ficant because it is exactly the aspect of the story that ISIS emphasizes
in this piece in Dabiq. The story is invoked in the context of a polemic
against Muslims whom they dub the “proponents of choice” or simply
“the pacifists.” These people claim that coercion is wrong, and that
Muslims should not impose their views on others by force; all people
should have the freedom to choose to believe or not to believe as they
personally see fit. This is a traditional posture found among Sunnis and
Shi’is alike, generally based on a reading ofQ Baqarah 2:256, there is no
coercion in religion, for truth has been clearly distinguished from falsehood.42
As ISIS spokesmen see it, however, the qurʾānic Noah story presents clear
proof that this liberal ideal of free, unfettered choice in matters of faith
is wrong, insofar as the story presents a clear opposition between salva-
tion through cleaving to the truth and imminent destruction. The critical
aspect of the exegesis of the story that is presented (or implied) here is
that, in the view of ISIS’ spokeman, the coming of the flood cannot be
construed as God’s punishment on the infidels of Noah’s time due to
their disbelief, as is commonly presupposed. It is perhaps natural to think
so; this is certainly the basic understanding of the story in the Bible, and
the Qurʾān simply asserts that the unbelievers of Noah’s time were
destroyed in the deluge and subsequently damned to perdition in the
afterlife.43 The relationship between these two separate facts, which may
readily be interpreted as different aspects ofGod’s punishment upon the
disbelievers, is not typically perceived to be problematic.
However, ISIS’ spokesmen do see a logical problem here. The Qurʾān
repeatedly asserts that the punishment exacted for kufr is damnation to
Hellfire; so perishing in the flood cannot be a punishment for this sin
per se. So what is it? We may admire the ingenuity of ISIS’ exegete here
in discerning the answer, if only to recognize the adroit way that what
he perceives as a theological problem in the narrative provides him with
an expedient pretext for articulating a political doctrine important to
ISIS. If those who deny God are doomed to Hellfire, the flood can only
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be read as an instrument ofcoercion, a threat ofphysical destruction that
backs up Noah’s call to his people to repent. Essentially, Noah issues a
harsh threat to his people, believe or else; come with me and be saved,
otherwise drown and be damned. The threat is a legitimate means of
coercion intended to pressure people to submit to Noah’s message; it is
part of his characteristic “methodology.”44 ‘Abū ʿAmr’ even goes so far
as to state that if someone were to have believed in Noah’s basic message
of repentance, but claimed that he had no right to coerce people to follow
him, that denial of his prerogative to resort to coercion in and of itself
would constitute kufr.45
Strikingly, Noah’s approach or “methodology” is here openly char-
acterized as “intellectual terrorism.” It was his intention to scare people
into believing with the threat of imminent destruction: “He told them
with full clarity, ‘It’s me or the Flood’”—the phrase that inspires the title
of this feature in Dabiq.46 Further drawing on the image ofNoah’s Ark,
‘Abū ʿAmr’ emphasizes that only those who cleave to ISIS, associate with
their movement, pledge obedience to their caliph, and follow their teach-
ings can be saved: “in every time and place, those who are saved from
the punishment are a small group, whereas the majority are destroyed.”47
ISIS’ use of this imagery to communicate a basic point from their
political doctrine is particularly striking, because the image of Noah’s
Ark is commonly employed in Shi’i tradition as a figure for their commu-
nitarian theology. There is a well-known prophetic ḥadīth that states that
fitnah would come to flood the community, and the only way to salvation
would be to follow the Ahl al-Bayt or “People of the House,” that is, the
Prophet’s family.48 The Shi’ah have long interpreted this tradition to
mean that only those who recognize and obey the imāms from the family
of ʿAlī, the leaders recognized by their community, will find safe refuge
from the worldly conflicts that will (or have) rent the Muslim ummah;
they alone will survive the “flood” of fitnah and achieve both worldly
and ultimate salvation. Noah’s Ark has thus been a favorite motif of Shi’i
visual culture for many centuries.49 It is a natural image for a path to
salvation chosen by and available only to the very few.50 Given its recur-
ring emphasis on the tiny minority that have always followed the pro-
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phets and imāms, it is unsurprising that our Fatimid text cites this tradi-
tion:
[The Prophet said:] “Truly, I see fitnah seeping into your
homes like rainfall… But my House is like Noah’s Ark; the
one who boards it is saved, and the one who spurns it is
drowned. That is, the one who follows the path ofmy family
and cleaves to it will not be drowned in fitnah like the peo-
ple ofNoah were drowned in water…”51
The invocation of this imagery of the Ark and the Flood in both
Dabiq and the Fatimid text demonstrates in a vivid way that there are
certain symbols and ideas that have historically had significant traction
among Muslim groups that seek to utilize them for specific purposes. For
ISIS, the Ark that saves from fitnah or communal strife (as well as serving,
ultimately, as the sole vehicle for salvation) is not loyalty to the family
of the Prophet, as in our Fatimid text, but rather, as seen here in Dabiq,
immigrating to join ISIS to fight for the Islamic State under the banner
of their caliph.52 For ISIS, as for the Fatimids, only that tiny minority that
recognizes its claims and pledges obedience to them can be saved: to
quote Dabiq again, “in every time and place, those who are saved from
the punishment are a small group, whereas the majority are destroyed.”
In a strikingly similar way to the militant Shi’ah who sought to gain
support for their resistance to Sunni authorities over a thousand years
ago, ISIS’ rhetorical goal is to valorize the path of an elite minority and
to justify a posture of extreme militancy in support of their statebuilding
project and their extreme political doctrines and claims.53
Calling down God’s curse: Prophetic precedent and political intimidation
ISIS’ message is further distinguished by a unique exegetical flourish
found here in Dabiq. As noted above, this is a special issue ofDabiq devoted
to the theme of the Flood, with two separate pieces on this included
therein: first “It’s either the Islamic State or the Flood,” the piece on
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Noah’s intellectual terrorism discussed above, and then a second item,
a feature entitled “The Flood of the Mubāhalah.”54
Understanding the significance of this term mubāhalah requires
some familiarity with the traditional account of early Islamic history.
According to that traditional account, delegates from the Christian
community ofNajrān, the center ofArabian Christianity in the Prophet
Muḥammad’s day, once came to see him and disputed with him over
theological questions pertaining to the nature of Jesus. In response,
God revealed the qurʾānic verse which is now Q Āl ʿImrān 3:61:
Ifanyone disputes with you about this now, after knowledge of
the matter has come to you, Say: ‘Let us get together, our sons
and your sons, our daughters and your daughters, us and you,
and let us earnestly pray, and invoke the curse ofGod on those
who lie.’
The phrase “let us invoke the curse” renders Arabic nabtahil,
from the verb ibtahala; if two parties do this in opposition to one ano-
ther, the appropriate verbal form is tabāhala, from which the noun
mubāhalah, a mutual imprecation, derives. Muḥammad received this
verse from God, brought the members ofhis family together, and then
faced off against the Christians, who backed down because they were
intimidated, too frightened to call down God’s wrath as warrant for
the claims they made about Jesus. Ever after, this event has been called
the mubāhalah.55
This episode from the Sīrah is very important for Shi’ah, who
understand it to establish a significant role for Muḥammad’s family
as witnesses to and warrants for divine truth. While the Christians of
Najrān gathered learned adult men as their witnesses, Muḥammad is
sometimes described as coming to the assembly with only four people
accompanying him: ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, and their sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn.
This is one of a handful of events that seems to establish that Muḥam-
mad’s close relatives possessed a special authority and knowledge
based on their intimate relationship with him; the Prophet’s bringing
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them (and only them) to the confrontation implies an elevated status for
these individuals above all others, even a kind of partnership.56 Shi’i sour-
ces, including our Fatimid text, thus make much of this tradition, as it
seems to establish the special authority of the imāms of the Ahl al-Bayt.57
For ISIS, this episode is important for a different reason. Aston-
ishingly, the ISIS leadership has actually done this. Originally entering the
Syrian conflict in 2011 as ISIS’ proxy, the insurgent group most commonly
called Jabhat al-Nuṣrah quickly came to differ with the leaders of the
Islamic State over both strategy and tactics; by 2013 Jabhat al-Nuṣrah
had split from ISIS and the two groups commenced excoriating each
other in social media.58 In early 2014 the leadership of Jabhat al-Nuṣrah
began openly denouncing the ISIS leadership as Khārijites, invoking the
name of this notorious sect from early Islamic history to imply that ISIS
had left the Sunni fold due to its members’ extremism and open acts of
violence against other Muslims.59 In response, ISIS spokesman Abū
Muḥammad al-ʿAdnānī invited the leadership of Jabhat al-Nuṣrah (whom
they derogatorily refer to as Jabhat al-Jawlānī, after Abū Muḥammad al-
Jawlānī, the head of the organization) to a public dispute and a mubāhalah
to settle their grievances.
Here in Dabiq, the rationale and legitimacy of this action is explain-
ed in a few pages in a piece entitled “The Flood of Mubāhalah.” Intri-
guingly, the circumstances under which ISIS initiated this action receive
less attention than the lengthy explanation ofhistorical precedents for
it. In particular, the author notes that Muḥammad never asserted that
only his summoning ofGod’s curse against the Christians ofNajrān was
legitimate. Rather, various authorities are cited supporting the permis-
sibility of the practice in the time after Muḥammad, and a number of
examples of scholars invoking God’s curse in a mubāhalah against their
rivals in legal and doctrinal disputes are supplied.60
Why the mubāhalah against Jabhat al-Nuṣrah is to be likened to a
flood is not noted here; nor is the connection to the flood ofNoah’s time
explicitly parsed. However, we can infer, in light of the preceding piece
“It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” that a connection to Noah’s
preaching to his people, specifically his threatening them with destruc-
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tion as “intellectual terrorism,” is implied. This is exactly what the ISIS
leadership believes Muḥammad was doing with the mubāhalah, essentially
intimidating the Christians ofNajrān into acquiescing to his claims and
abandoning their own, since he knew he was right and they were wrong,
and God would intervene directly to vindicate him. Further, this is what
ISIS spokesmen see themselves as doing: committing intellectual terror-
ism against doctrinal rivals—or actual violence against people who will
not submit to them—as a legitimate means of coercing submission and
acquiescence to their claims. They believe themselves to be in the right
so strongly that they are willing to invoke God’s curse on any who gainsay
them. Moreover, since there is a well-known prophetic precedent for
this behavior, ISIS immediately gains the rhetorical advantage ofbeing
able to claim to be following in the footsteps not only of various Salafi
icons like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, but obviously of the
Prophet himself.61 This is but one of many examples of ways in which
ISIS and its supporters deliberately blur the distinction between past and
present and hearken back to the golden age of Islam’s founding that they
idealize.62
Valorizing violence at the end ofdays
The striking commonalities between Fatimid and ISIS propaganda—
in particular the conjunction between violence, coercion, and promised
retribution against those who deny their authority or defy their claims—
are arguably due to the necessity for both movements to justify their
revolutionary statebuilding projects in their respective historical and
political contexts. The Fatimids came to power in the tenth century by
overthrowing various governments and principalities in North Africa
that drew their legitimacy from either token or actual loyalty to the
reigning Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, forging a new caliphate through the
use of force backed up by alternative religious justifications. ISIS has
quite evidently done exactly the same thing against the background of
the nation-state system that has prevailed in the Middle East since the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Both groups rely on themes familiar
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from Islamic history, or topoi like Noah’s Ark drawn from the Qurʾān and
tradition, to drive a particular point home to their audience: a terrible
reckoning is coming, and only the in-group—whether ISIS or the Fati-
mids—will be saved, along with those that not only accept their doctrines
but acquiesce to their political authority.
Both movements not only project a message grounded in mille-
narian eschatology but use their millenarianism as a justification for
violence. This is true ofmany movements that espouse an apocalyptic
or chiliastic ideology. Not only does the claim that ISIS is fulfilling pro-
phecy serve to legitimize their authority, but the idea that a terrible
apocalyptic reckoning is coming inspires loyalty among their supporters,
and infuses their communications with a sense ofurgency that facilitates
the transgression ofboundaries and the violation of social norms.63 We
can recall again their blunt statement “it’s us or the Flood”: compounding
the psychological effects of the radical dislocation of recruits, commission
of extreme acts to cement allegiance to the group, imposing severe penal-
ties for desertion, and so forth, the projection of a sense of impending
danger and imminent cataclysm—a mentality, essentially, of apocalyptic
emergency—further serves as an instrument to subvert and overthrow
the behavioral and cognitive norms of recruits’ home communities and
ofMuslim society at large. Foremost here is the need to foster and justify
open hostility against other Muslims, a species of violence that most
forms ofhistorical Islam repudiate—and one that seems unjustifiable on
the basis of the Qurʾān, one might add.
On the other hand, given the strong sectarian impulse that charac-
terized some of the more militant schools of Shi’ah in early and medieval
Islam, these groups were more comfortable ‘othering’ Muslims who rejec-
ted the cause of ʿAlī and his family as unbelievers. For its part, the Fatimid
propaganda text refers to such rejecters and the regimes that they puta-
tively support as idolaters, hypocrites, and apostates—all terms that asso-
ciate Sunnis with categories of people whom the Qurʾān and Islamic tradi-
tion generally identify not only as enemies of the faith but as legitimate
targets of violence. One appellation for Sunnis in the text is especially
noteworthy, namely “the calf worshippers of our community.” In one
100 Michael Pregill
exceptional passage, the text uses the figure of the Israelites’ idolatrous
worship of the Golden Calf as a metaphor for those whose loyalties are
misplaced, following imāms who have abandoned the cause of the Ahl
al-Bayt instead of supporting them.
The qurʾānic as well as the biblical accounts of the Calf episode
depict the death of those who went astray worshipping it, albeit in dif-
ferent ways. In Exodus 32:25-29, Moses rallies the tribe of the Levites to
go through the camp and pacify the idolaters in a mass bloodletting. In
the Qurʾān, the Israelites seem to collectively recognize their guilt, and
Moses commands them to kill themselves to make things right with God.
The verse depicting this in Sūrat al-Baqarah has been interpreted in dif-
ferent ways, though the dominant strand in early exegesis at least was
that the key phrase, fa’qtulū anfuskakum (literally “kill yourselves”), means
“kill each other,” and so Moses was enjoining the Israelites to engage in
open combat, in which the innocent would overcome and slay the guilty.64
Evoking this image of the righteous Israelites purging the commu-
nity of idolaters in one of its most transparently chiliastic passages, our
Fatimid text proclaims that while repentance may formerly have been
an option for those who did not cleave to the correct imāms, now with
the coming of the Mahdī, the “gates of repentance” are shut tight for the
“calfworshippers”:
While in the time before the emergence of the Mahdī, the
community of the Prophet had to forego killing, when the
caliph al-Mahdī emerged, the gates of repentance were shut
tight for the Calf worshippers from this community—just as
they were shut tight for all those who did not believe before
the rising of the sun in the west…65
The Fatimid text’s reference to the slaughter of the Calfworshippers
exploits this qurʾānic portrayal of the purging of a sinning, deviant por-
tion of the prophetic community by those who follow the path of its true
leaders, dutifully rejecting the temptation to turn aside and cleave to
false idols instead. The sinister implication is that such a bloodletting is
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imminent for the Calfworshippers of the present day, those who reject
the imāms of the family of ʿAlī and follow idolatrous leaders instead, now
that “the rising of the sun in the west” (the advent of the Mahdī) has
taken place.
It is worth noting that Sunni exegetes have been extremely reluc-
tant to read the Sūrah 2 story in such a way. Although early exegetes
recognized the qurʾānic injunction to “slay yourselves” as Moses’ com-
mand to his loyal followers to purge the idolaters from the community,
already by the tenth century, Sunni exegetes appear to have disliked the
sectarian implications of this interpretation, and focused instead on
readings that saw the killing as a collective atonement—the whole com-
munity being punished for the crime of the Calf, guilty and innocent
alike—or even insisted that the ‘killing’ referred to in Q 2:54 is figurative.66
But for a sectarian movement like the Fatimids, the story is naturally
read as advocating a violent purge of deviant transgressors from the
community.
As for the Fatimids, so too for ISIS: apocalypticism justifies and
encourages radical acts of violence, enabling the remaking of society,
the redrawing ofboundaries, and redefinition of the entire ethos of the
community. With the apocalyptic final struggle impending, the division
between sinners and saved becomes an all-encompassing concern; there
is no in-between. Thus, a more recent issue ofDabiq, released in the after-
math of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, castigates Muslims who apolo-
gized for the killings or expressed solidarity with the victims. This is
discussed under the rubric “Extinction of the Grayzone.” The “gray-zone”
is exactly what it sounds like—that intermediate area where ISIS locates
Muslims who are not in solidarity with them but rather criticize them
and thus side with unbelievers— making them, essentially, infidels al-
though they may purport to be Muslims.67
Those dwelling in the grayzone are, in the eyes of ISIS’ spokesmen,
apostates, hypocrites, infidels, and so forth, and so unambiguously merit
death for their hypocrisy and disbelief. This “gray movement,” the Islam
of the “grayish,” has existed since the time of the Prophet, but must be
eliminated because Islam in their view is intrinsically about drawing a
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sharp distinction between truth and falsehood, with no room in the mid-
dle.68 ISIS’ position here confirms the idea that millenarianism, especially
millenarian violence, aims to remake the world as it is into something
radically new. This becomes abundantly clear when we recognize the
reconfiguration of society, the undoing of assimilation and liberalism
and diversity, that ISIS aims to achieve in the countdown to the Hour,
the clock having started with their proclamation of Abū Bakr al-Bagh-
dādī’s election by the Islamic State Shura Council in May 2010 and his
assumption of the caliphal title amīr al-muʾminīn or Commander of the
Faithful, supposedly in fulfillment of ancient prophecy.69
Conclusion
As with the militant Shi’i groups of early and medieval Islam, so
too with ISIS: notions of a saved minority and a sinning majority; an
absolute distinction between the upright and the errant, the damned
and the saved, with no room for a “grayzone” in between; and an immi-
nent judgment that will destroy the moderates and their false leaders,
ushering in a new era—all of these themes, alongside an embrace of truly
spectacular violence, the fostering of a state of ultrafitnah, a war of all
against all in the Muslim community—all of these serve to support the
creation of a new state, grounded in arguments based on the traditional
sources ofQurʾān and ḥadīth read through a conspicuously sectarian lens,
in the service of a new, militant, perfectionist order that eagerly anti-
cipates the coming of the apocalypse.70
To reiterate a point we made earlier, the ideology of ISIS is not
crypto-Shi’ism. The purpose of this comparative exercise has not been
to assert some direct line of influence from the Fatimids to their move-
ment, or imply that ISIS is a Sunni recurrence of the militant Shi’ism that
troubled the political, social, and religious order of the dār al-Islām a
thousand years ago. The reduction of all varieties of radicalism to a single
essence is clearly historically problematic. This reductionism has recently
been manifest in ill-considered attempts to compare ISIS to the ‘Assas-
sins,’ the aforementioned Nizari Isma’ili sect that conducted guerilla
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warfare (including targeted political killings, thus giving a name to this
phenomenon that persists today) against Sunni authorities in the ele-
venth and twelfth centuries. Happily, these careless comparisons have
been energetically and thoughtfully refuted quite publicly, particularly
by Farhad Daftary, perhaps the preeminent living scholar of the Isma’ili
tradition.71 To align ISIS and the Nizaris based solely on a stereotyped
conception of ‘Islamic terrorism’ does a clear disservice to the complex-
ities of the historical realities involved. While it is debatable whether
ISIS merits anything but the most strident condemnation, the Nizaris at
least have tended to be misapprehended and caricatured by Western
observers since the Middle Ages.
At the same time, as our treatment here has hopefully shown, care-
ful examination of the textual evidence points to specific points of simi-
larity between the rhetoric employed by the Fatimids and ISIS as exam-
ples of a recurring tendency within historical Muslim communities that
incline toward extreme sectarianism—that is, the resemblance is struc-
tural, possibly (for lack of a better word) sociological. Some of the paral-
lels are admittedly deep-rooted and likely stem from centuries-old histor-
ical interactions and processes of symbiosis between Sunnis and Shi’ah.
For example, the Sunni prophecy of twelve righteous caliphs who will
rule in the age before the coming of the Mahdī (with ISIS claiming that
Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī is the first of them) is clearly an appropriation of
the Shi’i tradition of enumerating twelve Alid imāms. Other parallels are
clearly due to the common vocabulary and images found in fitan tradi-
tions in Islam, upon which both Sunnis and Shi’ah alike draw; thus, ISIS
propaganda sometimes asserts that “the sun of jihad” has risen; the simi-
larity to the Fatimid invocation of the image of “the rising of the sun in
the west” to describe the establishment of their dominion in the Maghrib
may be due to the popularity of the ṭulūʿ al-shams prophecy in fitan sour-
ces, though it is also possibly due to simple coincidence.72
Moreover, at least some of the resemblances between ISIS’ rhetoric
and claims and those we more readily associate with militant Shi’ism
might be attributed to the diffuse influence of certain currents in contem-
porary Twelver Shi’ism in the Iraqi milieu. They may even be attributable
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to the personal background and experience of ISIS personnel. For exam-
ple, as McCants notes, Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī grew up in a lower middle-
class family in Samarra, “steeped in the mythology and ideas ofTwelver
Shi’ism”; he has even claimed descent from the Tenth Imām, ʿAlī al-
Hādī.73 Given the pervasive presence ofTwelver Shi’ism in contemporary
Iraq, for Iraqi Sunnis, opposition to Shi’ah by no means precludes accul-
turation to Shi’i ideas and traditions. More generally, the distinctive
fusion ofmillenarianism and insurgency that has given ISIS its bellicose
bite could readily have been communicated from Shi’i militias and
preachers, through propaganda, sermons, and the like, to Zarqawī, Abū
Bakr al-Baghdādī, and other AQI and ISIS operatives and ideologues.74
Overall, the discursive parallelisms between Sunni and Shi’i groups has
often been most acute when communities live in close proximity to one
another or have even been socially integrated to some degree, as has
often been the case in Iraq’s history.
However, all that said, our main goal here has been to show that
minority and marginal sectarian formations in Islam have often relied
on particular types of rhetoric, a symbolic language characteristic of
sectarianism, in order to justify their positions. This is especially true of
any Muslim group that seeks to articulate a religiously grounded argu-
ment sanctioning violence against their fellow Muslims. A logical fallacy
commonly found in media discussions of Islam is the tendency to abso-
lutize it as essentially violent or essentially peaceful; not only are reli-
gions as abstract concepts incapable of being violent or peaceable, but
even when we speak ofMuslims as individuals and communities possess-
ing full human agency, to attempt to characterize all Muslims as having
one or another personal quality, political orientation, or moral disposition
is of course ludicrous. Rather, as is the case with all religions, the textual
and traditional sources of Islam offer rich resources for believers to arti-
culate diverse positions. Some of those positions have been more typical
and deemed normative by consensus than others, to be sure; and judged
by the standard established by both historical and majoritarian forms of
Islam, there is no question that both the early Fatimids and ISIS—as
extreme sectarian formations—are aberrant. Nevertheless, we must
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recognize that the tradition does provide a symbolic language to those
who seek a pretext for tightening the definition ofwho the real members
of the community are and fostering violence against those within the
community who disagree.75 The coincidences in symbols, rhetoric, and
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Antiquity and Early Islam 17; Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1999), 168–189.
14. BL Or. 8419, 2a–b. This tradition is sometimes called the ḥadīth
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of juḥr ḍabb on account of the unusual image of the lizard hole it evokes
here. All translations from the Arabic are the author’s unless otherwise
noted.
15. Ibid., 1b. On the so-called firāq tradition, see Rubin, Between Bible
and Qurʾān, 117–146.
16. The Sunni polemical claim linking the Shi’ah and the Jews is at
least partially historically rooted in an ancient inclination towards ‘bibli-
cizing’ among the Shi’ah themselves, but took on a life of its own in here-
siographical literature. See Steven M. Wasserstrom, “‘The Šīʿīs are the
Jews of our Community’: An Interreligious Comparison within Sunnī
Thought,” in Ilai Alon, Ithamar Gruenwald, and Itamar Singer (eds.),
Concepts ofthe Other in Near Eastern Religions (Israel Oriental Studies XIV;
Leiden: Brill, 1994), 297–324.
17. For other Shi’i applications of this tradition, see Rubin, Between
Bible and Qurʾān, 186–189. The tradition may very well have originated in
anti-Shi’i polemic but was readily reoriented by Shi’i traditionists and
authors in order to turn the tables on Sunnis.
18. BL Or. 8419, 50b–51a. The perception of an analogy between the
harsh treatment meted out to the Israelites by the Egyptians and that to
which the Ahl al-Bayt were subjected was no doubt encouraged by Q
Qaṣaṣ 28:3–4, which refers to Pharaoh’s making the people of the land
into a party—a shīʿ ah—so as to weaken or oppress some of them.
19. Ibid., 79b.
20. On taʾwīl, see the classic discussion of Ismail K. Poonawala,
“Ismāʿīlī Taʾwīl of the Qurʾān,” in Andrew Rippin (ed.), Approaches to the
History ofthe Interpretation ofthe Qurʾān (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988),
199–222. To this should be added the new treatments ofDavid Hollenberg,
Beyond the Quran: Early Ismaʿili Taʾwil and the Secrets ofthe Prophets (Colum-
bia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2016, forthcoming) and Velji,
Apocalyptic History, 14–21. I am very grateful to both Prof. Hollenberg and
Prof. Velji for generously sharing their much-anticipated work with me
prior to final publication.
21. It is specifically the handful of allusions to a transformative
world event in BL Or. 8419 that mark it as likely originating in the early
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Fatimid milieu: the coming of the Mahdī as the fulfillment of the prophecy
of the “rising of the sun in the west” (ṭuluʿ al-shams min al-maghrib/ ghar-
bihā); see Pregill, 43–47. The promotion of this millenarian imagery
assisted the Fatimids in overthrowing Sunni authorities in North Africa,
especially the Aghlabids, and helped them to establish their dominion
as an alternative to that of the Abbasids to the east. However, the idea
that the End of Days was imminent was abandoned fairly quickly after
the founding of their caliphate, the fostering of apocalyptic urgency
proving, as it usually does, antithetical to the fostering of sustainable
institutions.
22. This is not to say that there are no other historical precedents
for ISIS’ fusion ofmilitant Sunnism and apocalypticism; another obvious
parallel is the Almohad Empire, which dominated Morocco and southern
Spain for a number ofdecades after its founding in the twelfth century,
thus almost contemporary with the Fatimids. Nevertheless, as we shall
see, it is the parallels between the propaganda of ISIS and the Fatimids
that appear most compelling, especially their employment of certain
qurʾānic tropes.
23. On ISIS’ idealization of the Abbasid Caliphate under Hārūn al-
Rashīd, see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, 131–135.
24. For succinct treatments of ISIS’ apocalyptic doctrines, see Stern
and Berger, ISIS: The State ofTerror, 219–231 and McCants, The ISIS Apo-
calypse, 99–119.
25. See Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism (London:
I. B. Tauris, 2009); Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam, 141–164.
26. The exception that proves the rule in this case being the move-
ment led by Juhaymān al-ʿUtaybī, which seized the Masjid al-Ḥaram in
Saudi Arabia in 1979. As is increasingly recognized now due to the release
of formerly classified documents, ʿUtaybī and his circle were Wahhābī
dissidents who were motivated by radical millenarian beliefs.
27. This appears to be particularly due to the influence of Abū
Muṣʿab al-Sūrī, a jihadist ideologue whose widely circulated treatise
A Call for Global Islamic Resistance is a bizarre mix of tactical pragmatism
and millenarian enthusiasm; see Filiu, Apocalypse in Islam, 186–191. David
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Cook has argued in an unpublished paper that Sūrī had a significant
impact on Zarqawī, head ofAQI and spiritual father of ISIS, who saw his
insurgent activities as fulfillments of the fitan prophecies Sūrī collected
(“Abu Musʿab al-Suri and Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi: The Apocalyptic Theo-
rist and the Apocalyptic Practitioner”; I thank Prof. Cook for sharing this
paper with me). Zarqawī was thus presumably the channel through whom
Sūrī’s apocalyptic enthusiasms were channeled to ISIS propagandists,
who have likewise presented their activities as the fulfillment of pro-
phecy. Already in fall 2014, Michael W. S. Ryan’s analysis of the first issue
of Dabiq recognized the importance of ISIS’ debt to Sūrī’s ideas (“Hot
Issue: What Islamic State’s New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic
Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerilla Doctrine,” Jamestown




28. When the first phase of the IS caliphate was destroyed with the
killing of its caliph, Abū ʿUmar al-Baghdādī, and its main director, Abū
Ayyūb al-Maṣrī, in early 2010, scattered reports in the media noted the
event as a success of US and Iraqi joint forces in suppressing what was
termed a ‘doomsday cult.’ The relative insignificance of the IS movement
at that stage seems to have precluded further investigation at the time.
It should also be noted that outside observers can really only track the
prominence of apocalyptic symbols and traditions in ISIS’ propaganda,
without any means of gauging the degree of authentic conviction among
either the leadership or the rank and file. As McCants and others have
noted, the black banner of ISIS was at least for a brief time associated
with a broadly defined ideal of Islamic popular resistance; see The ISIS
Apocalypse, 69–71.
29. See Khalid Yahya Blankinship, The End ofthe Jihād State: The Reign
ofHishām Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik and the Collapse ofthe Umayyads (Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 1994).
30. For a convenient overview of Ibn Taymiyyah’s legitimation of
jihad against the Ilkhanids, see David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley:
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University of California press, 2005), 63–66, and on his significant impact
on post-Qutbian jihadist ideology, see 106–110.
31. See V. G. Julie Rajan, Al Qaeda’s Global Crisis: The Islamic State,
takfir, and the Genocide of Muslims (London: Routledge, 2015); cf. Eli
Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihadi Ranks and the
Emergence ofNeo-Takfirism: A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis,” Islamic
Law and Society 21 (2014): 419–452. On the historical vicissitudes of takfīr
as a marginal but at times historically significant practice in Muslim
movements, see Camilla Adang et al. (eds.), Accusations ofUnbeliefin Islam:
A Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr (Islamic History and Civilization 123;
Leiden: Brill, 2016).
32. Much debate of these issues was stimulated by Graeme Wood’s
piece “What ISIS Really Wants,” published in the March 2015 issue ofThe
Atlantic. Wood and various informants quoted in the piece sought to en-
courage both the general public and specialists to recognize that many
of ISIS’ doctrines were rooted in certain trajectories found in certain
varieties of authentic historical Islam, as opposed to claims that ISIS is
simply aberrant and totally unrecognizable by traditional standards. In
turn, Wood was criticized for implying that ISIS is more representative
ofmainstream thought than they are, or worse, have a greater claim to
historical authenticity than more moderate ways of thinking among
Muslims—thus enabling right-wing critiques of Islam and Muslims as
intrinsically violent, fanatical, etc. Wood subsequently published a sum-
mary and analysis of some of the responses to his piece: see http://
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-
wants-reader-response-atlantic/385710/. To those Wood mentions here
should be added three very serious academic replies: Caner K. Dagli, “The
Phony Islam of ISIS,” The Atlantic, February 27, 2015; Anver Emon, “Is ISIS
Islamic? Why it Matters for the Study of Islam,” The Immanent Frame,
March 27, 2015 (https://tif.ssrc.org/2015/03/27/is-isis-islamic-why-it-
matters-for-the-study-of-islam/); and Aaron W. Hughes, “ISIS: What’s a
Poor Religionist to Do?”, Marginalia/MRBlog, March 4, 2015 (http://
marginalia.lareviewofbooks.org/mrblog-isis-whats-poor-religionist/).
33. ISIS’ tendency to alienate less radical groups, even those with
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which it was previously closely affiliated, is exemplified by their falling-
out with Al-Qa’idah, to whom they were formerly subordinate, and their
schism with Jabhat al-Nuṣrah, their former proxies in Syria. See Stern
and Berger, ISIS: The State ofTerror, 39–50, 177–198 and McCants, The ISIS
Apocalypse, 89–98. When the caliphate ofAbū Bakr al-Baghdādī was pro-
claimed, the massively influential jihadist ideologue Abū Muḥammad al-
Maqdisī presciently questioned “whether this caliphate will be a refuge
for oppressed people and a haven for every Muslim or will become a
sword hanging over the Muslims who oppose it” (quoted in McCants, The
ISIS Apocalypse, 118–119).
34. The noun murtadd is not attested in the Qurʾān, but is readily
derived from the verb irtadda, which has a very strong connotation of
rejecting the truth, as in Q Muḥammad 47:25. On the other hand, the
term munāfiq and its related forms are amply represented in the Qurʾān,
where nifāq seems to represent the quality not simply ofpeople who say
one thing and do another, but rather profess loyalty to the Prophet and
community while secretly subverting them. The tradition assigns this
label to a group of individuals who were officially pledged to support
Muḥammad during his time in Medina but resented and covertly opposed
him.
35. ISIS’ polemic against the Safavid spread of Shi’ism in Iran is
ironic, for their movement has significant things in common with that
of the early Safavids, particularly the exploitation ofmillenarian anti-
cipation to marshal military support for their cause; on this, see the
recent treatment in Colin P. Mitchell, The Practice ofPolitics in Safavid Iran:
Power, Religion and Rhetoric (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), esp. 19–67.
36. ISIS propaganda also uses the term rāfiḍah or rāfiḍīs for Shi’ah
in general. Alawite supporters ofAssad in Syria are distinguished by the
label “Shabbīhah,” with the regime being termed “Nuṣayri,” again as a
way to assert implicitly that they are something other than Muslim, as
opposed to their own supporters who are simply Muslim.
37. A recent issue ofDabiq (issue 13, Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 1437 [January-
February 2016]) features two pieces on the history of the “Rāfiḍah,” mix-
ing objective historical facts and traditional Sunni polemical tropes. The
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main feature, “The Rāfidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl” (32–45), gives
an extended history of rafḍ as a supposedly perennial threat to true belief
in the Muslim community, rehearsing the common Sunni claim that
Shi’ism both originates and culminates with Jews—beginning with the
heresy of Ibn Sabaʾ and ending with the emergence of the Dajjāl or Anti-
christ, both figures being identified as Jewish. Overall, the Iranian char-
acter of Shi’ism is stressed, and the piece vacillates in a somewhat contra-
dictory fashion between characterizing Shi’ism as an ancient heresy and
emphasizing its spread as a late innovation; the latter is the specific focus
of the first piece on the subject in the issue, “From the Pages ofHistory:
The Safawiyyah” (10–13).
38. There is, however, an important distinction to be made between
an activism that employs violence and seeks to force the social world to
conform to pure, ideal Islamic standards and engaging in such discourse
as a means of disciplining the self and demarcating social boundaries.
On this complex question, see the discussion of Ibn Ḥanbal in Thomas
Sizgorich, Violence and Beliefin Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania, 2009), 231–271, esp. 263 ff. Once one group within the
community begins branding another as infidels, the rhetoric tends to be
contagious; thus, recently the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia dismissed
allegations ofmalfeasance in the Saudi organization of the Hajj by the
Khamenei regime in Iran by saying that Iranians are not truly Muslims
but rather majūs (Zoroastrians) (“Saudi Arabia’s Top Cleric Says Iranians
are ‘Not Muslims,'” BBC.com, September 6, 2016 [https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-37287434]). It is not difficult to imagine that
casual takfīr of this sort has become more acceptable given ISIS’ relentless
recourse to such language.
39. It is virtually indisputable that the Fatimid propaganda text em-
ploys this discourse to authorize violence against other Muslims, though
its takfīr is only implicit. That is, the terms kāfirūn or kuffār seem to only
be invoked in the text in reference to the infidels who opposed Abraham,
Moses, or Muḥammad, not the author’s contemporaries. However, one
can infer from the different descriptions of behavior deemed kufr here
that an analogy between infidels who explicitly deny God and those Mus-
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lims who reject the claims of the Ahl al-Bayt is implied. As is often the
case among Muslim groups in general, Isma’ili authors exhibit a variety
of attitudes toward this question. The recent discussion ofDe Smet shows
that spokesmen like al-Kirmānī (d. c. 1021) stridently rejected the Sunni
accusation that their creed constituted kufr, yet many Isma’ilis did not
shy from characterizing both Sunnis and Shi’ah (and even other Isma’ilis)
whose views they believed to be too radical to be kuffār. See Daniel De
Smet, “Kufr et takfīr dans l’ismaélisme fatimide: Le Kitāb Tanbīh al-hādī
de Ḥamīd al-Dīn al-Kirmānī,” in Camilla Adang et al. (eds.), Accusations
ofUnbeliefin Islam, 82–102.
40. “It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” Dabiq 2 (Ramaḍān
1435 [June-July 2014]): 5–11. Nothing seems to be known about the author,
who has been credited with a number of articles that have appeared in
Dabiq over the last two years.
41. On the qurʾānic depiction ofNoah and its relationship to biblical
and postbiblical traditions, see William M. Brinner, “Noah,” in Jane Dam-
men McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia ofthe Qurʾān (6 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2001
–2006), 3.539–544.
42. This verse underwent a significant shift in interpretation over
the course of several centuries, its more literal meaning as prohibiting
conversion by the sword gradually eroding in favor of a more spiritualized
exegesis, namely as a reference to the question of predestination. Never-
theless, its force as a testimony that disbeliefhad to be tolerated rather
than forcibly eradicated never went away completely. See Patricia Crone,
“No Compulsion in Religion: Q. 2:256 in Medieval and Modern Interpre-
tation,” in Mohammed Ali Amir-Moezzi, Meir M. Bar-Asher, and Simon
Hopkins (eds.), Le shīʾ isme imāmite quarante ans après: Hommage à Etan Kohl-
berg (Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses 137;
Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 131–178, repr. in Patricia Crone, The Qurʾānic
Pagans and Related Matters: Collected Studies in Three Volumes, Volume 1 , ed.
Hanna Siurua (3 vols.; Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts
129; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 351–409. For a classic example of the theological
implications of the opposite case, namely coercion to disbelief(or at least
prevention ofattestation ofbelief), see Eric Ormsby, “The Faith ofPha-
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raoh: A Disputed Question in Islamic Theology,” in Todd Lawson (ed.),
Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim
Thought. Essays in Honour ofHermann Landolt (London: I. B. Tauris in asso-
ciation with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005), 471–489.
43. Cf., e.g., Q Nūḥ 71:25.
44. The pursuit of daʿwah according to the proper “method” is part
of a broader concern with the path or methodology for establishing the
caliphate and summoning Muslims to support it evinced in ISIS propag-
anda materials. This is because the ḥadīth the movement commonly cites
as foretelling the restoration of the caliphate asserts that this will tran-
spire “according to the prophetic method” (al-khilāfah ʿalā manḥāj al-
nubuwwah); it is attested in a number ofmajor collections, including those
of al-Tirmidhī and Ibn Ḥanbal (ironically, the ḥadīth is typically related
from the Prophet by Ḥudhayfah b. al-Yamān, understood by the Shi’ah
to have been one of the major partisans of ʿAlī and his family among the
Companions). ISIS no doubt interprets the “prophetic method” as mean-
ing pursuit of the caliphate in accordance with the sunnah of the Prophet
Muḥammad—or, as imagined here, the sunnah of other prophets such as
Noah. If the Qurʾān establishes that coercion was the manḥāj used by
Noah, this validates their own use of coercive tactics. Regarding more
recent precedents, ISIS is not shy about asserting its preference for the
manḥāj ofZarqawī regarding the question ofdealing with the Shi’ah, as
opposed to the tolerant manḥāj adopted by such bastions of liberalism
as the Taliban and Al-Qa’idah; see “The Rāfidah,” 39–42.
45. As explained in Dabiq 2: “Furthermore, if anyone in the time of
Nūh (ʿalayhis-salām) called to the principle of free choice for the people
of Nūh, stating that Nūh is a caller to the true path but has no right to
force people to follow his daʿwah, such an individual would be considered
a disbeliever in the daʿwah of the Prophet Nūh even if he held it to be the
truth in and of itself” (“It’s Either the Islamic State or the Flood,” 9).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See discussion in Rubin, Between Bible and Qurʾān, 95–97.
49. See the exhaustive treatment of the subject by Raya Shani,
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“Noah’s Ark and the Ship of Faith in Persian Painting from the Fourteenth
to the Sixteenth Centuries,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 27 (2002):
127–203.
50. A similar elitism marks Gnostic interpretations of the biblical
story, though these more commonly tend to emphasize the Flood as the
work of a hostile Demiurge that destroyed the corrupting works of the
flesh on earth, rather than the Ark as a symbol of providential protection
for those who cleave to the truth. See Sergei Minov, “Noah and the Flood
in Gnosticism,” in M. E. Stone et al. (eds.), Noah and His Books (Judaism
and Its Literature 28; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2010), 215–236.
51. BL Or. 8419, 32a. The early Safavids were likewise prone to invoke
biblical images in combination with militant rhetoric, and so they too
made us of this ḥadīth to urge their followers to cleave to them faithfully
as the sole refuge from turmoil and strife. See Mitchell, Practice ofPolitics,
30–46.
52. The duty ofMuslims to emigrate to fight for or otherwise sup-
port ISIS is a recurring theme in their doctrine and propaganda; it was
the main feature ofDabiq 3 (Shawwāl 1435 [July-August 2014]). The call
to Muslims to commit to hijrah to support the cause of revival, in emu-
lation of the emigration of the Prophet and his Companions from Mecca
to Medina, has been a staple of jihadist rhetoric for decades, and was
particularly prominent in the propaganda of Al-Qa’idah. It was most
likely first popularized in the writings of the Egyptian Shukrī Muṣṭafā,
whose organization Jamaʿat al-Muslimīn emerged as part of the larger
Islamist resistance to the Sadat regime in the 1970s; their emphasis on
separating from Egyptian society, which they considered to be in a state
of total apostasy, earned the group the derogatory name Takfīr wa’l-Hijrah.
See Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Ber-
keley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1985), 73–78. On the Isma’ili call to
hijrah in support of their imāms, see Velji, Apocalyptic History, 36–38.
53. Notably, at least in the issue ofDabiq upon which we have focus-
ed here, ISIS’ propagandistic use of the motif of the flood evokes Shi’i
parallels much more than it does other instances of flood imagery invoked
in apocalyptic traditions of a less overtly sectarian nature. For example,
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see Cook’s concise discussion of the so-called “tradition of Thawban,”
mentioned in some pro-Al-Qa’idah writings of the 1990s and 2000s: see
Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, 10–11, 182–183.
54. This second feature is not specifically credited to an author; one
supposes it is also the work of ‘Abū ʿAmr.’
55. There are a number ofwidely disseminated ḥadīth reports about
the episode, some ofwhich are found in major canonical sources. Some
of the early accounts lack any reference to Muḥammad’s family at all;
for example, Ibn Isḥāq’s account focuses on the revelation of some eighty
verses from Sūrah 3 (Āl ʿImrān, which deals at great length with Jesus
and Mary) to the Prophet in response to the challenge of the Najrānī
delegates, but does not mention his family as witnesses (The Life ofMuham-
mad: A Translation of Isḥāq’s [sic] Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, trans. A. Guillaume
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955], 270–277). Compare the fully
“Shi’ified” version related in Shaykh al-Mufīd: Kitāb al-Irshād: The Book of
Guidance into the Lives ofthe Twelve Imams, trans. I. K. A. Howard (Qom:
Ansariyan Publications, 2007), 116–119.
56. This incident is thus closely related to that of the kisāʾ or mantle,
which establishes ʿAlī, Fāṭimah, and their sons as the “People of the
House” referred to in Q Aḥzāb 33:33. For convenient discussions of the
relationship between these two events in the context of larger questions
about authority and succession, see Wilferd Madelung, The Succession to
Muḥammad: A Study ofthe Early Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 14–16 and Oliver Leaman, Controversies in Contemporary Islam
(London: Routledge, 2013), 8–12; for discussion of the differences in inter-
pretation of the tradition between moderate and more radical branches
ofthe Shi’ah, see Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects, esp. 77–87.
57. Oddly given its vociferous advocacy for the claims of the Ahl
al-Bayt on the one hand and its vehement criticism of Jews and Christians
on the other, the episode of the mubāhalah does not receive as much
attention in the Fatimid text as one might expect. In one passage, Q 3:61
is quoted and the reference to “your sons” explained as Ḥasan and Ḥusayn
(who were actually Muḥammad’s grandsons), on the basis of the mubā-
halah event (BL Or. 8419, 47b). In several passages the importance of ʿAlī,
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Fāṭimah, Ḥasan, and Ḥusayn as the “People of the House” or “People of
the Cloak” is stressed, but overall it seems to be assumed here that, as
with other key aspects of traditional Shi’i argument for the authority of
the Alid imāms, the audience is familiar with the basic issues and so the
episodes are not recounted at length.
58. On the fractious (and fratricidal) history between ISIS and Jabhat
al-Nuṣrah, see McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, 85–98.
59. Over the last year, the Nuṣrah leadership has continued to seek
support for its campaign against the Assad regime in Syria by distancing
itself from ISIS and its atrocities, and particularly by emphasizing signi-
ficant differences between their ideology and that of ISIS—for example
by reiterating the illegitimacy of targeting civilians. In other ways, how-
ever, they remain barely distinguishable from ISIS, mistreating religious
minorities and forcibly imposing “Islamic” codes of dress and modesty
in territory they control. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Aymenn Jawad
al-Tamimi, “Druze Clues,” Foreign Affairs, October 5, 2015 (https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-05/druze-clues). Famous-
ly, a jihadist fighting for Nuṣrah in Syria appeared in a video urging
righteous Muslims in the area to resist ISIS as khawārij after their killing
of civilians in Aleppo in August 2015; this video was very widely circulated
on the Internet via social media and received significant exposure in
Western countries due to the fact that the spokesman in the video is Abū
Baṣīr al-Brīṭānī, a young English convert. Many other Muslim groups and
spokesmen have jumped on the bandwagon ofbranding ISIS as khawārij
as a gesture marking their behavior as wholly unacceptable and un-
Islamic. A persuasive argument to this effect grounded in the ḥadīth has
been made repeatedly by Yasir Qadhi, who notably has been denounced
in Dabiq and effectively marked for death by ISIS.
60. “The Flood of Mubāhalah,” Dabiq 2 (Ramaḍān 1435 [June-July
2014]): 20–30; see especially 20–22 on the justifications for engaging in
mubāhalah. The roster of scholars who invoked God’s curse against rivals
provided here is an impressive one, including Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Awzāʾī, Ibn
Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalānī, and Ibn ʿAbd
al-Wahhāb. Admittedly it is not only Sunnis who have engaged in this
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practice historically, nor only ISIS that has done it in modern times; Mīrzā
Ghulām Aḥmad, founder of the Ahmadi sect, summoned both Hindu and
Christian challengers to mubāhalah; see Simon Ross Valentine, Islam and
the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, Belief, Practice (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2008), 47–51.
61. Moreover, since the first and most famous mubāhalah was in-
voked by Muḥammad against Christians, the implicit dynamic that anyone
invoking the curse against rivals establishes is that they are following
the sunnah of the Prophet while their opponents are not only in error
but actually the equivalent of infidels. Conversely, Nuṣrah lose the rhetor-
ical high ground here, for while no one wants to be called a Khārijite,
Sunnis at least tend to be rather ambivalent about the political conflict
that spawned this sect. Imitating the actions of the Prophet himself in a
confrontation in which he was indisputably in the right grants far more
prestige than imitating his cousin and son-in-law ʿAlī in the internecine
conflict of the First Fitnah.
62. See the trenchant analysis of jihadist poetry by Robyn Creswell
and Bernard Haykel, “Battle Lines,” The New Yorker, June 8–15, 2015,
emphasizing the idealized past that fills the landscape of the ISIS imagin-
aire: “The culture of jihad is a culture of romance. It promises adventure
and asserts that the codes ofmedieval heroism and chivalry are still rele-
vant…” The poetry composed by ISIS supporters is littered with deliberate
anachronisms, such as the reference to jihadist enclaves as ribāṭs, a term
that traditionally refers to a fortress on the border of Islamic territory
from which ghāzīs, warriors for the faith, would sally forth to raid against
their enemies.
63. Fostering loyalty among recruits, especially children, is also
achieved through methods typically employed by insurgent and terrorist
organizations such as desensitization to violence and forced complicity
in atrocity, a point emphasized by Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of
Terror, 210–215. On the waning impact of ISIS broadcasts of video atrocity
despite repeated escalations, see J. M. Berger’s recent commentary, “The
Decapitation Will Not Be Televised,” Foreign Policy, July 3, 2016 (https://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/ 03/isis-roller-ball-hunger-games-cinema/).
122 Michael Pregill
64. Q 2:54. See my discussion of the politically-charged exegesis of
this qurʾānic topos in “‘Turn in Repentance to your Creator, then Slay
Yourselves’: The Levitical Election, Atonement, and Secession in Early
and Classical Islamic Exegesis,” Comparative Islamic Studies 6:1–2 (2010):
101–150.
65. BL Or. 8419, 30b–31a.
66. Pregill, “‘Turn in Repentance,’” 142 ff.
67. “Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq 7 (Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 1436
[January-February 2015]): 54–66.
68. On the polarizing effect created by ISIS and its terror campaigns
in Europe in particular, see Karim El-Gawhary, “No More Shades ofGrey,”
Qantara.de, March 28, 2016 (https://en.qantara.de/content/is-attacks-
in-brussels-no-more-shades-of-grey). Notably, a team ofRussian scholars
published a book in fall 2015 recommending that the Russian state adopt
a conciliatory policy ofpromoting national unity through emphasizing
the historic ties between Orthodoxy and Islam as a strategy for achieving
security; part of the proposed strategy rests upon state support for tradi-
tional expressions of Islam while openly condemning ISIS as an aber-
ration. See Paul Goble, “New Russian Book Says Only Ideological Approach
Can Defeat Islamic State,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor,
October 21, 2015 (https:// jamestown.org/program/new-russian-book-
says-only-ideological-approach-can-defeat-islamic-state-2/).
69. It has often been observed that the apocalyptic mentality aims
at refashioning the world, but that this impulse is also radically restor-
ative as well—the new order achieved at the culmination of history in
some way recapitulating, mirroring, or embodying the pristine order
that stood at the beginning of things. This atavism is manifest not only
in ISIS’ insistent aping of supposed prophetic precedent—a kind ofhyper-
Sunnism that defies all aspects ofwhat Sunnism has historically repre-
sented—but in symbolic gestures like the use of Muḥammad’s seal on
their flag and the adoption of the regnal name Abū Bakr by Ibrāhīm
ʿAwwād Ibrāhīm al-Badrī. This is obviously meant to hearken back to
Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (r. 642–644), Muḥammad’s father-in-law and the first
caliph of the community.
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70. But not too soon; as McCants notes, by emphasizing the return
of khilāfah as the fulfillment of prophecy, ISIS quietly distracts its follow-
ers from the question of when the Mahdī will appear, thus insulating
themselves from disconfirmation and disappointment (The ISIS Apocalypse,
142–144).
71. See Farhad Daftary, “Islamic State and the Assassins: Reviving
Fanciful Tales of the Medieval Orient,” The Conversation, February 26, 2016
(https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-and-the-assassins-reviving-
fanciful-tales-of-the-medieval-orient-53873). The use of “Assassins” as
a simple shorthand for any Muslim group that engages in extreme acts
is unfortunately encouraged by sensationalistic and misleading depictions
of that group in both fiction and nonfiction.
72. Shi’i sources more broadly speak of the moment ofmillenarian
deliverance of the faithful as the “rising” of the Mahdī or the Qāʾim (ano-
ther term for the Mahdī or Imām of the End Times).
73. See the biographical notes on al-Baghdādī in McCants, The ISIS
Apocalypse, 73–79.
74. In his chapter on contemporary Shi’ism, Filiu notes the rapid
communication of apocalyptic ideas across Shi’i communities in Iraq,
Iran, and Lebanon over the last ten years, especially intensifying from
2005 to 2006 (Apocalypse in Islam, 141–164). There is no reason we should
suppose that Sunni communities in the same areas, living in close prox-
imity to Shi’i communities, consuming the same media and participating
in the same political and social discourse, would not be affected by this
trend as well.
75. Thus, it is particularly important to recognize that there is no
neutral, unmotivated reading of the normative sources in Islam or any
other religious tradition; every reading reflects a combination of inheri-
ted tradition and individual and communal inclination. Over the cen-
turies, Twelver Shi’ah have generally rejected a reading of the Qurʾān
that authorizes violence against other Muslims in favor of a more depoliti-
cized hermeneutic. Notably, under particular historical and cultural cir-
cumstances, a highly politicized reading of the Qurʾān came to be
popularized again by Iranian Shi’ah; in the later twentieth century, the
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Qurʾān was increasingly understood to be a revolutionary document,
emphasizing martyrdom as a politically necessary creed and enabling
the articulation of an ideology that contributed to the Iranian Revolution
in 1979 (or at least justified a theocratic cooptation of a popular revolt).
See the systematic study ofNajibullah Lafraie, Revolutionary Ideology and
Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).
Response to Michael Pregill,
“ISIS, Eschatology, and Exegesis”
Kenneth Garden
Michael Pregill’s approach here is a fruitful alternative to the ques-
tion: “How Islamic is ISIS?” In its place he asks: “What kind ofMuslims
make up ISIS? Whom in Islamic history do they most resemble in their
rhetoric and use of scripture, and what does this tell us about their posi-
tion, their appeal, and—perhaps—their prospects?”
The parallel he has found, the Isma’ili Shi’ite Fatimid dynasty of
the tenth to twelfth centuries, is a striking one. ISIS is a fanatically sec-
tarian Sunni movement, and it is ironic that the group’s unusual inter-
pretation of the episode ofNoah’s Ark in its online magazine Dabiq was
anticipated by a Shi’ite dynasty. But the point here is not that this makes
ISIS somehow unconsciously Shi’ite. Rather it suggests that ISIS, like the
Fatimids, is trying to legitimate itself and the gruesome violence it per-
petrates to a Muslim community that largely rejects its message. The
Fatimids ruled over North Africa and the Levant from Egypt. Their Mus-
lim subjects, even in the capital city they founded, Cairo, remained Sunni.
ISIS likewise has proclaimed a new caliphate and demands recognition
from a worldwide Muslim community that has roundly rejected its call.
Both groups resort to scriptural rhetoric to justify their earthly failure
to win a mass following and threaten recalcitrant fellow Muslims.
As Pregill explains, the Noah of the Qurʾān called to his community
over and over to abandon its sinful ways, to no avail. Of course his sinful
neighbors would be punished in the afterlife for their rejection, but God
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and his prophet were not content with that. Rather, they had to be threa-
tened with an earthly punishment to compel earthly compliance. The
proselytizing of the Fatimids among their Sunni subjects fell on deaf
ears, just as ISIS finds most all of the world’s Muslims content to inhabit
what it has defined as the “grayzone” of Islamic practice that does not
recognize the group’s religious and political authority. For these deniers,
the flood looms.
Of course, the ISIS leadership takes their interpretation of the Noah
story in a different direction; for them, ISIS itself is the flood. Invoking
the incident of the mubāhalah, as the Fatimids did as well, though to a
different end, ISIS links it to the Noah narrative, referring to “the Flood
of the Mubāhalah.”1 Much as Muḥammad frightened his opponents into
backing down in a religious dispute by invoking God’s curses on which-
ever party was in the wrong, ISIS threatens its own opponents with des-
truction—at its hands—if they continue to oppose the group. ISIS is the
messenger and the punishment in one, even as the group also claims to
be the harbinger of a coming apocalypse.
These are Islamic arguments, but not because they objectively
represent “true” Islamic doctrine as plainly stated in scripture. As Pregill
points out, ISIS seeks to legitimate itself scripturally by invoking qurʾānic
passages or ḥadīth that proclaim the sanctity of the pious minority, such
as the ḥadīth of the stranger, which states that “Islam began as a stranger
and will return to being a stranger as it began, so blessed be the stran-
gers,” or the ḥadīth of the “saved sect,” in which the Prophet says that
his community will be divided into seventy (or seventy-two) sects, of
which all but one will end up in hellfire.2
But Islamic scripture can be invoked to make precisely the opposite
case by invoking ḥadīth such as “If you see a dispute, side with the major-
ity,” or “my community will never agree upon an error.”3 What makes
a group (very) Islamic, as Graeme Wood says of ISIS, is not its doctrine
or the amount of scripture it cites, but rather its ability to present its
doctrine in a language that links it to Islamic scripture and tradition in
a way that other Muslims feel obliged to engage with it. This is not to
say that doing so will win a majority following; a wide-ranging consensus
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could still reject and refute ISIS’ doctrine, as indeed it has. The point is
that other Muslims feel addressed in a way they don’t by moral claims
that invoke the life of the Buddha or the letters ofPaul.
Pregill’s exercise here points to a typology of Islamic self-repre-
sentation and legitimation. What kind of Muslims avail themselves of
the sorts of interpretations of the particular texts that ISIS evokes?
Minority groups resigned to the rejection of their understanding of Islam
by the Muslim population over which they claim sovereignty. With this
reading of the Noah story, ISIS, like the Fatimids before them, makes its
rejection by its fellow Muslims a point ofpride. The group’s leadership
cast themselves as lonely proclaimers ofGod’s truth in a gray, apostate
world who will see themselves vindicated in the end. And they present
the violence they threaten and practice to force acquiescence to their
rule as godly “intellectual terrorism” with precedent in the life of the
Prophet himself.
This is not how a group successfully winning hearts and minds
reads scripture. We would do well to remember this when we wonder
about their standing in the world Muslim community.
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Notes
1. “The Flood of the Mubāhalah,” Dabiq 2 (Ramaḍān 1435 [June–July
2014]): 20–22.
2. Islam began as a stranger: e.g., Muslim b. Ḥajjāj , Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim,
imān 145–146, bāb 65 (bayān anna’l-islām badaʾa gharīban…), nos. 270–271;
among the Six Books, this tradition is also attested in the collections of
Ibn Majah and al-Tirmidhī. The division of the ummah into sects: e.g.,
Abū Dāwūd al-Sijistānī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, sunnah 1–2, nos. 4579–4580; also
attested in Ibn Majah and al-Tirmidhī.
3. Usually known as the sawād al-aʿẓam or tradition of the ‘greatest
majority’: e.g., Muḥammad b. Yazīd Ibn Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, fitan 25,
no. 3950.
ISIS: The Taint ofMurji’ism
and the Curse ofHypocrisy
Jeffrey Bristol
Abstract
This paper is an attempt to analyze one facet of ISIS’ discourse in order
to understand why the movement chooses the arguments it does and
how it uses them to achieve particular goals. One of the most commonly
occurring tropes in ISIS propaganda is its critique of its opponents as
“Murji’ites.” The Murji’ites were a school of Islamic thought that emerged
early on in the history of the Muslim community, and ideas and claims
associated with them were critical in debates over Islamic identity and
the path to salvation. In the modern era, various movements have re-
interpreted the traditional discourse on the Murji’ites in specific ways,
and ISIS spokesmen draw on both classical and modern elaborations of
an idea of Murji’ism to polemicize against Muslims who resist their
claims and fail to support them. Thus, we see that ISIS does not create
its rhetoric out of whole cloth, but borrows pieces from Islamic intel-
lectual tradition selectively and engages with older Salafist ideas in the
articulation ofa new ideology.
doi: 10.17613/t7ev-0j45 Mizan 1 (2016): 129–166
130 Jeffrey Bristol
Introduction
There are many tropes threaded throughout the propaganda of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.1 It uses these themes to create a com-
pelling message both to inform the world of its intentions and win re-
cruits to its cause. These themes are usually drawn from traditional
Islamic discourse, which serves to plug the group into the greater reli-
gious tradition and presents it as having a legitimate religious voice. It
also helps the group define and delineate what it considers “Islamic”
and what not. One of ISIS’ most commonly used tropes is its critique of
opponents as “Murji’ites,” a school of Islamic thought that developed in
the early period of the Islamic community and was central in debates
concerning Islamic identity and salvation.
ISIS uses the term murjiʾī as a pejorative, though what it means by
the label is not always clear. It is often associated with ideas ofhypocrisy
(nifāq), oppression (ṭaghūt) and innovation (bidʿah). These three concepts
create a powerful trinity in ISIS’ view of Islam and the world and are
instrumental parts of its use of ideology to create and maintain a state
based on its narrow and specific reading of the Islamic intellectual tradi-
tion and its identification ofwhat “correct” Islam is.
As we shall see, Murji’ism is a complex topic. Whether one speaks
of the mainstream Islamic intellectual tradition or the specific interpre-
tation of ISIS, Murji’ism often reflects contemporary needs for vilification
or spurring followers to political action. While Murji’ism began as a res-
ponse to a specific split within the Islamic community, a response intend-
ed as a compromise position to avoid division, it turned just as quickly
into a vehicle for political and theological mobilization—in some cases
as a rallying cry, but in most as a pejorative heresy.2 The latter conception
has been the most enduring in history, and turned Murji’ism into a school
where many might accept its tenets but few would espouse them out-
right.
While the development ofMurji’ism as a school of thought that no
one subscribes to but many degrade is interesting in and of itself, what
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is significant is how ISIS uses it to create a coherent discourse through
which to accomplish recruiting and self-legitimization. In recognizing
this, it is important to see how ISIS has adapted the concept from pre-
vious movements and bundled it with a group of other highly productive
symbols to strengthen its message. This symbolic action is important to
recognize, for much of ISIS’ success has emerged not just on the battle-
field but by deploying rhetoric backed by a compelling ideology to moti-
vate individuals to migrate and die for its cause.
Breaking down the package ofMurji’ism and its associated ideas is
important because it shows how ISIS is able not only to use the Islamic
intellectual tradition but also to improvise to create compelling argu-
ments. By reconfiguring old ideas, it gains a veneer of conservative legi-
timacy that Islamic fundamentalists value so highly, while maintaining
the power to innovate and create new material from old. By combining
arguments that obedience to secular law detracts from following a true
Islamic path, that refusing to fight in what it identifies as a legitimate
jihad contributes strength to the enemy, and that acting in ways contrary
to ISIS’ demands imperils one’s very faith with time-worn arguments
about Murji’ism, ISIS can bring its rhetoric to a highly effective level.
In this sense, we should view publications like Dabiq and much of
ISIS’ media production not just as propaganda but as a coherent discourse
that intends to build and implement a worldview among its consumers.
While some of its material is intended for the outside, most of it is uncon-
vincing to anyone who has not already associated themselves with ISIS’
ideology. Instead, ISIS’ ideology gives potential recruits and sympathizers
a vocabulary and perspective on the world which they can use to inform
their own actions and to engage with others they might encounter, whe-
ther potential sympathizers or opponents who might try to draw the
potential militant from their path.
This paper is an attempt to analyze one facet of ISIS’ discourse in
order to understand why ISIS chooses the arguments it does, how it uses
them, and what end it intends to achieve: to recruit members, inform
them of ISIS’ policies, and encourage them to act in the world, particularly
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to emigrate to Syria and add their manpower to the greater cause. Conse-
quently, the Murji’ite complex serves as an ideal point of entry into the
purpose of ISIS’ communications and its goals as a movement.
Unfortunately, the debates surrounding Murji’ism are hard to un-
derstand. This difficulty emerges in part because the term is an old one
and carries much theological baggage, and in part because ISIS develops
their own conception ofMurji’ism from within a particular modern con-
text. Consequently, this paper will seek first to explore the historical
context, development, and use of Murji’ism within the mainstream
Islamic intellectual tradition, and then to explain how ISIS interprets
and uses the term for its own ends.
Historical Murji’ism
Murji’ism emerged as a theological school very early in the history
of Islamic thought. It played a major role in the early community’s de-
bates concerning salvation and who had rightful claim to membership
in the community. This debate was particularly cogent within the context
of the struggle for caliphal authority between ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, the Pro-
phet’s cousin and presumptive heir to the previous caliph, and Muʿā-
wiyah b. Abī Sufyān, the governor of Syria and eventual founder of the
Umayyad Caliphate. Their conflict revolved around the question ofwho
was the best political leader and most upright Muslim to lead the com-
munity.
While this conflict, generally called the First Fitnah (civil war), is
popularly understood as the beginning of the Shi’ah-Sunni divide, what
is important for our discussion is the emergence of a third division, the
Kharijites, who challenged the community by advocating a strict, exclu-
sivist definition of Islam and membership in its community. They con-
sidered only the truly righteous as worthy of being called Muslims, a
proposition that at the time was interpreted to exclude not just ʿAlī and
Muʿāwiyah, but also a large segment of the then-current Islamic estab-
lishment and community as a whole—a rupture that seriously threatened
the unity of the Islamic community.
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In the political context of the early community, debate over caliphal
legitimacy specifically—and membership in the Islamic community as
well—was particularly contentious because it dictated whether one
should take up arms against the ruler or not. While the loyalist position
held that the Umayyad caliph was not only a legitimate ruler, but also
best qualified religiously to guide the community, the extremist opinion,
most commonly associated with Kharijism, not only refused to acknow-
ledge the legitimacy of the Umayyad Caliphate, but also advocated armed
rebellion against them. Consequently, while moderates might live with
either ruling party, the extremes were dedicated to fighting a bloody
and divisive conflict that threatened to end Islamic political hegemony
and its empire shortly after it had begun.3
According to the accounts of later authors, Murji’ism developed
initially as a compromise in response to the schismatic threat that Umay-
yad loyalism and Kharijism posed, a compromise that would ensure the
social and political stability of the whole by creating a definition of Islam
that would result in broad inclusivity.4 It centered on an ethos of political
quietism.5 Its center piece was the concept of irjāʾ, meaning “deferral.”
Deferral in this case meant the belief that a judgment of another belie-
ver’s faith cannot be made in the current world but is postponed to the
final judgment when God would decide among the worthy.6 This coun-
tered Kharijite extremism in both its political claims (i.e., that the Umay-
yads should be overthrown) and its personal attacks against individual
Muslims whom they viewed as deviating from the faith.7
In the specific case of the debate between Muʿāwiyah and ʿAlī,
deferral meant that the question of who was more eligible to lead the
community should be deferred indefinitely, making rebellion an invidious
and harmful action even if one viewed either or both of them as illegit-
imate Muslims. In general terms, it meant the community could be led
by anyone who met certain criteria, not merely the most just or the most
righteous.8
While the idea ofdeferral was initially the core of the school’s ideas,
as reflected in one of its earliest expositions in a letter reproduced and
discussed by Josef van Ess called the Kitāb al-Irjāʾ, Murji’ism later became
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even more strongly associated with a different idea, the separation of
deeds from faith.9 This doctrine, which was often the basis of attacks on
the Murji’ites by their opponents, held that Murji’ism improperly separ-
ated islām (submission, but understood to entail specific actions) from
imān (faith).10 This was problematic because Murji’ites (supposedly)
believed in deferring judgment to God to such a degree that individuals
who committed grave sins that clearly put them outside the pale of Islam,
such as apostasy or slander of the Prophet—sins that the Qurʾān itself
declares to nullify faith—would remain within the community and still
be considered legitimate Muslims, benefitting (both spiritually and
materially) from such membership. In essence, critics argued that clear
absurdities, injustice, and potential violations of scripture resulted from
the Murji’ite position.11
In its extreme, these opponents opine, Murji’ism would even allow
one to make the illicit licit (istiḥlāl) or vice versa, considered to be a grave
sin as by doing so, one controverted and abrogated the holy text using
one’s own reason, replacing God’s will with one’s own willfulness. Indeed,
as time went on, Murji’ism became less and less associated with the con-
cept of irjāʾ, despite providing the name of the group, and gained fame
in heresiographies for its potential to condone the illicit as licit.12
In the narratives passed down to us, the claim that the Murji’ites
sought to separate deeds from faith developed as a result ofMurji’ism’s
deployment to rally political action in a later cause, which moved the
philosophy from the realm ofquietism into sometimes violent activism,
with uprisings happening in Khurāsān, in the eastern part ofmodern-
day Iran.13 During the Umayyad Caliphate, after the First Fitnah, strife
emerged between Arab Muslims who participated in the initial invasions
and converts who embraced the faith after their lands had been con-
quered. Converts had many reasons for joining the new faith, aside from
personal conviction, and Arabs had many reasons to deny them member-
ship in the community.
Materially, non-Muslims had the burden of two sets of taxes to pay:
the jizyah, a poll-tax levelled on all non-Muslim inhabitants of the land,
and the kharāj, a tax that non-Muslim farmers had to pay on the land
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they cultivated. Becoming a Muslim meant simultaneously that converts
were relieved of the burden of these taxes and that the community at
large, which pooled together and paid out the income from these taxes
to its membership in the form of stipends, lost revenue. In other words,
conversion shifted the tax burden from local residents to Arab armies
and settlers. In part because of this, there was a reluctance to admit con-
verts as full-fledged members of the community. This created resentment
among many inhabitants of the empire, particularly in remoter areas
where there were larger numbers of converts and fewer Arabs.14
In this case, Murji’ism allowed community membership based sim-
ply on the declaration of faith, not on actions or identity at birth. One
merely needed to profess the faith by reciting the shahādah and one
gained both membership in the community and the alleviation of a signi-
ficant tax burden. This new understanding of faith became instrumental
in several provincial uprisings, in which Murji’ism seems to have
coalesced as a more formal school of thought than it had been previously,
becoming a vehicle for political action.
This new use of Murji’ism placed it in the center of political and
religious debates, however. What had previously been a quietist position
now became a lightning rod as individuals within the community took
positions for or against it, depending on their own interests and feelings
regarding not just theology but also social and political concerns. As a
result of this transformation, Murji’ism earned a place of infamy in the
realm ofheresies. While the converts won their battles and became an
indelible part of the larger community, those who embraced Murji’ism
erred, so the new heresiographers argued, by pushing inclusion too far.15
It is likely that the development ofMurji’ism into an activist creed
that separates deeds from faith occurred at a later date.16 This position
is neither directly stated nor implied in the founding work of the move-
ment, the aforementioned Kitāb al-Irjāʾ by al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad Ibn
al-Ḥanafiyyah (d. 700), a work that was itself written after the initial
conflict over leadership that gave birth to Kharijism. It is significant,
however, that at some point the two concepts ofdeferral and separation
were themselves separated; while the latter came to be wholly identified
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with Murji’ism and condemned, the former, the principle of irjāʾ, was
accepted by many schools of Islamic thought.
It is interesting in this respect to examine the most famous name
associated with Murji’ism, the jurist Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 767). Abū Ḥanīfah’s
inclination toward certain Murji’ite positions is recognized by many scho-
lars; the most significant presentation ofAbū Ḥanīfah’s Murji’ism in Wes-
tern scholarship is Joseph Schacht’s analysis of the scholar’s treatise on
the subject called Kitāb al-ʿĀlim wa’l-Mutaʿallim.17 What is notable about
this treatise is that it does not portray Abū Ḥanīfah as unambiguously
Murji’ite. Instead, he supports the concept of irjāʾ against its opponents
while condemning the Murji’ites as a group for their separ-ation ofdeeds
from faith.18
That Abū Ḥanīfah makes this distinction is significant, not just be-
cause it shows the general adoption of a popularized concept of irjāʾ, but
also because it shows that Murji’ism had crystallized into a heretical epi-
thet at an early date; while Abū Ḥanīfah accepts the basic idea of irjāʾ, he
rejects Murji’ism itself as a creed. It also raises the question ofwho exactly
espoused the extremist views with which Murji’ism is associated. It is
clear that the doctrine of irjāʾ found adherents, especially among rebel-
lious converts in Khurāsān.19 However, it is less clear that there was ever
a strong party ofMurji’ites that accepted unequivocally the doctrine of
separating deeds from faith, which makes separating the actual history
of the doctrine from its later interpretation extremely difficult.20 Unfor-
tunately for the school, despite the general adoption of its primary tenet,
later thinkers continued to relegate it to the realm ofheresy.21
If it is true that this second component ofMurji’ism was little if at
all actually adhered to by real believers, then it indicates the role which
Murji’ism as a trope has played in the rhetoric of Islamic factionalism. It
shows that the claim ofMurji’ism has historically been a powerful accu-
sation that became untethered from any specific social context, making
it deployable against opponents who generally fit its mold.22 This demon-
strates the continuity between the past and ISIS’ Jihadi-Salafist present,
for Murji’ism has been resurrected in recent years as a productive tool
ISIS: The Taint ofMurji’ism 137
for categorizing and delegitimizing many of the opponents of Salafism
within the Islamic community.23
While we observe the continuity of ISIS’ use of Murji’ism within
the Islamic tradition, we should note that ISIS and its contemporaries
are not slaves to that intellectual tradition. Indeed, observers have noted
that while they are active consumers of the Islamic intellectual past, they
also reinterpret that tradition to support their positions.24 Their use of
Murji’ism is no exception. Consequently, before we analyze ISIS’ propa-
ganda statements against Murji’ism, we should understand what ISIS
and other Jihadist-Salafists mean by the term and how they use this label
in conjunction with a series of other topoi to build categories of appro-
bation and stigmatize groups that oppose or rival them.
Renewed accusations ofMurji’ism
Our discussion of the historical development of Murji’ism began
and ended very early in Islamic history. This is because Murji’ism formed
a key part of debates pertaining to Islamic theology and the identity of
those who deserved to be recognized as fellow believers. Such theological
questions, including questions about the nature ofGod and the Qurʾān,
were settled fairly early in Islamic history, and as debates about theology
waned, intellectuals turned their attention to other subjects.25 The intel-
lectual disciplines that gained prominence as theology lost it included
law, philosophy, mysticism, and the coalescing distinctions between Sun-
nism and Shi’ism. Indeed, it is in this new intellectual world that we see
the emergence of the four legal schools, the much debated “closing of
the gates of ijtihād,” the development of the schools ofmodern Sufism,
and the writings of the great philosophers. It is not until the eighteenth
century that we see a resurgence of debates surrounding theology and
basic doctrinal questions such as who deserves to be considered a member
of the Islamic community.
The re-emergence of theological issues in the Islamic world was
sparked by two simultaneous historical events. The first was a revival
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movement in the Arabian Peninsula spearheaded by the political expan-
sion of the Ibn Saʿūd family and supported by the followers ofMuḥammad
b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), a fundamentalist scholar who preached an
extreme doctrine that condemned all forms of Islam deviating from his
strict, literalist interpretation of it. He declared that these “alternative”
practices of Islam violated tawḥīd, or the unity of God, and thereby fell
into shirk, or polytheism. His ire was raised especially by Sufi groups and
worship at saints’ shrines. The second event was the contemporary emer-
gence of an era of colonialism that brought a package ofWestern cultural
traits often referred to as “modernity” to bear against local folkways and
the dominant Islamic intellectual tradition.
Modernity posed a particular challenge to the Islamic intellectual
tradition in that, while it was highly sophisticated and cosmopolitan, it
had long been accustomed to assimilating other traditions on its own
terms. With the loss of political dominance caused by the intrusion of
Europeans, Muslim scholars were forced to reconcile with newly domi-
nant foreign traditions. As the influence of Europeans increased, a crisis
emerged.
There were two general responses to the crisis that modernity pre-
sented in the Islamic world.26 One was pioneered in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries by thinkers like Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Afghānī (d. 1897) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), who suggested an
integration ofWestern sciences with Islam, with one informing the other
to create a synthesis between them. This required rethinking many basic
assumptions in the Islamic tradition, including law, mysticism, and, to a
lesser extent, theology. This approach, which is followed by the majority
ofMuslims today, envisioned an Islamic modernity in which Islam would
stand alongside Christianity as a religion of, to use a favorite term of the
nineteenth century, “progress.”
In the second response, counter-narratives to the European incur-
sion were formed. These approaches emphasized rejecting modern inter-
pretations of the world and religion as iniquitous and un-Islamic. In this
sense, their followers can be described as “fundamentalists.” In this
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world-view, certain aspects of modern technology and social thought
might be incorporated into Islamic society but only if strictly subordi-
nated to Islam. This counter-movement often went further than just
demanding a struggle against the Western import ofmodernity, however;
it demanded total reform of the Islamic tradition at hand, following in
the footsteps ofWahhabism and related movements.27 It also, in many
cases, viewed local interpretations of Islam, such as worship at saints’
shrines, as foreign to a religion that should be solely inspired by its sacred
text and original traditions.28 Because of these concerns, the fundamen-
talists felt it was time to clean the slate and re-examine the basic ques-
tions of Islam, such as who was and was not a Muslim and what was and
was not Islamic. This necessitated a revival of the basic traditions of theo-
logy. The fundamentalists who were most heavily involved in this re-
evaluation and who believed that the only the Qurʾān and the sunnah of
the Prophet (his sayings and behavior) could resolve religious issues
came to be known as Salafists.
Thinkers of a Salafist orientation adopted different approaches to
the perceived need to re-evaluate Islamic thought. One was followed by
individuals such as Sayyid Qutb (d. 1962), who considered classical Islamic
scholarship as a whole to be useful but unnecessary. Instead, he sought
to read the Qurʾān and sunnah with new eyes, ironically becoming inno-
vative in his own way. The second group, the tradition to which ISIS and
its ideologues belong, viewed the classical scholarship as a bedrock foun-
dation but disagreed with the way in which that scholarship had been
used, especially regarding the creation ofwhat they considered illegiti-
mate divisions within the community, such as the legal schools, as well
as innovations such as the introduction of Greek philosophy and other
non-Islamic forms of knowledge into Islamic thought. This led to a selec-
tive and particular interpretation of the tradition.
As time went on, another group of Salafists revived arguments
about Murji’ism to bolster positions against the various semi- or wholly
secular regimes of the Arab world. In targeting Muslim governments,
these Salafists differ from other fundamentalists like Bin Laden who
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focused their attacks on the “far enemy” of the West.29 This reorientation
created a problem, however, for the regimes these Salafists targeted are
nominally Muslim, and a tenet of Islam, historically observed perhaps
more often in the breach, prohibits Muslims from fighting among them-
selves. Consequently, in order for those Salafists who urged violent
attacks against regimes in the Middle East to justify their call to action,
they needed a way to demonstrate that the governments currently admi-
nistering Islamic countries are not themselves Islamic, nor their rulers
truly Muslim.30
In order to accomplish this, the two schools of Salafism, those like
Qutb who reinterpreted the texts freely and those who more readily
turned to and made use of older traditions (albeit selectively), joined
forces. Qutb’s idea that the then-current state of affairs in the Arab-
Islamic world represented a return to the Jāhiliyyah, or the period of
“ignorance” that predated the emergence of Islam, combined with takfīr,
the labeling of an opponent as an infidel, provided useful arguments to
convince the Salafists’ followers that secular regimes were in fact
apostates.31
These arguments did not work on everybody, however. The willing-
ness of many Salafists to take such an extreme step as to discount the
profession of faith made by public persons set off a battle within organ-
izations aimed at Islamic reform, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood,
which were often dominated by moderates who were unwilling to take
the step of recognizing political rulers as outside the pale of Islam and
thereby potentially legitimizing violence against them.32
The split between the moderate and the extreme Islamic opposition
presented the radical Salafist party with a rhetorical problem similar to
that of critiquing Muslim regimes despite the taboo on fomenting fitnah.
In this case, rather than resorting to the reasoning of contemporary
thinkers such as Qutb, these partisans reached back into the classical
period of Islamic thought, painting their opponents as Murji’ites for refu-
sing to condemn world leaders as apostates and thereby preventing a
full Islamic movement against them.33
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While this trend emerged most markedly in debates within the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during the 1960s and ‘70s, it eventually
influenced Saudi Salafist thought generally and spread into other parts
of the radical thoughtworld. In Saudi Arabia such rhetoric was particularly
intense given the Islamic nature of the monarchy, which has claimed a
wholly Islamic basis for its laws and appointed jurists to support its posi-
tion. Many groups within the kingdom objected to this stance, however,
and pointed to the foreign origin of some statutes, presenting a serious
problem to the regime’s legitimacy. Ultimately, the biggest security threat
came with the attacks on the holy cities ofMecca and Medina in 1979, an
act committed by a radical Salafist that galvanized opponents of the re-
gime within the kingdom.34
In the interim, many events, including the war against the Soviets
in Afghanistan and the attacks by Al-Qāʾidah against Western targets,
captured the imagination of Islamic radicals and put a temporary halt to
their activities within their own borders. This was only a temporary res-
pite, however: as soon as the Afghan war ended and American interven-
tion in the Middle East opened the door to political instability in Iraq and
elsewhere, Salafist activity against local regimes increased. This required
these radical groups to both justify their attacks to their fellow citizens
and to convince bystanders ofwhy they should believe their neighbors
to be apostates living un-Islamic lives.
Individuals who attempt to encourage militant action within their
own states have had convenient recourse to the idea of Murji’ism. In
recent years, perhaps its greatest exponent has been the Jordanian thinker
Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, a radical Jihadi-Salafist who influenced ISIS
through his role as an author of radical literature, though he himself has
come to oppose ISIS. He was also the one-time spiritual mentor for Abū
Muṣʿab al-Zarqawī (d. 2006), the founder of the Al-Qāʾidah branch in Iraq
that would eventually evolve into the Islamic State. Maqdisī himself came
by the use of the term “Murji’ite” and much of his knowledge through
his connections with the Afghan Arab movement as well as from time
spent studying in Saudi Arabia. Maqdisī’s near-constant time in prison
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after returning to Jordan gave him the opportunity to spread his message
and view of Islam there, including how to use the term and who should
be considered a Murji’ite.
These parties use the term “Murji’ism” to provide the ideological
inspiration to violent action described above. In this sense, Murji’ism is
paired with its classical opposing heresy, Kharijism, to categorize groups
and individuals accordingly as they are perceived to employ takfīr either
too little or too often.35 Those individuals who are either working within
the system or who are quietist, advocating a suspension of judgment
against secular rulers or peaceful resistance to them, are labeled as
Murji’ites, while other groups who are perceived as being too narrow-
minded in their activities (especially if that group opposes and uses takfīr
against one’s own) is viewed as being Kharijite, condemning the righteous
Muslim as being unrighteous.36 ISIS has repeatedly done this in its propa-
ganda.37
These classical terms provide a framework for discussion, one that
ISIS uses to identify which groups are associated with them and which
are opposed to them. By identifying and exploring the reasons for such
associations, ISIS is able to identify behaviors which it variously condones
or condemns, isolating its opponents from political support, while mar-
shalling support for their own cause. While this paper does not cover
ISIS’ use of Kharijism as an accusation—an accusation which ISIS itself
often bears—this seems to occur less frequently and with less vigor than
the accusation ofMurji’ism. On the whole, understanding the latter term’s
use by ISIS and what ISIS means when it refers to an opponent as a
Murji’ite is significant for understanding who it perceives as its allies
and enemies, how it mobilizes support for or against them, and what
kind ofworld ISIS intends to create.
ISIS’ interpretation ofMurji’ism
Murji’ism, as ISIS understands it, is primarily concerned with
separating deeds from faith and affirming that any Muslim, no matter
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how iniquitous in action, is counted as part of the community.38 ISIS uses
Murji’ism as an opprobrium, and by condemning other Muslims as
Murji’ites, ISIS implicates them in hypocrisy by arguing that because
Murji’ites hold that deeds are separate from faith, then such people claim
that a person can commit iniquitous deeds and still called a Muslim. As
a result, Murji’ites call un-Islamic deeds Islamic. ISIS takes this argument
further by supposing that all Muslims living in non-Islamic contexts are
ipso facto Murji’ites and hypocrites.39
There is a link missing in this argument: it is not clear that just
because a Muslim lives in a non-Islamic society, that individual must
engage in or endorse non-Islamic behavior. This logical flaw is, in fact, a
point Maqdisī and other Salafists opposed to ISIS recognize and the reason
some of them label either all of ISIS or parts of ISIS as Kharijites or worse
than Kharijites.40 As we shall see, however, ISIS explicitly identifies an
individual with their society, a fact that has powerful consequences for
motivating action, and thus plays an important role in ISIS’ propaganda.
Identifying a person with their social context is central to ISIS’ use
ofMurji’ism to create a complex that defines and links together the ideas
of innovation, hypocrisy/apostasy, and ṭāghūt, or “oppression.” Together
these terms are part of the main driving force for ISIS’ propaganda
machine and form the compass rose of ISIS’ view of contemporary political
structures.
While these terms are important within ISIS’ understanding of the
world, the organization left them largely undefined explicitly until Dabiq
8, in which it devoted an entire section to Murji’ism and its “taint” entitled
“Irjā’: The Most Dangerous Bida’.” In this article, ISIS describes what it
understands Murji’ism to be and discusses why it is a heresy, citing several
scholars to support their opinion.41 The author begins his discussion of
Murji’ism by explaining the idea of irjāʾ, but it is an explanation specific
to the Salafist context. They identify irjāʾ as a reaction against the excesses
of Kharijism and understand Murji’ism as a deviation that went too far
the other way. In doing so, he claims that the Murji’ites “created their
own sect.”42 This is an important accusation, for ISIS believes that true
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Islam is one wholly without sects, even without the traditional four
schools of jurisprudence, so that any creation of sectarianism renders
one’s Islam void.43
They also define irjāʾ itself, though ISIS’ definition requires some
interpretation. In Dabiq 8 they say that “they [the Murji’ites] expelled
action from the reality of Īmān [faith] thereby ‘delaying’ action beyond
Īmān’s definition, and this is the linguistic root for the word Irjā’, as Irjā’
means ‘a delay.’”44 This is a somewhat cryptic definition of irjāʾ and it is
not clear what ISIS understands is or has been delayed. Is the action (or
the judgment of the action, which was the original understanding of irjāʾ)
delayed, or does “delay” refer to removing action from “Īmān’s defi-
nition.” Either is possible.
That ISIS uses “delay” to imply the removal of action from faith is
supported by much of the rest of the article, which focuses on the
Murji’ite belief that action has no bearing on faith. ISIS cites numerous
scholars who make this argument, each condemning Murji’ism to varying
degrees.45 What is significant is that these condemnations take on a straw
man quality. None of them asks the question ofwhether someone who
maintains Murji’ism but acts righteously is considered to have valid faith.
Instead, ISIS assumes that a Murji’ite is not practicing their faith, and
not just on account of small oversights, but rather by committing such
grave errors as never fasting and even praying in the opposite direction
of the qiblah. Further, ISIS sees a Muslim’s tolerance of these acts as being
just as severe as committing the violations themselves.46
While the construction of this straw man is unsurprising given how
heresies have been used in the history of Islamic rhetoric, it does accom-
plish a number of things. First, it allows ISIS to demonstrate clearly that
Murji’ism is a heresy that places one outside the pale of Islam. Second,
by identifying it as a sect, they can connect it to charges of bidʿah. Third,
by redefining irjāʾ and emphasizing the aspect of belief in the separation
of deeds from faith—and then pushing it still further to say that Murji’ites
necessarily exclude deeds from faith—ISIS can begin to construct an ela-
borate definition ofhypocrisy, which it then uses to paint large numbers
ofgroups both as Murji’ites and hypocrites.
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At the end of the article in Dabiq 8, ISIS goes further in adapting
the idea of irjāʾ by arguing that there are different forms of it infecting
the “battleground of Shām,” a fact that goes a long way to legitimizing
or delegitimizing parties in the larger conflict. ISIS defines Syria’s irjāʾ
as being “‘Islamic factions’ with a nationalist agenda” and “[n]ationalist
factions with an ‘Islamic’ agenda.”47 These two categories include all
groups supported by outside regimes or aligned with non-ISIS ideologies
and encompasses both small groups and larger forces such as the Free
Syrian Army.48
While these groups often have very different goals, what they do
share in common is opposition to ISIS and its brand of transnational
Islamic hegemony. They also enjoy support from Arab regimes, the very
regimes ISIS opposes and that have been the targets of criticism from
other Jihadi-Salafists. In accordance with ISIS’ intellectual heritage, it
seems to be precisely this connection to the mainstream Islamic world
that gives these groups the taint ofMurji’ism, a fact confirmed in one
of ISIS’ first public uses of the label “Murji’ite” in Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī’s
speech announcing the caliphate, “This is the Promise ofAllah.”49
The result of this taint, and its sure sign, was these groups’ “hypo-
crisy” in taking territory and then refusing to implement “shari’ah,”
which when used by ISIS means the narrow interpretation of shari’ah
that ISIS itself supports.50 At the end of the article, the author does finally
allude to a more classical idea of irjāʾ (i.e., the denial of a connection
between actions and faith, rather than that of supporting what it
perceives to be pseudo-Islamic regimes) by saying that these groups did
not implement the shari’ah because their own fighters are not good
Muslims.51
The Murji’ite bundle, 1 : Innovation
This section introduces our exploration of the Murji’ite bundle.
The term “bundle” appears here because of the multifaceted nature of
ISIS’ use of the idea ofMurji’ism. When ISIS refers to Murji’ism, as they
make clear throughout the article “Irja’: The Most Dangerous Bid‘a,”
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they mean more than just Murji’ism itself. In ISIS’ propaganda, they
tightly connect Murji’ism with the ideas of innovation, hypocrisy, and
oppression to create a powerful means of accusing its opponents of
multiple sins in a single instant. As a result, to understand the importance
of ISIS’ rhetorical use ofMurji’ism fully, we must break down the bundle
ISIS has created and examine its parts.
Innovation (bidʿah) is a term with a long history in the Islamic
intellectual tradition. Originally, it referred in a general way to any
practice that came after the time of the Prophet and his Companions,
and as such had two modalities: bidʿah ḥasanah and bidʿah al-madhmūmah.
The first class of innovations were good; these included practices that
can even be considered individual obligations, such as the study of
grammar or rhetoric. The second class includes innovations that run
contrary to the principles outlined in the four sources of law: the Qurʾān,
the sunnah, the consensus of scholars, and the use of reason or analogy.52
While the above represents a traditional view of bidʿah, there has
always been a strong minority condemning any innovation as heterodox
and unauthorized. While such an extreme position has historically been
marginal, such condemnation has become increasingly commonplace in
fundamentalist rhetoric with the rise of Salafism and its conscious ahis-
torical claim of returning to what these groups perceive as the unmedi-
ated practice of the Prophet. Because any innovation by definition was
absent from the Prophet’s original community in Medina, any innovation
is by definition forbidden, no matter how beneficial its character. The
accusation of innovation is, for example, common in the works of Sayyid
Qutb, occurring in both In the Shade ofthe Qurʾān, his exegesis of the holy
text, and Milestones. Osama Bin Laden also employed the term as a criti-
cism ofArab regimes that adopted pro-Western stances and thus, in his
view, compromised the faith.53 It is also characteristic of Bin Laden’s own
intellectual heritage, standing as a cornerstone of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s
original reformation movement.54
It is not coincidence, therefore, that one of ISIS’ major complaints
about those it calls Murji’ites concerns their perceived innovation within
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the Islamic intellectual tradition.55 Because Murji’ism falls outside of the
original intentions of the Qurʾān as ISIS understands it, it is automatically
suspect as bidʿah. In this way, ISIS’ condemnation ofMurji’ism parallels
the similar condemnation of the Shi’ah. Many groups, such as Al-Qāʾidah,
condemn the Shi’ah as ahl al-bidʿah (people of innovation), referring
primarily to what is perceived as an innovation in the Shi’i theological
elaboration of the role of the Imāms in religion.56 Piggy-backing on this
rhetorical tradition, ISIS is able to condemn multiple parties under the
same accusation: the Shi’ah are guilty of innovation through avowal of
the Imamate, while Murji’ites are guilty of innovation by reinterpreting
their legal obligations, but doing so while still claiming to be within the
“orthodox” Sunni tradition. 57
We see here that bidʿah is a very basic and powerful charge. ISIS
can potentially call anything it disagrees with an innovation, and by
doing so portrays itself as the only true inheritor of the Islamic tradition
as established and practiced by the Prophet. Moreover, because ISIS
believes it has the only true view of Islam, ISIS assumes it must know
what was originally intended to be part of the faith, both what it permits
and what it excludes, legitimizing its authority to label phenomena as
innovative or not. It follows then that anything falling outside of its
understanding of Islam must be, ipso facto, an innovation.58
On the surface, the ubiquitous rhetorical possibility of bidʿah seems
to take some of the sting out of its accusation, for anyone other than ISIS
is ripe for condemnation on its account. It is significant that while ISIS
often implies as much, it reserves its special critique of bidʿah for parti-
cular groups. In the case ofMurji’ism, ISIS not only condemns it as bidʿah
but actually writes in the subtitle of its article on irjāʾ that it is the “most
dangerous” innovation.59 In doing so, it singles out this theological
tendency as deserving special condemnation and makes it clear that
when ISIS refers to specific groups as Murji’ites, it also considers them
innovators. Murji’ism is such a dangerous innovation because of its
connection to hypocrisy, a sin that puts into question a Muslim’s very
belonging to the community.60
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The Murji’ite bundle, 2: Hypocrisy
Perhaps the most significant element of ISIS’ Murji’ite bundle is
hypocrisy. Like the concept ofMurji’ism itself, ISIS uses this term both
in its classical sense and in a more particular way that links ISIS with a
broader spectrum of Jihadi-Salafist thought, while simultaneously taking
the idea farther than previously realized due to its declaration of the
Caliphate. Its adaptations specifically serve to effect its recruitment and
ideological goals. Both definitions are covered in the article on Murji’ism
cited often here, “Irjā’: The Most Dangerous Bid‘a” from Dabiq 8, though
its more particular use of the term is more prevalent throughout Dabiq
and in ISIS speeches generally.
In general, but in this article especially, Murji’ism is strongly linked
to hypocrisy. This link emerges for complex reasons. First, ISIS relies on
the traditional claim that Murji’ism removes deeds from faith, meaning
that a Murji’i can represent any act, in theory, as being Islamic even if
the act is repugnant to the faith. This leads, in their novel interpretation,
to the assertion that all Muslims who refuse to affiliate with ISIS or
actively oppose them are essentially Murji’ites, and thus hypocrites.
The reader should bear in mind that ISIS’ world is one of philosoph-
ical extremes and dichotomies. Consequently, if one can do something,
one will do it to the extreme of either virtue or vice. As a result, ISIS
assumes that a Murji’ite will necessarily commit grave errors on account
ofhis or her Murji’ism.61 The discrepancy between action and belief is
a hallmark of the classical Islamic understanding of hypocrisy, though
in this case it is inverted. The classical example of the hypocrites emerged
from Muḥammad’s community in Medina where they represented old
elites who were jealous ofMuḥammad’s new status and were outwardly
righteous Muslims while inwardly scheming to maintain their authority.
Consequently, they failed to support the Prophet at crucial moments,
especially in battle. The result was something that resembles what we
in English typically label as hypocrisy, meaning individuals who pretend
to do one thing while in their inmost hearts will another. ISIS does
acknowledge this form of hypocrisy and uses it to condemn certain
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actors.62 However, its more powerful and significant model ofhypocrisy
involves accusing individuals of inwardly believing they are Muslim while
outwardly acting in a non-Islamic (at least as understood by ISIS) manner,
reversing the traditional understanding ofhypocrisy.63
This new model of hypocrisy is particularly useful for ISIS. The
conventional definition relied on the discrepancy between outward
righteousness and inward belief, which is hard to establish concretely
since inner belief is not observable. ISIS’ understanding ofhypocrisy, on
the other hand, is as something both observable and readily condemnable.
The explicability of their model also explains why ISIS is so concerned
to define and refute hypocrites: in doing so, ISIS can to claim that all
Muslims not affiliated with them are hypocrites at best based on what
they do or fail to do, especially failing to support ISIS militarily. This
support (or the lack of it) is empirically provable in the world.
In order to understand why ISIS is interested in interpreting hypo-
crisy this way, we must look beyond its extended discussion ofMurji’ism
in Dabiq 8and examine earlier discussions, such as that in an article found
in Dabiq 7, “The Extinction of the Grayzone.”64 The idea of a disappearing
“grayzone” is important in ISIS’ propaganda and draws on a number of
Islamic tropes, reinterpreted in a particular fashion. The first is the idea
that the world is necessarily drawn into two camps: believers and
unbelievers. In the time before ISIS when there was no caliphate, ISIS
argues, who belonged to which camp was unclear. While some, like Bin
Laden, were clearly in the camp of the believers and others, such as
Christian Euro-American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, were clearly
nonbelievers, there were many in the middle, such as ordinary Muslims.
These were the true inhabitants of ISIS’ grayzone: potential believers
who had not yet picked a side.65
According to ISIS’ understanding of history and the course that
history will take, its creation of a caliphate represents an epochal moment
that caused the “extinction of the grayzone.” Before its existence, Muslims
could choose an intermediate space while clinging to a modicum of
righteousness because there was nowhere to go where one could truly
be Muslim both outwardly and inwardly. With the creation of the Islamic
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State, however, this changed. Because ISIS supposedly represents the
true caliphate, Muslims are required to emigrate to support it, especially
by lending it aid against its foes. As a result of this necessity, the grayzone
is shrinking; those who can immigrate to the territory of the Islamic
State do so (as they must), while those who do not choose apostasy and
damnation by remaining behind.66
We also note that Murji’ism and the grayzone are linked. The
grayzone for ISIS is defined by its hypocrisy as it is the proper domain
of hypocrites. People who claim (and may inwardly believe) they are
Muslim but do not act their Islam out live in the grayzone.67 What this
functionally means is that any individual who prays, fasts, and acts accor-
ding to an understanding of Islamic law that differs from that of ISIS is
a de facto hypocrite unless they make an effort to be otherwise. These
people are the Murji’ites: they claim to be believers but do not fight the
holy war like believers.68
This point is important for ISIS’ recruiters. The various authors of
Dabiq and spokespeople for the Caliphate argue in many places that
because the non-Islamic world is so non-Islamic, any individual who lives
in it becomes an apostate themselves regardless of their intention.69 This
is because the very environment is imbued with what ISIS perceives not
just as non-Islamic but anti-Islamic behavior.70 As a result of having to
be on the street with immodestly dressed women (this includes even
women wearing hijāb but not the more substantial niqāb), shopping in a
store that accepts credit cards, or any range of things, a Muslim becomes
a hypocrite involuntarily by accepting these facts and not fighting against
them. Because of inaction, this individual fails in their central respon-
sibility to “command the good and forbid the evil.” (A qurʾānic principle,
al-amr bi'l-maʿrūfwa'l-nahy ʿan al-munkarmeans that a Muslim is expected
to take steps to enjoin others to do what is right and impede them from
doing what is wrong; what exactly this entails is subject to a wide variety
of interpretations.) In doing so, they accept the prohibited as if it were
permissible and turn Islam on its very head. The only way to avoid this,
ISIS very clearly argues, is to emigrate to a location that strictly enforces
shari’ah law. Of course, the only place they can do this is in ISIS-controlled
ISIS: The Taint ofMurji’ism 151
territory, making an argument that seeks to feed their migration
machine.71
Understanding ISIS’ argument about this kind of unconscious
hypocrisy is important not just because in doing so we understand their
recruitment strategy, but also because it shows us something about how
ISIS uses the Islamic intellectual tradition. The fact that they are adept
at not only using the traditional understanding ofhypocrisy, but creating
a new definition based on it and incorporating that into their discourse
demonstrates ISIS spokesmen’s command of the Islamic intellectual
tradition and the power they can derive from it.
Dabiq engages in a critique of hypocrisy that is much more tradi-
tional as well. While the use ofhypocrisy we have just discussed intends
to force recruits to take a side and to reinforce ISIS’ dichotomies, their
use of the more conventional model of hypocrisy has a very different
goal: to critique and expose the illegitimacy ofArab regimes. ISIS engages
in its closest discussion of this form ofhypocrisy in Dabiq 8, in the same
article in which it attacks Murji’ism. Particularly singled out in this sec-
tion are “palace scholars”: these are individuals linked to Arab govern-
ments who claim to produce Islamic legal rulings and knowledge that
support their governments’ policies and ambitions.72 As far as ISIS is
concerned, Arab nations are especially guilty ofhypocrisy because they
claim that enforcing shari’ah is important, and they actually have the
power to do so, yet they in fact fail to do so.73
We must examine here precisely what is meant by failing to enforce
shari’ah, for many of these countries, Saudi Arabia especially, view them-
selves as doing just that. A major element of ISIS’ understanding of
shari’ah is not just enforcing the so-called ḥadd penalties, or those punish-
ments which are specified in the Qurʾān, but also an obligation to fight
a holy war against all non-Muslims until the world is divided into two
camps and righteousness prevails (and possibly Armageddon occurs).
This is an uncompromising stance that would require countries like Saudi
Arabia to repudiate fully and completely any involvement with Western
countries; this is clearly an impossible extreme, though this demand
links ISIS to other Jihadi-Salafists who have come before them.
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This condemnation of hypocrisy is much more in line with the
classical understanding, according to which individuals claim to observe
the law but fail in practice. It is also identical to the major accusation of
hypocrisy levelled against the hypocrites ofMedina by Muḥammad and
his community. Not just “palace scholars” but also quietist scholars are
guilty of this passivity, for while the latter condemn Muslim regimes for
supporting non-Muslim attacks against Muslims, they do nothing to stop
it, implying that they prefer comfort to righteousness.
This form of hypocrisy is very different than the first and is used
in different ways, for it is a conscious hypocrisy. The point of these
accusations, unlike the former, is not to spur immigration to ISIS’
Caliphate; none of these accusations appear in contexts linked to the
concept of hijrah, or migration. Instead, they are clear condemnations:
a way of indicating who is with and against whom. They are also signi-
ficant because they allow ISIS to link in the third element of the Murji’ite
bundle: the claim ofoppression (ṭaghūt).
The Murji’ite bundle, 3: Oppression
Oppression links to hypocrisy and innovation because oppression
of a believer occurs when an unrighteous power forces the faithful
individual to live and act in an environment built on non-Islamic laws
that causes a lapse in religious social responsibility (i.e., a failure to com-
mand the good and forbid the evil), creating a non-Islamic, innovative
environment. Moreover, a consequence ofMurji’ite compromises is that
individuals are forced into a position where they are called to obey the
innovative, secular laws that operate outside the realm of religion and
compelled to internalize their personal religious convictions, even
potentially acting against them. This creates a de facto separation between
deeds and faith that turns the true believer into a hypocrite.
ISIS presents a strong narrative regarding the “oppressor” (ṭaghūt).
This is a particularly potent word within the Salafist community at large.
The term comes from the Qurʾān where it is used eight times, all with a
satanic or evil connotation. Specifically, ṭaghūt is variously used to mean
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an idol (Q 2:256, 4:51, 5:60, 39:17), false leaders (Q 2:257, 4:60, 4:76), or
Satan (Q 16:36, 5:60, 39:17). As one can see from the different words that
are used to translate the term, the significance of ṭaghūt is not always
clear. Salafists have a very particular understanding of it, which plays a
major role in their discourse. Like many aspects of their theology, their
understanding of ṭaghūt can be traced to Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb
(d. 1792) who wrote about it in his Risālah fīmaʿnā ṭaghūt. Here he iden-
tifies ṭaghūt specifically as the religious use of intermediaries to worship
God, such as the saint cult.74
Contemporary Salafists modified Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s under-
standing of ṭaghūt to apply to political circumstances. They were able to
do so because Islam to these individuals is a total system, meaning that
everything in life must be seen through a religious perspective. This
means that just as God is at the apex of religious power, so too must He
be at the apex ofpolitical power. Consequently, if ṭaghūtmeans the use
of intermediaries to worship God, it can also mean the use of inter-
mediaries to usurp the sovereignty ofGod. In this case, Salafists under-
stand the intermediaries to be democracy, constitutionalism, or any
other form ofpolitical organization that is not based in Islam. In essence,
they argue that all forms of secular government are ṭaghūt.75
While ISIS fully accepts this understanding of ṭaghūt, when it speaks
of oppression, it puts its own spin on the term, which becomes clear if
we consider oppression in relation to hypocrisy as discussed above. In
doing so, we see how ISIS argues that secular governments not only usurp
God’s rightful role in the world but actually become religious oppressors
themselves; they understand oppression in part as an involuntary regres-
sion to Murji’ism and the resultant hypocrisy that obeying secular law
forces a Muslim to commit, a hypocrisy that risks turning a believer into
an apostate.76 Thus ISIS connects Murji’ism to the complaint of oppression
and forms the basis of their objection to the recognized governments in
Muslim countries: by implementing secular law these secular regimes
oppress true religion and favor the false.
Ifwe recall the original use of the word ṭaghūt, one connotation of
which was “idol,” we see how ISIS anchors its use of the term in its tradi-
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tional meaning, while simultaneously reinterpreting it. In doing so, it
not only draws a connection between the current period and the Islamic
past, implying that the impieties of today are remnants from those of
yesterday, so further legitimizing itself as part of an eternal Islamic state;
it also emphasizes that the hypocrisy it fights is part of an undying,
recurrent threat to religious truth that must be defeated. In other words,
ISIS represents itself as the only true inheritor of the Islamicizing (though
not the prophetic) mission ofMuḥammad.
By using ṭaghūt to describe the oppressive governments of today,
ISIS makes the argument that these states are no different than the idols
of the past: both draw the worshipper away from God and replace a Mus-
lim’s object ofworship with ungodly things.77 The connection between
idolatry and unconscious hypocrisy is what completes the circle between
oppression and Murji’ism. Murji’ism, or at least its political compromise
with a government not based wholly in Islam, is oppressive because it
forces potentially righteous individuals into unrighteous lives, oppressing
them into unreligion. Consequently, the only reasonable, Islamic reaction
is to overthrow those governments and implement a religious regime
that would support what ISIS considers the true version of Islamic law,
thereby freeing its adherents from the oppression of the unjust and en-
abling them to live truly Islamic lives. As a result, rebellion against such
governments is really liberation, for nothing can be truer than to live in
the way God, the creator, created humans to exist: according to His law.78
In order to understand this fully, we note that ISIS considers politics
to be a zero-sum game: whatever it loses is gained by its opponents and
whatever its opponents lose, ISIS gains. Compromise is impossible, for
it means both the absolute weakening of ISIS and the strengthening of
its opponents. Moreover, because truth must be stronger than, and even-
tually vanquish, falsehood, the struggle to live a religious and moral life
is a strictly win/lose contest: if one unrighteous element remains in
righteous society, that society becomes instantly and irrevocably pol-
luted, and pollution must be removed until purity is reached, constituting
the telos of creation and supporting ISIS’ apocalyptic narrative. This is
the essence of their hastening the “extinction of the grayzone.”
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Of course, one can argue that there are many ways to overthrow
the unrighteous, and that the ballot box, or cooperating with oppressive
regimes, could be one of them. The potential for election to change
governmental direction toward Islamic righteousness has long been a
staple in moderate Islamic political thought, a principle embraced by
such Islamic intellectuals as Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, and others.79
One of the most famous and influential parties endorsing this position
has been the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that has played a key role in
the development of Salafist thought as described above. The success and
notoriety of the last group looms so large, in fact, that belief in the
potential for democracy to produce an Islamic state is a heresy ISIS calls
ikhwāniyyah, or the way of the (Muslim) Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-
Muslimīn).80
ISIS views ikhwāniyyah as compromise and considers it absolutely
impossible. Why ISIS argues this derives from two primary consider-
ations. The first is discussed above, namely that politics is a zero-sum
game of absolute winners and absolute losers, and the hybrid that would
result from using a sinful instrument such as democracy during the
transition to absolute, unquestioned “Islamic” rule is unacceptable as a
government under which righteous Muslims can live. The second reason
ties into ISIS’ understanding ofMurji’ism. It is clear from its statements
both in Dabiq and elsewhere that ISIS views even the Brotherhood and
other popular Islamic political organizations as being guilty of the sin of
Murji’ism.
While we have seen that their strongest argument against
Murji’ism’s conflation of right and wrong concerns the involuntary
hypocrisy Muslims within state systems experience, ISIS also condemns
democracy for the oppression it visits on God. In their understanding of
authority and sovereignty, the only legitimate sovereign authority is
God, and claiming to have authority from any other source is sinful and
arrogant. Since voting is clearly an act that legitimizes a power other
than God’s and creates a law that deviates from His command, the act of
engaging with a secular government through voting and thereby legi-
timizing its power is a hypocritical act for the true Muslim. In essence,
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this argument brings the idea of ṭaghūt, or false idols, to its logical
conclusion by arguing that following corrupt regimes results in shirk, or
polytheism, because one assigns what should be God’s (sovereignty) to
something else.81
This prohibits using democracy as a means to a righteous end be-
cause the means itself desecrates the divine. By the very fact of
engagement with an oppressive or potentially oppressive power, one ac-
cepts de facto the authority of a power other than God, reducing one’s
faith through that action. Consequently, since the means of countering
the system from within are iniquitous, even potentially playing the
system against itself becomes an impossibility.
This uncompromising stance toward the oppressor forces a person
into armed opposition to all governments other than the caliphate of
ISIS. While a comprehensive discussion of ISIS’ arguments for the impor-
tance of what it considers jihad within the correct practice of Islam is
outside of the scope of our discussion, we should observe that fighting
a holy war against the oppressors is one of the only ways ofdefinitively
removing oneself from potential stigma as a hypocrite, for only in open
rebellion can one be sure that one is not contributing to the success of
a regime based in a law other than God’s and therefore causing oneself,
no matter how unwillingly, to stray from the fold and become a hypocrite
at best and an apostate at worst. In this way, the Murji’ite bundle func-
tions as an intellectual complement to the physical isolation and commit-
ment created through ISIS’ emphasis on violence, which at once seduces
potential recruits and simultaneously cuts them off from life and society
outside of the Islamic State.82
The result of this stance is to lock the followers of ISIS into its
organization and leave no ideological room for escape. In a sense, one’s
Islam becomes defined as much by what one opposes as what one does,
for it is not just performing God’s obligations that makes one a Muslim,
but also opposing anything that might trap one into sin. Ultimately these
traps include any political organization that does not fall under ISIS’
umbrella, making ISIS the single arbiter of what can legitimately be
considered Islamic. Anything else is oppressive, for even if an organ-
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ization outside of ISIS does not oppose ISIS actively, ISIS ensures that it
is categorized in such a way that it becomes an anathema, which is the
true meaning of the “extinction of the grayzone” cited in Dabiq 7.
Conclusion
One of the most significant aspects of ISIS’ media output is its ability
to use rhetoric to affect action in the world. Much of ISIS’ success in
recruiting fighters from abroad, attracting separatist groups in countries
as far flung as Libya and Afghanistan to affiliate with it as well as defectors
from other Syrian rebel groups, has to do with its positioning itself as
the only legitimate Islamic state and its caliphate as the realization of
all legitimate Islamic political efforts. This does not imply that battlefield
success or control of territory does not also play a key role in ISIS’ success
as an organization, but the rhetoric and tangible successes feed each
other. Moreover, its rhetoric supplied much of the basis for ISIS’ initial
expansion and provided the spark that lit its explosion into the Syrian
scene.
What is also significant is that ISIS does not create its rhetoric from
whole cloth, but borrows pieces from the Islamic intellectual tradition
in which it partakes. By using traditional Islamic tropes and themes, ISIS
is able both to signal its legitimacy and direct the action of others to
support its success in the fields of battle and politics. It cements its legi-
timacy, showing its erudition and mastery of complex theological and
legal topics, and demonstrating that it has the best, most comprehensive
and divinely sanctioned answers to the faithful’s questions.
In this paper, we have examined a single piece of this rhetoric:
Murji’ism. By necessity we have narrowed our compass to the most
prominent English language publications. Though we have had a narrow
purview, it is a significant one. Murji’ism is clearly a topic ISIS cares
deeply about, having discussed it in nearly every issue ofDabiq. It is also
important because through what I call the Murji’ite bundle, ISIS is able
to link complicated but compelling arguments through a simple theme
that is unarguably Islamic, grounded in the tradition’s history. It is also
158 Jeffrey Bristol
significant that ISIS has been able to plug into three of the major bugbears
of Salafist thought–hypocrisy, innovation, and oppression–using a single
trope.
While this paper has been concerned with a single theme, there
are many other tropes within ISIS’ materials that beg for similar treat-
ment, such as its use of Murji’ism’s correlate, Kharijism. Only through
understanding many of these themes will we begin to comprehend the
power and allure ISIS has over its supporters and the nature of its appeal
to Muslims throughout the world.
Above all, we see that Murji’ism is a theological concept that is alive
and well, one that is capable of being adapted to new contexts and uses.
When combined with its partners in the bundle, it is a comprehensive
whole that many individuals find compelling and hard to refute. When
they do so, however, it is often by using the same categories and terms
ISIS itself does, a fact we can see by reviewing the anti-ISIS writings of
individuals like Maqdisī. Consequently, understanding the soft power of
ISIS will go a long way to countering its hard power, for crafting a strategy
to argue against its intellectual positions is as important as creating one
to capture its military positions.
Understanding that ISIS does not operate in a vacuum, that it is
not a spontaneous product of political instability, is also important.
Without understanding the ideological, economic, social, and political
factors that gave rise to it, it will be impossible to counter its extremism,
and accomplishing the latter is predicated on the former. This effort is
often complicated by a tendency to belittle the Islamic credentials of ISIS
and its constituents. While it is certainly true that many of its fighters
are not very well-educated in Islamic tradition, it is a serious mistake to
assume that ISIS does not have its own very learned and erudite scholars.
When attempting to understand how ISIS can accomplish the things that
it does and convince people to go along with it, it is not to the fighter we
must look, but rather to the scholar. This paper is intended to be a step
in that direction.
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The Islamic State as an Empire ofNostalgia
Thomas Barfield
Abstract
Primary empires were the product of internal development and
self-sustaining through the exploitation of their own resources, but
there were also historically a large number of “shadow empires.” These
were imperial polities that were the products of secondary empire form-
ation, which came into existence as a response to the formation ofpri-
mary empires elsewhere and could not exist except in interaction with
them. One unusual subset of these were “empires of nostalgia” that
claimed an imperial tradition and the outward trappings of an extinct
empire, but did not themselves meet the basic requirements of an imper-
ial state such as direct control of territory, true centralized rule, or signi-
ficant urban centers. The most famous European example was the Caro-
lingian Empire established by Charlemagne and its long lived successor,
the Holy Roman Empire, which survived as an institution for a thousand
years. The Islamic State’s proclamation of itself as a reborn caliphate is
now a contemporary example built on nostalgia in the Islamic world for
a long-dead empire that still exerts a strong cultural attraction upon
many Muslims. The Islamic State justifies its actions and ideologies by
attempting to ground them in a lost golden age that they propose to
restore.
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Introduction
So rush O Muslims and gather around your khalīfah [caliph],
so that you may return as you once were for ages, kings of the
earth and knights ofwar. Come so that you may be honored
and esteemed, living as masters with dignity. Know that we
fight over a religion that Allah promised to support. We fight
for an ummah [the worldwide community of Muslims] to
which Allah has given honor, esteem, and leadership, pro-
mising it with empowerment and strength on the earth. Come
O Muslims to your honor, to your victory. By Allah, if you
disbelieve in democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as
all the other garbage and ideas from the west, and rush to
your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will own the earth,
and the east and west will submit to you. This is the promise
ofAllah to you. This is the promise ofAllah to you.1
The declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic State in June 2014
revived debates on the nature of the caliphate itself, which had formerly
seemed to be a topic of interest only to Muslim theologians and historians
of the Islamic world. One key question was how a movement that emer-
ged in a civil war environment in Syria (where factions among the Sunni
majority sought the ouster of the minority Alawite dictatorship of Bashar
al-Assad) and Iraq (where a Sunni minority was alienated from Shi’ite
majority national government) could attract so many foreign Muslims
to fight for it under the Islamic State banner. After all, civil wars sparked
by fierce political grievances are common worldwide, but rarely attract
enthusiastic foreign volunteers willing to die for them. But as Alexis de
Tocqueville noted in regard to the French Revolution, movements claim-
ing to be based on universal ideas transcend such boundaries and have
a different dynamic:
By seeming to tend rather to the regeneration of the human
race than to the reform of France alone, it roused passions
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such as the most violent political revolutions had been incap-
able of awakening. It inspired proselytism, and gave birth to
propagandism; and hence assumed that quasi religious char-
acter which so terrified those who saw it, or, rather, became a
sort of new religion, imperfect, it is true, without God, wor-
ship, or future life, but still able, like Islamism, to cover the
earth with its soldiers, its apostles, and its martyrs.2
As Tocqueville’s reference to the rise of Islam indicates, before the
late eighteenth century movements that inspired such widespread trans-
national mobilization had always been religious in nature, the most
recent example being the rise of Protestantism in sixteenth century
Western Europe and the political upheavals it produced. While succeeding
movements of this type in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
(democratic, nationalist, or socialist) were all secular in origin, they did
share something in common with similar earlier religious movements.
Like their predecessors, they were future-oriented, proclaiming the
promise of a new and better world once the corrupt old one was swept
away. Whether religious or secular, all promised their followers an
idealized future in which sacrifice today would be redeemed in a better
tomorrow.
By contrast, the Islamic State is backward-looking. Instead of calling
for sacrifice to create a new future utopia, it seeks to revive a structure
long dead—the Islamic caliphate—interpreting it as the lost Muslim ideal
that can be restored only by using past Islamic precedents as a strict
template. No policy, law, or political strategy can be deemed legitimate
unless it is grounded in the institutions and examples provided by the
early Muslim state and its divinely guided leaders. In this process the
Islamic State rejects the structure of the modern nation state system and
seeks to replace it with a universal empire of religion, announcing that
all existing state structures lose their legitimacy upon the arrival of the
caliphate: “The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations,
becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival of
its troops to their areas.”3 Like similar religious movements in the past,
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it promises its followers either ultimate victory or the consolation of
bringing the world itself to an end in a fiery apocalypse.
While literature on the caliphate is enormous, not enough attention
has been paid to its recent re-creation as a variety of secondary imperial
state formation in which the trappings and ideologies of long lost empires
are used as a political tool to build a new one. Such “empires of nostalgia”
draw on a strong cultural tradition of a perceived golden age that can
be reclaimed now or in the near future. Only one ofmany types of secon-
dary empire, empires ofnostalgia have a distinct form that is rooted in
very deep and specific cultural traditions whose appeal is usually a mys-
tery to those who do not share it. Further, in the twenty-first century
the Islamic State is not alone in appealing to nostalgia for vanished em-
pires. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Vladimir Putin now
portrays Russia as the beleaguered defender of an Eastern Orthodox reli-
gious legacy inherited from the Byzantines, appealing to a peculiarly
Russian cultural ethos that undergirds it. Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan has taken to reviving an appeal to the memory of the Ottoman
Empire that the founders ofTurkish Republic abolished and buried. The
Communist Party heirs to Mao’s radical assaults on traditional Chinese
culture now have a string ofworldwide Confucius Institutes to market
these formerly attacked values worldwide. Both empires and nostalgia
are thus worth a closer look.
A world ofempires: Primary and secondary
Until the end of the First World War, empires were the most com-
plex and dominant form of political organization in Eurasia, and had
been so for more than two millennia. They had two distinctive forms
that had different origins: large primary empires that that were self-
generating and self-supporting, and smaller (in territory or population)
secondary empires that emerged in response to them. In some cases,
overly successful secondary empires transformed themselves by evolving
into primary ones, usually through campaigns of conquest and incor-
poration into a larger hybrid system.
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Primary empires were states established by conquest that had
sovereignty over continental- or subcontinental-sized territories that
incorporated millions or tens of millions of people into a unified and
centralized administrative system.4 They financed themselves largely
from internal resources through systems of direct taxation or tribute
payments derived from their component parts. They maintained large
and permanent military forces to protect marked frontiers and preserve
internal order. Historically, primary empires were one or two orders of
magnitude larger in territory and population than rival polities that (if
they avoided incorporation) lived on their margins: regional kingdoms,
city-states, or tribal confederations. Classic examples from Eurasia inclu-
ded the many empires that united China (Qin, Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing
dynasties) over the course of two millennia,5 the Roman and Byzantine
Empires that long dominated the Mediterranean basin,6 and the many
iterations of the Persian Empire and its successor states on the Iranian
Plateau and Central Asia.7
After the rise of Islam, the caliphate became a huge primary empire
that ran from Spain and North Africa through the Arab Middle East and
beyond into the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia.8 Upon its breakup,
successor primary empires eventually appeared in what had become the
Islamic world. The largest and most long-lasting was the Ottoman Empire
that first emerged in the thirteenth century and by the eighteenth ruled
from the Balkans to the borders of Iran, from the Caucasus to the Arabian
Peninsula, Egypt, and parts of North Africa. But other significant and
long-lasting empires in the Muslim world that emerged around the same
time period were established by the Timurids in Central Asia, the Safavids
in Iran, and the Mughals in India.9
Such primary empires may have begun with the hegemony of a
single region or ethnic group, but they all became more cosmopolitan
over time with the incorporation of new territories and people very
different from themselves. Indeed, the main characteristic of a successful
primary empire was its ability to thrive on diversity and make it a
strength. An important aspect of its political structure, one that gave it
great stability, was that the empire’s founding ruling elite could be re-
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placed without bringing about the collapse of the state structure. Poli-
ties whose founding elites defined the state by their exclusive domi-
nance of it lacked this capacity—they either had to limit the size of the
state to one they could manage unaided, or risk its collapse at the hands
of disaffected peoples whose own elites became permanent enemies of
the state. The leaders of the early Islamic conquests experienced this
tension firsthand when they broke away from a narrow conception of
participation (Islam as a religion exclusive to the Arabs) to a strikingly
diverse one (Islam as a world religion) in which all believers could poten-
tially be part of a single political system in which there was an oppor-
tunity for a wide range ofpeople to participate.
Empires were aided in this process by various types of long-term
imperial projects designed to imprint particular aspects of their own
cultural system on all peoples under their rule. It was not an attempt by
the elite to create clones of themselves, but rather to foster a common
core of values that would add to existing ones. It was a project that moved
in stages from coercion and cooptation to cooperation and identification.
It produced a vision ofunity that extended well beyond force and created
what we often identify as a civilization that long outlasted the political
system that first produced it.
Examples include the use of Chinese ideographs and Confucian
models of morality and governance in East Asia, or the survival of the
use of Latin and Roman law and administration in the West. Religion
could also prove a strong foundation for an imperial project in some
parts of the world, as when the Romans and Byzantines began to see
themselves as protectors and then missionaries for Christianity. Of course,
the common use of the term “Islamic world” even today is a legacy of
the founders of the caliphate whose project ofmaking Muslim identity
paramount over all others long survived that institution’s political col-
lapse.
If classic primary empires were the product of internal development
and sustained themselves through the exploitation of their own resources,
there were also a large number of imperial polities that were the products
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of secondary empire formation. That is, they came into existence as a
response to primary imperial state formation elsewhere. Although they
often had tremendous power and influence, and mimicked primary em-
pires in their actions and policies, they lacked most of their essential
attributes. Most notably, they often exerted direct rule over relatively
few people, even when their geographical scope was huge. But the com-
mon element that really set all of them apart from primary empires was
the absence of an internal domestic resource base sufficient to support
the polity, and a dependence on external resources to make up that defi-
ciency. Secondary empires acquired these resources in various ways, but
always from people and states they did not attempt to rule directly. They
were thus “shadows” that took on the form and power ofprimary empires
without all of their substance.
There were four different types of shadow empires:
Mirror empires that rose and fell in tandem with their rivals because
they were responses to challenges presented by a neighbor’s imperial
centralization. The best examples are the series ofnomadic empires in
Mongolia that emerged when China was unified under native Chinese
dynasties.10 The danger China presented gave incentive for the nomads
to unite, but these polities preserved themselves only by extracting re-
sources from China, not by taxing their own people. Classic dyads includ-
ed the Han/Xiongnu from 200 BCE to 200 CE and the Tang/Turks from
600–900 CE. When native Chinese dynasties collapsed, so did their noma-
dic counterparts that had become parasitically dependent on them.
Maritime trade empires that held the minimum amounts of territory
needed to extract economic benefits from other polities that organized
the production of the goods they traded. By focusing their investments
on ports and strong navies, they attempted to control the means of ex-
change rather than the means ofproduction. Examples include imper-
ial Athens, Carthage, and Venice. In early modern times the Portuguese,
Dutch, and British penetration ofAsia took this form.11 They were vulner-
able to rival naval powers but tended to be shattered only when existing
land-based powers were strong enough to either destroy their trade net-
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works or target their centers for elimination, as when Rome destroyed
Carthage or the Spartans defeated the Athenians in the Peloponnesian
War.
Vulture empires that were created by leaders of frontier provinces
or client states who turned the tables on their erstwhile imperial masters
in times ofpolitical and economic distress by seizing control ofparts of
the old empires. They characteristically sought to adopt the cultural
values and administrative structures of the primary empires they occu-
pied rather than impose new ones. Although their systems of governance
were less sophisticated than the imperial systems they replaced, the
ability to preserve order in the midst of anarchy gave them a competitive
advantage. Ironically, the more successful they proved to be at restoring
order, the more they undermined the rationale for their rule. They histor-
ically lost power when the structure of the old regime and its indigenous
elites recovered enough to exclude the interlopers. Examples of such
vulture empires include most of the many foreign dynasties that ruled
north China,12 or the Nubians who briefly ruled ancient Egypt.13 In other
cases, vulture empires emerged as masters ofweak secondary imperial
polities that lay beyond the reach of bigger primary empires. These sha-
dow empires, such as the Hapsburg dynasty in Central Europe or the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Eastern Europe, incorporated neighboring
marginal territories but never produced an overwhelmingly strong center
to unify them.14
Empires ofnostalgia were based on the remembrance of organizations
past. They claimed an imperial tradition and the outward trappings of
an extinct empire, but could not themselves meet the basic requirements
of an imperial state such as direct control of territory, true centralized
rule, or significant urban centers. Indeed, they often lacked the territorial
size or population to justify their pretensions—as when rulers of former
provinces of an old empire promoted themselves to imperial rank. Exam-
ples include the medieval Carolingian Empire established by Charlemagne
and its long-lived successor, the Holy Roman Empire.15 As Voltaire acer-
bically complained, the “agglomeration that was called and which still
calls itself the Holy Roman Empire is neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an
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Empire,”16 yet it survived as an institution for one thousand years.17 No
better definition of a shadow empire of nostalgia could be had. As we
will see, the caliphate has had a similar hold on the Islamic imagination.
Shadow empires in each of these categories could on some occasions
evolve into true primary empires. The Mongol Empire founded by Gen-
ghis Khan in 1206 began like other mirror nomadic empires seeking only
to extort northern China but ended up conquering it, and most of Eurasia
as well, to become the largest land empire in history under his succes-
sors.18 Few maritime empires successfully moved to directly rule the
lands they exploited economically, but the expansion of the British in
India from a group ofprivate armed traders in the seventeenth century
to rulers of the whole subcontinent in the mid-nineteenth is an example
of how it could be done.19 And while most vulture dynasties that ruled
north China were never able to expand very far south, in 1644 the Manchu
Qing dynasty did—quickly moving from vultures to become primary im-
perial rulers of all China for the next two-and-a-half centuries.20 When
secondary empires did transform themselves into primary ones, however,
the legacy of their earlier experiences as outsiders often profoundly
affected how they saw the world. Unlike native Chinese rulers like the
Ming dynasty it succeeded, for example, the Qing treated non-Han peo-
ples as potential partners to be co-opted rather than inveterate enemies
to be walled off.21 In South Asia, even after their de facto displacement
of the Mughals and other powerful Indian states, the British were loath
to take on the formal responsibilities of governance, and never lost their
mercantile preoccupations that put profit first. Only after various forms
of indirect rule failed and put their position in India at risk during the
so-called Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 did the British government in London
finally end the East India Company’s responsibility for administration
there.22
Empires ofnostalgia and cultural memory
Of all the shadow empires, those based on nostalgia are perhaps
the most unusual and the most shadowy. They exist only in the minds
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of those who perceive them and are rooted in conceptions of empires
past that never truly existed in the ideal forms that were attributed to
them. Their origins were firmly rooted in the lasting cultural memory
left by powerful empires on the regions and peoples they ruled or bor-
dered. When these empires collapsed (particularly if that collapse resulted
in many generations of political anarchy, population decline, and econo-
mic decay), the extinct imperial structure was often imbued with the
aura of a former “golden age” now lost.
The memory of this empire and its trappings retained such an ideo-
logical hold over future generations that it could be used as a powerful
tool in later times when new rulers sought to build states or empires of
their own. It also provided many of them with templates for building a
large-scale administration where these had disappeared. This tendency
was strongest in China where the cosmological myth of a necessary em-
peror ruling “All under Heaven” emerged even before it was fully united,
and later provided the impetus to recreate a united empire after it was
lost.23 Any conquerors who could reunite China after a period ofdisunion
—even “barbarians” like the Mongols and Manchus— were deemed legi-
timate if they succeeded.24 The founding myth of unity that came into
being with the first Qin emperor in the third century BCE was so strong
that (unlike in the West) primary empires succeeded in reuniting China
after each period of state collapse. (Some today would see the People’s
Republic of China as the latest in this series of unified Chinese states
attempting to restore its former status as the dominant power in East
Asia.)
China’s success in recreating imperial unity after collapse (periods
that often spanned many centuries) was the exception rather than the
rule, however. In most places the dream of reestablishing a primary em-
pire in its past form always remained a distant hope rather than an achie-
vable reality. Still, the very idea of the old empire provided an ideological
basis for those leaders seeking to centralize power against the opposition
ofpowerful local elites. Charlemagne’s Carolingian Empire fell squarely
into this category because it lacked most of the basic necessities of state
formation, let alone empire formation. Early medieval Europe lacked big
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urban centers and an integrated economy. Its rulers could raise only
rudimentary taxes and relied on feudal troop levies rather than standing
armies. Indeed, the entire feudal system of land grants run by autonomous
local notables was antithetical to Roman principles of imperial rule. These
continued only in the Roman Catholic Church, whose hierarchical clergy
and institutional ownership of land far better reflected a Roman imperial
template.25
Still, it was recognized as an empire at the time, and continues to
hold an outsized place in medieval European history. Why? Because it
was the first widely accepted attempt to bring back the political model
ofRome to the Catholic Christian West, and it struck a powerful cultural
chord in regions that saw themselves as falling far below the level of civi-
lization that had once existed. It would serve as a potent ideological wea-
pon in the (ultimately unsuccessful) drive to centralize the petty states
of feudal Europe into a single imperial polity, as well as later giving Wes-
tern Europe an imperial vision of itself in dealing with the Islamic world
during the Crusades.26 It had far less of an impact in the territories of the
Eastern Roman Empire where the Byzantines (allied with the Eastern
Orthodox Christian Church) successfully maintained a unified imperial
structure and centralized military for a millennium after its collapse in
the West.27
In empires of nostalgia, rulers tied their own legitimacy to some-
thing that no longer existed but still attracted willing participation: the
desire to be part of a political project that inspired hope of better things
to come by appealing to past glory. Petty struggles for power and supre-
macy could be dressed in more attractive clothing and tied to loftier goals
that had strong cultural appeal. Cooperation was thus easier to achieve,
and recognition of the new ruler and his state as more legitimate, if it
could be linked to an admired (if long gone) empire rather than being
viewed as an unwelcome innovation imposed by a usurping power-hungry
clique.
Because empires of nostalgia draw their power from the realm of
cultural memory, they do not travel well. The West’s infatuation with
ancient Rome has little resonance in China, nor does the epic rise and
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fall of Chinese dynasties stir any emotion in the West. Yet in their own
realms, such remembrances of empires past can be tenacious. Indeed, it
appears the only way to kill the nostalgia for one is to inculcate a new
cultural order. While the model of Rome remained strong in the West,
it was lost to Roman North Africa after the Islamic conquest. From that
point on, people there were invested in empires ofnostalgia drawn from
the Islamic tradition. Few were more potent than the idea of the cali-
phate.
The caliphate and its new incarnations
The most powerful empire of nostalgia in the Islamic world has
always been the caliphate. Seen as a framework for governance sanctified
by the Prophet and his immediate successors that began in the mid-
seventh century CE, its early conquests were spectacularly successful.
They laid the groundwork not only for a new imperial structure but one
uniquely combining the Muslim religion and the state. Like most empires,
its internal politics were fractious and not very edifying for either those
who fell victim to them or later historians. Even as the empire expanded
externally, it was divided by civil wars over who should rule the caliphate.
The Umayyad Caliphate displaced those who were supporters of the heirs
of the Prophet’s son-in-law ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (who maintained a distinct
identity as Shi’ites). The Umayyads ruled the caliphate until 750 when
they were displaced by the Abbasids. The Abbasids consolidated their
power in part by murdering all the Umayyad pretenders they could find.
Despite its bloody beginnings, the Abbasid dynasty marked the highpoint
of caliphal power and has long been viewed as the period of Islam’s great-
est influence culturally and politically. Its power declined in the mid-
ninth century when it lost control of outlying territories and was chal-
lenged by many rebellions. The dynasty lost secular authority when con-
quered by new regional dynasties, beginning with the Buyids from Iran
in 945. However, the prestige of the caliphate was so high that all succeed-
ing Muslim dynasties acknowledged the caliph’s spiritual authority. The
caliphate ended when the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 and murdered
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the last caliph, abolishing the institution. Coming from a different cultural
tradition, they had no particular respect or sympathy for Islamic insti-
tutions (although their descendants who stayed would eventually adopt
the religion).28 The Ottoman sultans, who first took up the title for them-
selves in the fourteenth century, began to stress the importance of the
institution for their own legitimacy beginning in the eighteenth century,
in a fairly successful bid to portray themselves as defenders of Islam
against the growing power ofChristian Europe.
While appeals to an idealized Islamic past had a long history, parti-
cularly in the battle to throw off European colonial domination in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Islam as a framework for state-build-
ing had seemingly lost the battle of ideas to Western democratic, nation-
alist, or socialist movements that either rejected religion outright or
reduced its writ to the private sphere. Such secular movements all sought
to build ideal human societies of some sort and saw religion (ofwhatever
type) as an obstacle to achieving their goals. Beginning first with the
American and French revolutions in the late eighteenth century, religious
institutions in the West were stripped of any privileged political role
even in countries like Britain that still recognized a state religion. During
the twentieth century, socialist states like the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China attacked religious belief and religious institutions
directly, proclaiming atheism as national policy. Following the end of
World War I, most leaders of newly independent states in Muslim majority
countries (or those seeking independence) similarly grounded their poli-
tical legitimacy in a variety of secular rather than religious guises: nation-
alism, kingship, democracy, or radical socialism.
This can be seen most strongly among the secular nationalists who
established all the regimes of the Arab world following the dismember-
ment of the Ottoman Empire (save Saudi Arabia). They viewed religion
more as a source of the region’s weakness rather than strength, and be-
lieved it needed to be cast aside to build state power. Non-Arab Muslim
polities adopted similar policies of state secularism in pursuit ofnational
development. In the 1920s, it was the core ideology ofTurkey’s Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, who abolished the caliphate in 1924 during his successful
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drive to create a secular republic. Reza Shah Pahlavi attempted to mod-
ernize his country by stressing Iran’s pre-Islamic greatness under the
Persian Empire. Even in distant Afghanistan, King Amanullah Khan spent
the 1920s attempting to replace a legal system based on Islamic law with
secular courts employing a secular law code. A British Indian political
agent at the time went so far as to conclude that the rise of secular mod-
ernist reformers was “an illustration of the broad fact already noticed
that the impulse behind recent movements in the East is nationalist rath-
er than religious in character, and that when the two forces come into
conflict the advantage lies with the nationalist.”29
Almost a century later, this conclusion appears to have been pre-
mature. Beginning with the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Islamic world
has been swept by a revival of religious political movements in which
the secular nationalists have been at a clear disadvantage. But the form
such Islamic movements has taken has varied significantly. Some Sunni
Muslim Brotherhood followers saw their movement as able to work within
the structures of existing secular states, with the expectation ofmoving
them toward such religious goals as the implementation of shari’ah law.
Others sought to implement purely Islamic governments with no incli-
nation to share power. In Shi’ite Iran, clerics set the rules of the Islamic
Republic and oversaw its management. In the Sunni world, Mullah Omar,
the Taliban leader ofAfghanistan, proclaimed the country an independent
Islamic emirate and gave himself the title of amīr al-muʾminīn (Commander
of the Faithful) in 1996. Notably, however, he did not proclaim himself
caliph, or suggest that the Afghan emirate marked the beginning of a
new caliphate. In this he appears to have been following Al-Qa’idah
opinion that a caliphate could only come into existence after the lands
of the original caliphate (including places no longer Muslim, like Spain)
had come under its control. Significantly, Mullah Omar was neither an
Arab nor from the Prophet’s tribe, qualifications historically deemed
necessary for becoming a caliph (although these criteria had not applied
during the many centuries when the Ottoman Turkish sultans claimed
the title).30
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The shift of the concept of the caliphate from some future culmi-
nating endpoint that would emerge only after Islam’s final victory over
its rivals to a contemporary institution designed to bring that victory
became manifest in June 2014. At that time, the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) endorsed Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī’s declaration of himself as
caliph in the territories ISIS occupied. In sharp contrast to Mullah Omar,
Baghdādī is both an Arab and a descendant of the Prophet’s tribe of
Quraysh. The large number ofMuslim supporters, including thousands
of foreign fighters and even women, who have flocked to join in the fight
for this new caliphate has surprised many observers. Their enthusiasm
for participating in a fight that is not their own is best explained by view-
ing the Islamic State and its declared caliphate as an “empire ofnostalgia”
that attracts precisely because it is an attempt to recreate a lost empire
ofglory when Muslims were politically and culturally dominant.
The original caliphate was a transnational empire, so those attemp-
ting to revive it now see themselves as legitimate in reaching out to the
entire Muslim ummah for support. Like other purveyors of empires of
nostalgia, however, its culturally resonant project is based on illusions
designed to soften a harsher reality. The war the Islamic State portrays
as a noble and attractive struggle pitting believers against unbelievers
to create an ideal Islamic state is in reality a vicious civil war conflict
within the Muslim community. Only by declaring its equally Muslim
opponents (albeit of different sects or political factions) kuffār or infidels,
apostates worthy of death (that is, takfīr), can the new caliphate justify
its brutal tactics that bring mass slaughter and oppression to the heart-
land of the old caliphate.
In this, ISIS lays the foundation for its demise: successful empires
succeed by tempering their violence through the accommodation of
diver-ity. Power may be won by the sword, but it is maintained by softer
means. As conquerors of large non-Muslim communities, rulers of the
early caliphate needed to accommodate indigenous groups and accepted
them as long as they accepted the caliphate’s rule and paid taxes. By
contrast, the current Islamic State works in an environment in which
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Muslim communities constitute the vast majority. Ironically, some
Christian communities have received better protection that their Muslim
neighbors because the original caliphate granted them specific protec-
tions not shared by other religions (such as the Yazidis) or those fellow
Muslims they have deemed heretical.31 By defining its caliphate so nar-
rowly, they risk the fate of similar radical Islamic movements such as
the seventh-century Kharijites, who also viewed most other Muslims as
enemy apostates. They were marginalized and destroyed by unified
opposition to them in both the Sunni and Shi’ah communities.
Of all the varieties of shadow empires, an empire of nostalgia is
least likely to make the transition into a primary empire. Even in China
where new dynasties grounded themselves in older imperial traditions,
that transition was only the finishing touch that transformed conquering
rebels and foreign invaders into legitimate rulers. In this they resemble
what anthropologists call revitalization movements whose charismatic
leaders seek to bring about a social transformation of the world that
would empower their followers.32 To attempt the recreation of an old
imperial structure on the ground, however, invites attack by rivals of all
sorts that few such movements could withstand. Empires of nostalgia
thus do best in a world where there are no powerful state rivals, in times
when long periods of political turmoil produce a desire for order even
where it cannot be delivered. Where strong states do exist, such move-
ments are almost always destroyed as autonomous political entities, a
prospect that often leads to the belief that divine intervention will save
the day, as the ISIS Caliphate’s English-language media mouthpiece
asserts. Called Dabiq, it is named for the site in northern Syria where
some believe the Muslim version ofArmageddon will occur.
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Response to Thomas Barfield,
“The Islamic State as an Empire ofNostalgia”
Franck Salameh
If I may, I wish to both agree and take issue with parts ofTom Bar-
field’s conclusion that ISIS is an “empire ofnostalgia” seeking to recreate
a lost “golden age.” This is an exquisitely accurate assessment, suggesting
that an exercise such as ISIS may be “based on illusions” and may there-
fore prove to be ephemeral. By osmosis, this also diminishes the tenacity
and resilience of the Islamic State itself, and devalues the legitimacy of
its religious bearings.
However, such an assessment nevertheless ignores the tenacity
and resilience of both empire and religion in the Middle East. For exam-
ple, suggesting that secular nationalism as a principle and basis of gov-
ernment, as well as a source of political legitimacy, may trump other
models in the Middle East ignores the staying power of these forces in
the region.
To wit, even in presumably secular, modern Middle Eastern soci-
eties such as Turkey, more citizens readily identify as Muslims first and
foremost than as citizens of a “secular” republic. Surmising otherwise
is a reflection of post-religious Western biases, not time-honored Muslim
norms. Furthermore, secular nationalism and the pretense of secular
nationalism are not necessarily identical when it comes to ideas and
political cultures of the Middle East: the former may be secular; the latter
only parades secular ostentations.
doi: 10.17613/rxh3-6s83 Mizan 1 (2016): 187–194
Franck Salameh188
And so, I would like to push back with two—perhaps combustive
—suggestions to flesh out Barfield’s assessment:
First, that ISIS may indeed be the norm in the longue durée of
Middle Eastern history, rather than the exception;
Second, that the secular state (particularly the current
crumbling Arab-defined state system in the Middle East) is
the exception to the rule, and may not have the staying
power once attributed to it. In other words, places like
“Syria”—and in some Western and pan-Arabist circles
“Greater Syria”—or for that matter Jordan or Iraq and the
rest, are modern inventions that never achieved legitimacy.
ISIS, on the other hand, may hold both legitimacy and
authenticity.
It is true that Muslim-majority countries (or some Muslim majority
countries) in the Arab-defined Middle East might have trotted out secular
ideals with great zeal throughout the twentieth century. But to suggest
that, say, the Ba’ath in Syria and Iraq, or Nasserism in Egypt, or the
jamāhiriyyah (socialist populism) of Libya, or the monarchies ofMorocco,
Jordan, and the rest (which, incidentally, all proudly flaunt their kings’
direct descent from the Prophet Muḥammad)—to suggest that the above
somehow drew their political legitimacy, and therefore their staying
power, from secular—as opposed to religious—principles and traditions,
is to paint too bright and optimistic a picture of realities that may point
into darker corners ofMiddle Eastern societies and history.
Government in places like Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the rest in the
Arab-defined Middle East, in spite of their proclaimed secular attributes
(which may be more meaningful to Western audiences than to locals)
remain governments ofdeeply religious societies and political cultures,
drawing legitimacy chiefly from religion—from Islam to be exact.
It is politically soothing for Western pundits (and the Western aca-
demy in particular) to diminish the centrality of religion in Middle
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Eastern lives. Yet the political realities of the Middle East remain inti-
mately entwined with religion. This is easily illustrated with one example
from my own world of references.
In the mid-1970s, during one of the numerous fitful ‘pinnacles’ of
Arab nationalist fervor that were then dismantling the Lebanese state
(perhaps at that time the region’s only non-Muslim entity outside of
Israel), Syria’s dictator Hafez al-Assad, in those days the leading man of
“secular” Arabism, had to extort a fatwā edict from Lebanon’s supreme
Shi’a cleric, Mūsā al-Ṣadr, confirming the Alawites’ Shi’ite Muslim pedi-
gree—Alawites who incidentally wedded Phoenician paganism, metem-
psychosis, Christian Trinitarianism, and Greek and Gnostic conceptions
of divinity to what traditional Muslims may consider only nominally,
even dubiously, Islamic practices.
Now, why would Assad seek a religious affidavit shoring up his Mus-
lim credentials if his prerogatives as a ruler stemmed from “secular”
sources in an ostensibly secular, Arab nationalist Syria? Because in multi-
ethnic, multi-religious, polyglot Syria, the “secular” Ba’athist state consti-
tution still mandated that the president of the republic be a Muslim—and
Assad was obviously, in the eyes ofmany, not considered a Muslim. Al-
though this is only one example that confirms the rule across the board
in the Middle East, there are many other parallels to it. One ought to try
to be a Coptic Christian president ofEgypt, for instance.
True, the Arab nationalism trotted out by Syria’s Assad (and his
Ba’athist clone in Iraq, and others elsewhere) had initially been a secular
creed at its inception in the early twentieth century. But this early secular
Arab nationalism was in the main the creed ofArabophone Christians,
intelligible only to them and other non-Muslim minorities at the time.
That is, secular nationalism was the doctrine ofnon-Muslims preoccupied
with building a post-Ottoman polity for themselves where they would
no longer be relegated to second-class dhimmitude (officially tolerated
under Islamic law but sometimes subject to discriminatory rules and
restrictions) living by the sufferance of a Muslim state, often enduring
persecution, discrimination, and the indignity of a devalued existence.
But a secular Arabism denuded of its Muslim content ultimately proved
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unintelligible, and therefore unattractive, to the bulk of the Muslims of
the late Ottoman period.
Even Michel Aflaq, the Damascene Greek Orthodox Christian foun-
der of the Arab Ba’ath Party—a committed secularist by all accounts but
nevertheless a Christian secularist—even he could not escape the cen-
trality of Islam in his neighborhood, and the centrality of Islam to the
secular Arab nationalism that he promoted. He conceded that being an
‘Arab’ and being a ‘Muslim’ were complementary, if not synonymous.
From the time of the Prophet Muḥammad to the time of the prophet of
Arab nationalism—Michel Aflaq himself also adopted the name Muḥam-
mad in later years—during that time period, spanning some fourteen
centuries, little has changed in the sense that identity and self-awareness
under Islam have always been religious. So in a sense, not only is there
no opposition between Islam and the so-called secular Arab nationalism
of the modern Middle Eastern state system; indeed, there is a great deal
of conflation, and harmony, and cooperation, and synonymity.
Secular Ba’athist doctrine as articulated by Michel Aflaq held that
the Prophet Muḥammad was also, in point of fact, the founder of the
Arab nation and was to be venerated as such by every Arab nationalist,
whether Muslim or not. Indeed, Aflaq himself practiced what he preached
and is believed to have converted to Islam.1 He was anyway given a Mus-
lim state funeral in Iraq in 1989.
There are many adages in the literature of Arab nationalism that
confirm the fact that secularism as a source of legitimacy in the post-
Ottoman, Arab-defined Middle East is at best a pipe dream that defies
the region’s laws of nature, which remain overwhelmingly defined by
religion (which is to say, defined by Islam). For instance, a leading Iraqi
Arab nationalist writer, ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Bazzāz, noted that Islam is
the religion of the Arabs (and by the Arabs), par excellence. “There could
in no way be a contradiction between Islam and Arabism,” stressed
Bazzāz.2 Another writer from the same school agreed, maintaining that
“Islam is the other face ofArabism.”3 Munāḥ al-Ṣulḥ, a prominent Leban-
ese Arab-nationalist theorist, confirmed his cohorts’ attitudes, claiming
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that “Islam is another name for Arab nationalism.”4 Even Michel Aflaq
himself is noted to have claimed repeatedly that “Islam is to Arabism
what bones are to the flesh.”5 But perhaps most significantly, the logo
of the Arab League itself—an ‘Arab’ and not a ‘Muslim’ league, one ought
to remember—is emblazoned with a fragment of a verse from Sūrat Āl
ʿImrān of the Qurʾān, which reads: “You are the finest nation (ummah)
that has been brought forth to mankind.”6
So, in conclusion:
ISIS is indeed an “empire ofnostalgia,” but it is grounded in
nostalgia that stands on solid historical ground—nostalgia
that is to many more real than reality itself.
The brief “secular” interlude in the Middle East of the early
twentieth century was exactly that: brief, and just an inter-
lude. It was also the exception to the rule. The rule was and
remains: empire and religion, tightly conjoined—a fusion that
long preceded Islam, or even monotheism.
“Secularism” is an absurdity in the Middle East.
Empire (and indeed theocratic empire) can be said to be a
Middle Eastern invention. From the time of the Sumerians to
ISIS in our time, the pattern has been one of discontinuity
and change, and many iterations of cultures and rulers; but
empire in varied incarnations has remained unchanged, and
Islam as a badge and rationale for empire has endured. ISIS is
in line with that time-honored pattern. Islam, after all, to the
majority ofMiddle Easterners (not only to the ISIS types) is
the pinnacle of human existence; whatever came before Islam
is not worth remembering, let alone preserving—and ISIS is
making good on that principle. And whatever may come after
Islam can never measure up.
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Lastly, whether ISIS endures or not, that is not the question.
What matters is that ISIS is here; perhaps not here for long,
but it has been here long enough; it is demolishing cultures
and peoples and monuments that withstood and stood the
test of time.
And today, in the year in which many commemorate the hundredth
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, one may be rightly concerned
with the fate of millions of Middle Easterners under the gun, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike. One may be concerned with the fate of tens of
thousands of Middle Eastern migrants escaping the violence of their
homelands, strewn about in rickety boats adrift around the Mediterra-
nean. These are moving images and compelling causes for concern! And
yet, the collapse of the Middle East and the destruction ofNear Eastern
Christianity and Christendom continue unabated.
Debaters and demagogues and pundits and pedagogues deliberate
with zeal and clarity and alacrity about ISIS and the causes of ISIS and
the life-expectancy of ISIS, while Christians in the Middle East (others
as well, of course others, but disappearing Christians and non-Muslim
minorities in the main) are stalked by a looming gruesome end, wonder-
ing how much longer they will be able to hold out. Conferences and aca-
demic papers and attempts at understanding, and all the jeremiads and
condemnations and righteous indignations and analyses that follow, may
all be well and good! Yet little else beyond the academic and the perfunc-
tory is being done! Little else perhaps can be done! And the breviaries of
the victims and the hunted grow longer! And all that is offered ultimately
remains a creepy form ofmodern voyeurism: looking at the atrocities,
flinching with horror, getting offended, and then moving along social
media circles, avidly scrolling further down Twitter feeds.
Crucifixions, beheadings, victims burned alive, others buried alive,
and on and on and on. This ought not be the eighth century! Our modern
calendars assure us we live in the twenty-first century. We all know that.
But we all also live in a smug post-religious, post-imperial Western bub-
ble, and assume the rest of the world does so too, or ought to.
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In March 2015, at the behest of France, the United Nations Security
Council debated the possibility of a UN “Action Charter” aiming at protec-
ting Near Eastern Christians (and other indigenous endangered species)
from the cruelty of ISIS.7 Some clamored to suggest this was a fantastic
initiative! Better than nothing, they claimed! In reality—and beyond the
fact that it never amounted to anything—France’s was an initiative sadder
and more ominous than reality itself. It marked the last chapter in a long-
standing saga ofdestruction, signaling a sort of resignation in the loom-
ing extinction of one of the founding elements ofhuman civilization—the
non-Muslim “first nations” of the Near East—and the rise of an empire
that to many Westerners may be deemed archaic, obsolete, and cruel,
but which to many Middle Easterners is not totally bereft of legitimacy,
authenticity, and historicity. ISIS may indeed be an “empire ofnostalgia”!
But its yearned-for “secular” alternatives are perhaps a cross between
Candide and Pollyanna, and we may indeed currently be living in the
middle of “the best of all possible worlds.”
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ISIL and the (Im)permissibility
of Jihad and Hijrah:
Western Muslims between Text and Context
Tazeen Ali and Evan Anhorn
Abstract
In this paper, we draw attention to the ways in which theology operates
within, and indeed proceeds from, generative social contexts. Beyond
a concern for correct interpretation of scripture, categories of religious
permissibility and impermissibility are socially constituted—they define
boundaries of inclusion or exclusion that establish specific relationships
to hegemonic Western societies. To examine these relationships, we will
consider the charismatic critique of the Islamic State, as well as the insti-
tutional response ofNorth American Muslim scholars, through an ana-
lysis of textual interpretations for the obligation ofhijrah (emigration)
and jihad proposed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and
its supporters.
Drawing from Weber’s analysis of charisma, we contend that the ideo-
logy of ISIL and its style of argumentation play upon Muslim anxieties
over their national belonging in the West. This resonance is seen through
a close reading of the ISIL promotional magazine Dabiq and the way in
which its authors imagine their Western audiences. Against ISIL’s claims,
the argument for the impermissibility of this jihad by leading Western
Islamic scholars and organizations such as the Council on American-
Islamic Relations (CAIR) is also considered. In the North American con-
struction of an Islamic legal discourse on the impermissibility of joining
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ISIL, Muslim minorities’ anxieties over national belonging are again high-
ly relevant. We argue that, while coming to opposite conclusions, both
Western Islamic scholars and ISIL ideologues rely upon constructions of
Western Muslim anxiety as much as the Islamic tradition for staging
their arguments. These legal arguments can only be understood by con-
textualizing these debates as a part of a broader contest over Islamic
authority and institutionalization in the West.
Introduction: Charisma and the Islamic State’s critique ofWestern society
On June 28, 2014, Abū Muḥammad al-ʿAdnānī, spokesperson for the
jihadist organization Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), declared
the group’s creation of a global Islamic caliphate.1 This announcement
coincided with the first issue of the new state’s propaganda magazine,
Dabiq, and the first day of the month-long Muslim festival ofRamadan,
a holiday marked by Muslims around the world with fasting and repen-
tance. The Ramadan launch date was meant to be highly symbolic for
the declaration of the Islamic State in Dabiq. Mirroring the spiritual invi-
tation ofRamadan, the first issue ofDabiq calls for a return, repentance,
and reform to match the earthly restoration of the Islamic caliphate—at
once a political, religious, and social answer for a divinely sanctioned
pattern ofhuman life and governance.
It is important to bear in mind the close relation of the Islamic
State to its media apparatus. While Dabiq is explicitly conceived as a
recruitment device, it is not the only manner in which Western Muslims
are called to personal and political restoration. By its very nature, the
idea of the Islamic State is itselfdaʿwah—a universal call to all Muslims.
Lacking an historical people, established borders, or a cultural heritage,
the global caliphate is as much an appeal for an ideal utopian society as
it is for a functional political state with boundaries, infrastructure, and
the rule of law. The first issue ofDabiq relates the following part of the
declaration speech:
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O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good.
Raise your head high, for today—by Allah’s grace—you have a
state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, mights,
rights, and leadership… Therefore, rush O Muslims to your
state… O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of perform-
ing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so,
because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.2
The language of the speech is clear: the Islamic State is where
Muslims truly belong. Indeed, it is the only authentic place of belonging
for Muslims, since it alone is able to offer the leadership, dignity, and
might that is the true, divinely ordained inheritance ofMuslims. In this
way, the Islamic State exists in an ideal form—as a charismatic appeal
for a potential world. As Max Weber argued, it is not the recognition of
a charismatic authority here that validates that authority; rather, true
charisma, as Weber conceives it, needs no external validation. Its truth
is such that recognition is merely owed to it from the world.3 The failure
of some (or even most) to tender this recognition is immaterial to the
charismatic claim to authority—it is simply the failing of the world to
appreciate the truth, something which then serves to further bolster the
tight bonds of the charismatic group. As an engendering idea, as a crea-
tive and charismatic impulse, the Islamic State demands recognition—a
duty that is left to the rest of the world to fulfill. For non-Muslims, the
form of recognition is fear, as evinced in Dabiq’s regular articles devoted
to the statements by Western leaders regarding the growing threat posed
by the Islamic State. For Muslims, the form of recognition is immigration
—to respond to the call to abandon life in the West and join the Islamic
State, thus recognizing its claim to legitimacy, its leaders’ authenticity
and authority as inheritors (khulafāʾ, the plural of khālifah or caliph) of
prophetic leadership. The obligation of immigration, then, proceeds from
a charismatic appeal of recognition and is not hampered in the least by
the obverse case: the relative rarity ofMuslim immigration to the Islamic
State and thus the dearth of recognition. In this ideal form, recognition
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is a duty; the Islamic State is not dependent upon the support or attitudes
of others. Failure to recognize the Islamic State does not imply the failure
of the State—rather, it is a failure or fault within our-selves (whether
Westerners, Muslims or—most intriguingly—Western Muslims).
Understanding the charismatic nature of Dabiq’s call for immi-
gration is critical to understanding the obligation of hijrah. For Weber,
pure charisma seeks to overthrow any established social order, setting
itself in diametric opposition to stable, routinized society and economy.4
As Weber argues, the rationalized social and economic order is challenged
by charisma precisely because “by its very nature [charisma] is not an
‘institutional’ and permanent structure, but rather, where its ‘pure’ type
is at work, it is the very opposite of the institutionally permanent.”5 Yet,
as S. N. Eisenstadt has highlighted, in Weber’s thinking, charisma is also
foundational to building new institutional orders, so that there is a reci-
procal relationship between the charismatic appeal and the institu-
tionalization it seeks to create.6 This is because, as Weber argues, the
original basis for the stable social and economic arrangements of society
lies in an original charismatic moment that establishes a new precedent
for provisioning the needs and demands of the society.7
In its “purest” type, this distribution takes the form of gifts and
war booty, which are apportioned according to the pure whim of the
charismatic leader. This alternative to the economic organization and
provisioning of stable society becomes one of the primary vehicles for
the charismatic movement to challenge the stable social order. Yet as
the movement stabilizes, the charismatic caprice of the former mode is
slowly replaced by increasingly bureaucratic and routinized forms, which
seek to provision the needs and demands of the society members in a
manner that is more organized and predictable over time. Yet the initial
charismatic impulse lies at the foundation ofnew institutions and social
arrangements. As Eisenstadt argues elsewhere, institutions retain the
capacity to return in part to their original charismatic impulse, as new
entrepreneurial figures seek to bring reform and renovation to ossified
and stagnant social institutions.8
In this way, just as oil revenues fund the Islamic State’s admin-
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istration, charisma finances the very construction and operation of the
command to immigrate, and sets the claims of the Islamic State into a
certain relationship with the West. As a charismatic regime, the Islamic
State is imagined to be the very antithesis of Western stability and
bureaucracy, whose routinization and standardization stifle the creative
impulse that is essential to the charismatic worldview. In order to achieve
the utopian vision of the Islamic State, the call to immigrate demands
complete abandonment of the West—it is either Us or Them, either the
revolutionary charismatic calling or the ossified social structure of the
West. To immigrate is not to move from one country to another. It is to
abandon a habituated social order in favor of the limitless potential of
a conceptual frontier.
It is in this context that the third issue of Dabiq constructs the
Islamic State’s claim of immigration over Western Muslims. The issue’s
feature article, entitled “Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity,” lays out
the psycho-social realities of immigration.9 Here, the author seeks to
address the putative barriers that might impede young (and prono-
minally male) Western Muslims from leaving the West, including the
relative safety, economic security, and educational opportunities repre-
sented by Western life. In so doing, the author presents an idea of the
West in contrast with an idea of the Islamic State, suggesting what it
might mean to belong to either.
In this way, the personal safety of life in the West is neither emu-
lated nor ignored in the Islamic State, but rather turned on its head, so
that the promise of pure death in martyrdom is the celebrated oppor-
tunity of the charismatic regime. This immediate and intimate access to
the charismatic world is essential to the Islamic State’s claims to subvert
the rigid, impersonal, and bureaucratic life of the West. Similar themes
of immediacy are carried through the article’s critique of the “modern
day slavery of employment,” which is contrasted with the right ofwar
booty (including enslavement) as the prophetic inheritance of all Mus-
lims.10 Again, the economic security of Western society is not denied;
rather, the purity of the one who “eats from… his sword” is extolled,
contrasting the impersonal wage-labor ofWestern economies with the
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unique and personalized rewards of the charismatic economy.11 Finally,
the article does not deny the opportunities for education—even Islamic
education—in the West, but instead invites Western Muslims to apply
their knowledge in the building ofa new world.
Each case celebrates the experience of immediacy allegedly found
in life under the Islamic State—an ideal place where one breaks from the
rigid, impersonal, and hierarchical life of the West—without denying the
purported (if equally idealized) experience of life in Western society. As
commentators standing outside of that social order, the authors ofDabiq
are nevertheless responding to it, which can be seen in the very con-
struction of the obligation for hijrah. While invoking Islamic texts and
narratives, the charismatic call and authority of the Islamic State arti-
culated in Dabiq is thus intimately connected with Western society as it
is imagined by the authors, who then articulate their Islamic alternative
in direct relation to the West.
Performing American Islam: The “Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi”
In late September of 2014, in a speech addressed to the UN General
Assembly, Barack Obama called upon Muslims all over the world to “expli-
citly, forcefully and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like
al-Qaeda and ISIL.”12 Around the same time, in an interview with CNN’s
Christiane Amanpour, John Kerry also asserted that Muslims worldwide
would be required to “reclaim Islam” in the greater campaign against
ISIL.13 Elsewhere both Obama and Kerry explicitly attempted to attenuate,
at least verbally, the relationship between Islam and ISIL. For example
in his official statement on ISIL, Obama, channeling the same sentiments
expressed by George Bush following the September 11 attacks, insisted
that the perpetrators of violence were “not ‘Islamic’” and even remarked
that the majority of ISIL targets have been Muslim.14 Much to the surprise
and dismay ofmany commentators, Kerry went a step further and insisted
on calling ISIL by the pejorative Arabic term “Daʿesh” (a derogatory name
for the group based on the acronym derived from its name in Arabic) on
the basis that the group’s actions “are an insult to Islam” and therefore
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should not be called Islamic.15
At best, these efforts by American political leadership to make clear
a distinction between Islam and ISIL are well-intentioned, and presumably
meant to assist Muslim communities across the globe who might be un-
fairly associated with violent groups such as ISIL. However, we argue
that the sharp imperatives laid out by Obama and Kerry for Muslim
communities worldwide to denounce violence enacted by ISIL actually
reinforce associations between “Islam” and ISIL in public perception in
the United States. By requiring all Muslims to disavow the violence of
groups like ISIL, there is an implicit notion that, in essence, there is
indeed a link between extremist groups and Muslims unless otherwise
noted. Moreover, when the most powerful American political figures
construct such a linkage between all Muslims and ISIL, there are signi-
ficant implications for Muslims in the West. For American Muslims in
particular, the seemingly innocuous imperatives made by Obama and
Kerry signify that being a part of the American public discourse requires
the adoption of certain rules and parameters that have been dictated for
them. For example, public discussions over ISIL are restricted to what
Islam and the Qurʾān do or do not say about topics such as violence, jihad,
slavery, and women’s status. This in turn means that American Muslim
leaders can only respond on those same terms. They are required to
engage with questions of religious interpretation rather than discuss
foreign policy, free market capitalism, and the marginalization ofMuslims
in the West, all factors that inform the current situation in Iraq and
Syria.16
Obama and Kerry represent the hegemonic discourse that estab-
lishes what issues are at stake and which questions are of significance.
In this context, Western concerns about each and every act ofviolence
perpetrated by Muslims are almost always dictated in religious terms.
What is expected of American Muslim leaders, then, is to conform to
these expectations by providing a religious response to ISIL. By providing
Islamic counter-arguments to the kinds of claims articulated in ISIL pub-
lications such as Dabiq, as mentioned earlier, and restricting the dis-
cussion solely to matters of religion, American Muslims are forced to
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accept the rules of the debate. In other words, American Muslims are
compelled to acquiesce to a discourse that not only emphasizes religion
and theology but also effaces socio-political and material conditions as
viable causal factors to understanding the phenomenon of ISIL.
Furthermore, in performing the role that is expected of them, we
argue that American Muslims are actually participating in another debate
entirely, namely about the legitimacy ofMuslim belonging in the United
States. Here it is helpful to draw on David Scott’s concept of the “problem
space” which is defined as
… an ensemble ofquestions and answers around which a hori-
zon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-
political stakes) hangs. That is to say, what defines this discur-
sive context are not only the particular problems that get posed
as problems as such (the problem of “race,” say), but the parti-
cular questions that seem worth asking and the kinds of an-
swers that seem worth having. Notice, then, that a problem-
space is very much a context of dispute, a context of rival views,
a context, if you like, of knowledge and power. But from within
the terms of any given problem-space what is in dispute, what
the argument is effectively about, is not itself being argued
over.17
According to Scott, a “problem space” comprises a specific set of
issues that make up the framework of a given debate. This framework is
defined by particular questions and answers that are dependent upon
various networks of power. However, within this framework of questions,
the real topic at hand is not itself acknowledged in explicit terms. For
instance, the structure of the American debates over ISIL is determined
by the hegemonic power of politicians and mainstream media. In this
case, figures such as Obama, Kerry, and even CNN’s Don Lemon—who
earnestly inquired if American Muslim human rights lawyer Arsalan
Iftikhar supported ISIL—set the terms of the debate from their positions
of power.18 Specifically, they require that Muslims respond to queries on
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ISIL through the lens of religious commitments and affiliation.
Obama and Kerry both singlehandedly put the burden of
responsibility on all Muslims to condemn what is considered “Islamic
extremism” as a necessary component of overcoming this complex global
phenomenon. Accordingly, in the televised interview with Iftikhar refer-
enced above, Lemon insistently expected him to explicitly articulate his
personal position on ISIL. It was not sufficient that Iftikhar had spent
the previous five minutes arguing that all Muslims should not be person-
ally held responsible for terror attacks, in the same way that Christian
leaders are not asked to be accountable for acts of violence perpetrated
by those with a Christian background. Nor did Iftikhar’s background as
an international human rights attorney qualify him to be perceived as
someone who would naturally be appalled at the actions of a group such
as ISIL. Iftikhar’s responses were not considered acceptable precisely
because they did not fall within the parameters of the debate. These are
clear examples of Scott’s questions and answers “that seem worth ask-
ing… and worth having.”19 The only questions and answers that are
deemed worthwhile in this context are whether or not all Muslims (and
in particular, American Muslims), as people who purportedly share a
faith with violent groups, agree with the ideology of ISIL. Furthermore,
an endorsement of ISIL is apparently the default stance of all Muslims
unless explicit and public apologies and/or condemnations are made
(and sometimes despite this). Applying David Scott’s concept of the
“problem space” to American debates about ISIL, then, we argue that
these debates are not really about the permissibility of jihad and emi-
gration in Islam, nor are they centered on the qurʾānic stance on violence
or warfare. Rather, these conversations mask the real issue at stake,
which is whether or not Muslims can ever truly belong in North America.
This renders the Muslim role in the West performative, in that it
functions as a way to lay claim to American belonging. This role is evi-
denced through what is popularly known as the “Open Letter to Al-
Baghdadi” issued by over 120 prominent Muslim scholars worldwide,
including representatives from key North American Islamic institutions
such as CAIR, ISNA (Islamic Society ofNorth America) and Fiqh Council
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ofNorth America, Zaytuna College, ADAMS Center in DC, as well as a few
Islamic Studies professors from US institutions. The letter was released
on September 24, 2014 and spans seventeen pages of text, with versions
available in Arabic, English, French, Turkish, and Persian.20
The letter is intended by its authors to be a dense and meticulous
refutation of the ideology of ISIL. It draws exclusively, albeit superficially,
on the classical legal tradition, ḥadīth, and Qurʾān in order to delegitimize
the Islamic State. The first sections of the letter draw heavily on classical
legal tradition (specifically that of the Shafi’ite school) in order to estab-
lish scholarly privilege in scriptural interpretation. As such the letter
and its signatories emphasize knowledge ofuṣūl al-fiqh (exegesis) and a
thorough command ofArabic as qualifications needed to quote the Qurʾān
to advance a particular position. This is in contrast to the preferred
interpretative method of ISIL as seen in Dabiq, wherein any reader can
pick up the text and interpret verses in isolation. To this point, the Open
Letter asserts that “it is not permissible to quote a verse, or part of a
verse, without thoroughly considering and comprehending everything
that the Qurʾān and Hadith relate about that point.”21
According to Nihad Awad of CAIR, who presented the letter in a
press conference in Washington, DC, the letter was meant to dissuade
potential recruits from emigrating for the purposes of jihad. Awad further
states that the letter “is not meant for a liberal audience” and that some
mainstream Muslims may not understand it either.22 However, we con-
tend that the outwardly complex legal argumentation renders it inacces-
sible to any potential ISIL recruits as well. Furthermore, the inaccessibility
of the letter in our view is a part of the American Muslim performance
that emphasizes religious and theological argumentation at the expense
of a discussion of socio-political context surrounding the rise of ISIL. The
most accessible part of the letter is its executive summary, which com-
prises twenty-four bullet points, each corresponding to a longer section
within the body of the letter. The presence of this executive summary,
we argue, signals that the very format of the Open Letter itself appears
to be intended for a Western, non-Muslim public. Executive summaries
are a standard feature of business and journalistic reports, and not
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typically utilized in either traditional or contemporary Islamic legal texts.
Interestingly, twenty-two out of these twenty-four points incor-
porate the statement “it is forbidden in Islam” or “it is permissible in
Islam.” For example, point eight reads: “Jihad in Islam is defensive war.
It is not permissible without the right cause, the right purpose, and with-
out the right rules of conduct.”23 However, John Kelsay demonstrates the
complex ways in which “right conduct” in jihad can be accommodated
in multiple contexts, thereby extending the purview of “defensive war”
and also allowing for the possibility of offensive jihad.24
Furthermore, we argue here that these definitive statements treat
“Islam” as a monolithic entity with a singular stance on various issues,
which in many ways is the very same critique that the letter directs
towards ISIL ideologues. In fact, the letter’s usage ofmultiple singular
statements on Islam contradicts point four that refers to the allowance
for differences of legal opinion within the classical tradition. The signa-
tories of the letter argue for the legal pluralism of Islam, while simul-
taneously claiming that ISIL is unequivocally “un-Islamic.” These contra-
dictory statements indicate that despite the appearance of complex legal
reasoning, the Open Letter only superficially reflects the classical tradi-
tion.
Moreover, despite Awad’s assertions to the contrary, the “Open
Letter to Al-Baghdadi” does not, in fact, engage deeply with classical reli-
gious texts and scholars. It may appear this way to the casual observer
because it is laden with technical language and vague invocations of
prominent classical scholars. However, the outward complexity and
inaccessibility of the letter to Western audiences do not suffice to render
it an accurate portrayal of the classical legal tradition. Here, the Open
Letter actually mirrors the superficial rhetoric employed by ISIL in Dabiq,
which is also laden with references to classical scholars.
For example, in the second point of the letter regarding the central-
ity ofArabic linguistic expertise, the authors of the letter contend that
mastery ofArabic grammar, syntax, and morphology is required to under-
stand legal theory. The letter then makes a distinction between khilāfah
and istikhlāf, in order to argue that the latter term signifies settling in a
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particular place, rather than rulership. As such, ʿAdnānī’s failure to dis-
tinguish between the two terms in this same way in his declaration of
the ISIL caliphate is cited as a grave linguistic error that stems from his
lack of command ofArabic.25 The letter thus dismisses ʿAdnānī’s declar-
ation that the caliphate is a reference to the qurʾānic injunction of “God’s
promise” as an inaccurate interpretation of the Qurʾān. However, in our
view, this dismissal does not actively engage with the fact that ʿAdnānī
is a native Arabic speaker of Syrian background, and according to Shaykh
Abū Turkī b. Mubarak al-Binʿalī, one of the leading authorities cited by
ISIL for its legal rulings, he is indeed learned in the religious sciences.
According to a statement published online by Shaykh Binʿalī, ʿAdnānī
memorized the Qurʾān at a young age and went on to study tafsīr, ḥadīth,
and fiqh.26 On this basis, ʿAdnānī’s credentials would, in fact, appear to
fulfill the scholarly prerequisites as specified in the letter to engage in
the interpretative exercise of ijtihād.
Furthermore, multiple sections of the letter draw on Abū ʿAbd Allāh
Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 820) teachings in a selective manner
when it bolsters particular claims against the legitimacy of ISIL. It appears
to gloss over and omit selections of Shafi’ite teachings that might, in fact,
support ISIL’s claims. For example, drawing on David Vishanoff, Kecia
Ali describes “linguistic ambiguity” as a key element of Shafi’ite legal
theory. Ali and Vishanoffdemonstrate that Shafi’ite hermeneutics allow
jurists to interpret texts in multiple ways, even while championing a
singular interpretation as objectively true in accordance to divine in-
tent.27 This indicates that the very same Shafi’ite hermeneutic that is
advanced in various parts of the Open Letter could conceivably be used
to advance certain aspects of ISIL ideology.
The appearance of complex legal reasoning in the letter constructs
an authentic neo-traditional style of argumentation by drawing on the
classical sources, which by necessity is lengthy and somewhat inacces-
sible. This very inaccessibility, however, appears deliberate, because it
ultimately serves to persuade non-Muslim audiences of its authenticity.
As Awad said in the press conference, “the letter will still sound alien to
most Americans… it is using heavy classical religious texts and classical
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religious scholars.”28 Yet, the letter publicly demonstrates moderate Wes-
tern Muslims actively taking control of their tradition’s narrative, and
performing the role that is expected of them by figures such as Obama
and Kerry. This performative aspect of the letter is further played out on
the Internet. The letter has its own website where users are invited to
add their signature to the letter, and then publish their endorsement on
Twitter and Facebook. This provides a way for Western Muslims to pub-
licly condemn ISIL through their personal social media accounts with
the authoritative backing of respected religious scholars. This highlights
that public condemnation of ISIL is the requirement established for
Muslims by the hegemonic discourse.
Awad further contends that the letter “is not meant for a liberal
audience,” but rather for those might be attracted to ISIL recruitment.29
However, we argue that this Open Letter is indeed meant for a Western
liberal audience. Most of the points in the executive summary appear
designed to allay specific Western anxieties about ISIL. For example, point
seven clearly states, “it is forbidden in Islam to kill emissaries, ambas-
sadors, and diplomats; hence it is forbidden to kill journalists and aid
workers.”30 This is in direct reference to the killings of the two American
journalists, James Foley and Stephen Sotloff, and British aid worker David
Haines, who are all mentioned in the letter by name. Foley, Sotloff, and
Haines were hostages of the Islamic State who were all beheaded only a
few weeks prior to the release of the letter, and so at the forefront of
public consciousness. Their executions are described as “unquestionably
forbidden (haraam).”31 The inclusion of these British and American names
as emissaries serves as further evidence that this letter is aimed towards
a non-Muslim Western audience, given that there was no mention of the
seventeen Iraqi journalists who had also been killed by ISIL in preceding
months.
In highlighting some of the internal contradictions present in the
“Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi,” it is not our intention to suggest that the
authors and signatories of the letter are disingenuous in any way. Rather,
we seek to emphasize that the superficiality with which the letter engages
with classical religious argumentation in its refuting of ISIL confirms its
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primary role in another debate, that is, the issue of American Muslim
belonging. The chief purpose of the letter, in our view, is to argue for the
legitimacy ofMuslims in American society. While the authors of the letter
may not necessarily be conscious of this masked debate, they are none-
theless actors who partake in this discourse of belonging. The rules of
the hegemonic discourse as articulated by Obama and Kerry are such
that any discussion of ISIL by Muslim leaders must necessarily address
theology. American Muslim debates on ISIL and the demand that all
Muslims must publicly condemn the Islamic State clearly demonstrate
that Muslims must struggle to claim a place in American society that
they currently do not have. We argue, then, that Western Muslim debates
over the (im)permissibility of jihad and emigration to join ISIL are less
about rival interpretations ofMuslim legal texts and scripture, and rather
speak more to the discourse ofMuslim belonging in North America.
Challenging the Islamic State: Muslim institution building in the West
Many key voices in American politics have responded to the ideo-
logical challenges of the Islamic State by emphasizing the role and respon-
sibility of the Western Muslim community as the vanguard of an anti-
Islamic State religious discourse. While some politicians have made efforts
to draw public attention to the diversity of Muslim belief on issues of
violence and terrorism, this strategy also runs the risk of alienating Mus-
lims in the West, who are told that the expression of a vocal stance on
the Islamic State is the criterion for their acceptance in the West (just as
the Islamic State claims their hostile posture towards Western states and
society is the criterion for their acceptance under Islam). Such strategies
have done tremendous damage to the establishment of social trust by
making narratives of conflict essential to narratives of belonging.
Given the charismatic claims of the Islamic State and the awkward
social positioning ofAmerican Muslims, what might be a more construc-
tive approach to promoting both civic participation and ownership of
American Islam? For Weber, the charismatic orientation towards society
arises out of “times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious [or]
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political distress.” 32 While Weber himself did not elaborate a great deal
about these conditions, Eisenstadt has argued that this occurs when the
rigidity of the prior social order fails to provide a sense of shared meaning
and belonging to its members. Yet charisma is not only found in these
moments of catastrophe; rather, as Eisenstadt has suggested, charisma
plays a vital and productive role in much more mundane situations as
well, particularly in reforming and transforming social institutions. For
Eisenstadt, the original charismatic drive of the institution—which first
led to its formation—provides later institutional actors with the resources
to remap powerful symbols and reorient the institution to address new
challenges in ever-changing social conditions. In this way, robust insti-
tutions are both the counterweight to claims of authority derived from
pure charisma, as well as the filter through which charisma may be chan-
neled into vital and sustaining social work. In the struggle to determine
who speaks for Islam, then, Western Muslim institutions are ideally situ-
ated to contest Islamic State narratives primarily because they have
recourse to the same charismatic potential.33
Productive examples might be drawn from Germany and the Nether-
lands, where the state has engaged with and even supported local Islamic
institutions, resulting in greater access to civic and political participation
for Muslim minority communities. As Ahmet Yükleyen has argued, these
institutions have played a central role in the process of integrating Muslim
immigrant communities. Such organizations, Yükleyen argues, vitally
serve to “negotiate between the social and religious needs ofMuslims,
on the one hand, and the social, political, and legal context of Europe, on
the other.”34 In this way, the ability ofGerman and Dutch Muslim com-
munities to engage the state is largely determined by the successful estab-
lishment of the communities’ institutions. Comparing Moroccan and
Turkish communities in the Netherlands, Yükleyen notes that
Despite their similar numbers, Turks have 206 mosques, where-
as Moroccans have 92. Turkish mosques provide social and
religious services, whereas Moroccan mosques are limited to
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ritualistic services. A higher level of religious institutional-
ization and functional diversity provides Turkish Muslims with
greater negotiating power with the state.35
Due to a number of factors, including the relative degree of involve-
ment of the Turkish and Moroccan governments, Turkish Muslim
institutions have been much more successful than Moroccan institutions,
which has resulted in different access to political and civic engagement
in the Netherlands. In Europe, such institutions incorporate the dual
functions of providing transparency for state regulation as well as meet-
ing the needs of the religious community.36 Moreover, these institutions
are critical sites for remapping Islamic symbols to address new challenges
and social change. As more Muslim refugees arrive in Europe, such
institutions (and models of state-supported institutionalization) could
provide vital resources for new communities, even as European
governments increasingly put counter-productive pressure on these
institutions to serve as vehicles for integration, assimilation, and state
security policies.
While occupying a medial position between the demands of state
regulation and the needs of the faith community, Turkish Muslim organ-
izations in the Netherlands compete in a marketplace of religious
institutions where they must leverage both the civic participation of the
community as well as government support to come out on top. They
navigate the political terrain and engage their communities in a way that
is largely transparent, public, and pro-integration. By allowing dual
citizenship and accommodating participation on the political stage, the
Dutch program has produced a Muslim discourse on integration that is
more participatory and cooperative. These Muslim groups, left to define
their goals and participation in society, have formed into political-centrist
organizations to take the most advantage of the democratic system. To
build relationships between individual Muslim groups and political
parties, such organizations have necessarily adopted a more inclusive
Islamic message.
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An alternative picture can be drawn from Germany, which also
has a long-established Turkish Muslim population. While many of the
same Turkish Muslim organizations exist in Germany, the state has adop-
ted a very different approach to Muslim institution building—one that
has been much less proactive in comparison to the broadly multi-cul-
turalist approach of the Dutch. The government’s hesitation in support-
ing these organizations in Germany in part reflects the Turkish state’s
involvement with the expatriate institutions. Many imām posts in Ger-
man mosques are temporary positions filled by preachers trained and
assigned by Diyanet, the Turkish ministry of religion. The centrally pro-
duced and disseminated Friday sermons (hutbe) of the visiting imāms, as
well as the apparent ambivalence ofDiyanet towards the integration of
Turkish Muslims into European society, has spurred a deep current of
suspicion between the German state and the Diyanet-associated mosques
and organizations.
At other times, the German state has taken steps to incorporate
Muslim organizations into the political process, for instance through
the annual Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference) ini-
tiated by former Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble in 2006. The
goal of the conference was to bring together German politicians and
representatives of the Muslim community in Germany to discussion
matters of integration and accommodation. Yet the state’s interest in
the forum languished amid complaints that the conference had failed
to produce a reasonably representative voice for Germany’s diverse Mus-
lim population. In addition to demanding clearer accountability and
consensus, the state also expressed concerns over the inclusion ofMuslim
groups that it had labeled as Islamist, including the same organization—
Milli Görüş—which had made long strides in integration and institu-
tionalization in the neighboring Netherlands. Eventually, the state moved
to block the participation ofMilli Görüş and others in the Islam Confer-
ence, which in turn frustrated other participating organizations and
undermined the promising potential of the conference. By 2009, Schäuble
had declared that “multiculturalism is not a solution” to integration in
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Germany.37
The process of institutionalization is an important counterbalance
to the claims of charismatic movements like the Islamic State. For Weber,
although charisma breaks down the rules and order of society, it is also
the origin of social institutions—the concretion of creative social visions
first articulated in the charismatic annihilation ofprevious social orders.
For charisma to survive the death of the charismatic founder, it must
institutionalize into permanent organizations and structures, which then
mediate and delimit the original charismatic vision. Yet the institution-
alization of charisma never does away with the generative openness that
lies at its core. Rather, as Eisenstadt has highlighted, there is a constant
interplay between the “charismatic potentialities” of a social vision and
the more organizational forms and processes that regulate and maintain
it.38 Charisma remains an important feature of the institution that lends
it authority, while paradoxically allowing for change and transformation
from within.
Despite the paranoia that often surrounds Muslim spaces in the
West—frequently conceptualized as backwards, conservative, and dang-
erous in Western media—native Islamic institutions provide the most
grounded challenge to the Islamic State’s charismatic claims.39 Not only
do local Islamic institutions furnish Western Muslims with an alternative
model of religious integration and habitation that can compete with the
narratives of the Islamic State, but more importantly, they provide a
space for participation and social engagement that more directly serves
Western Muslims’ need for social stability, cohesiveness, and community
boundaries. Institutions provide access to resources and opportunities
for their members that can be leveraged for advantage and gain. The
nature of these advantages is determined in part by countless historical
influences that shape the structurization of the charismatic institution.
On the one hand, as the charismatic authority finds institutionalized,
routinized expression, it must relocate itselfwithin the existing society.
On the other hand, in addition to these historical factors, the positive
opportunities of the institution are also shaped by the original creative
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ethos—the creative vision of authority and society as it emerged from
the pure potential of charismatic authority.40
In all this, we must be careful not to read Islamic State claims with
a naive understanding of the category of religion. It would be a mistake
to dismiss the claims of the Islamic State as merely a thin pretense for
political and material gain. One has to look no further than Weber’s for-
mative study of the emergence of capitalism in Northern Europe under
the influence of Calvinist ethical and soteriological doctrine to under-
stand that formal distinctions between religious and economic activity
are not always possible.41 At the same time, the recent Atlantic article
“What ISIS Really Wants” or the New York Times article “ISIS Enshrines
a Theology ofRape” run the risk of reducing the vast corpus of Islamic
legal and exegetical texts to a selectively distorted formulation of “what
Islam has to say about the matter,” whether that matter is war, rape, or
emigration.42 Any such formulation would necessarily decontextualize
positive statements by historical interpreters, while simultaneously
ignoring the prolific literature that complicates or contradicts those
statements. More importantly, as Kecia Ali has noted, such an approach
turns a blind eye to the historical, social, and political realities of vio-
lence, and the interstitial spaces that breach and connect them.43 Without
carefully attending to the different ways in which violent actions and
rhetoric emerge, including the social contexts within which violence is
articulated or enacted, we jeopardize our opportunity to better under-
stand it, as well as other forms ofviolence that were previously treated
as sui generis.
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